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ors, University of Michigan; B.A., with Distinction, DePauw University. Inspiration for
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(M.C.S., Boston University; B.A., West Virginia State University), who instilled in me
and many others appreciation and understanding of Negro, Colored, Black, and Afro-
American history. She received her degrees in the 1940s, when women, much less black
women, were not encouraged by society to further their education. Others who inspired
were my grandfather, Colmore Duncan, who, since American Negroes could not fight in
World War I under the American flag for the cause of freedom and world peace, fought
under the French flag and received two Croix de Guerre; my father, John C. Duncan, Sr.,
who rose in the United States Army from private to major through World War II, Korea
(Bronze Star), to just before Vietnam, living through the segregated Army, Truman's
Executive Order, and the newly integrated Army. My brother, A. Milano Duncan, and
my sister, lo-Aurelia H. Duncan, also provided sources of experience for this Article.
Other distinguished persons years ahead of their time who significantly inspired were my
beloved grandmother, Bessie L. Jackson, my wife's father, Walter T. Lunsford, my
wife's mother, Sally M. Lunsford, and my wife's grandmother, Elizabeth M. Lunsford,
all of whom were pioneers in the cause of equal rights and justice. My wife, Elizabeth D.
Lunsford Duncan (J.D., Howard University School of Law; B.A., Fisk University), who
has served as Majority Counsel and General Counsel for two committees of the United
States Congress, provided not only encouragement but also valuable insights and re-
search assistance. Utmost appreciation is due to research assistants B. Justin Jack, Jim
Oldner, and Michelle Payne, but especially due to Matthew Cordon, who provided ex-
ceptional research assistance and proofreading. The author has taught a variety of sub-
jects domestically and internationally. His anthropological linguistics and legal back-
ground, personal experiences, along with the many people who have influenced him,
provided the guidance and inspiration for the theme of this Article. The experiences,
people, and teachings cover over one hundred years, including the cases of Plessy,
Brown, Bakke, and Hopwood. Does the "American Dilemma" of color blind us to make
us go around in circles?
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INTRODUCTION
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race
in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.
So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if
it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to
the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view
of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect to civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer
of the most powerful. The law regards man as man,
and takes no account of his surroundings or of his
color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the su-
preme law of the land are involved.'
Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent to the "ridiculous and
shameful," 2 "racist and repressive," 3 and "catastroph[ic] ' ' 4 majority
opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson created, in one sense, the "most
powerful maxim in American law, ' '5 but the result in 1896 could
have been anything but true.6 It stood for 58 years until the "sec-
ond [e]mancipation" 7 of African Americans in Brown v. Board of
1 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
2 See Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? 145 (1994).
3 See Judith A. Baer, Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth
Amendment 112 (1983).
4 See Paul Oberst, The Strange Career of Plessy v. Ferguson, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 389,
417 (1973).
5 John Minor Wisdom, Plessy v. Ferguson-100 Years Later, 53 Wash & Lee L. Rev.
9, 10 (1996) (noting that counsel to Plessy supplied Justice John Marshall Harlan with
the phrase "Our Constitution is color-blind"). See also infra notes 266-76 and accompa-
nying text.
6 But see Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 Vand. L.
Rev. 881, 895 (1998) ("The Court's decision [in Plessy] was, indeed, so fully congruent
with the dominant racial norms of the period that it elicited little more than a collective
yawn of indifference from the nation."); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice:
The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow,
82 Colum. L. Rev. 444,459 (1982).
7 Roger Wilkins, Dream Deferred but Not Defeated, in Brown v. Board of Education:
The Challenge for Today's Schools 14, 15 (Ellen Condliffe Lagemann & Lamar P.
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Education [Brown 1].8 The maxim "Our Constitution is Color-
blind" has since transformed from a protective assertion against
racial discrimination of minorities into a weapon used to combat
affirmative action programs which seek to remedy past discrimina-
tion and assure equal opportunity in government action. 9 This
transformation has culminated in an announced "victory" of sorts
for "defenders" of the newly-understood colorblind' ° Constitution,
with the Supreme Court and various federal Courts of Appeals
striking down affirmative action as unconstitutional." The word
"colorblind" in the law has become an apothegm of sorts. Just as
"apothegm" can be defined as a short, pithy or terse, pointed say-
ing, 12 the term "colorblind" is a short instructive term derived from
past legal writings such as Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy. To be
colorblind in the law is to not recognize the differences of race, or
to not be influenced by considerations of race. 13 As Justice Harlan
Miller eds., 1996) ("Brown proved to be a second Emancipation Day.").
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9 This Article presupposes that affirmative action has some social benefits, but does
not undertake to defend wide-spread affirmative action programs, nor does it take the
position that those programs should be attacked. Instead, this Article discusses the use of
the maxim "Our Constitution is Color-Blind" in efforts both to attack racial discrimina-
tion in government action, and as an attack on affirmative action. The Oxford Companion
to the Supreme Court defines affirmative action as
a term of general application referring to government policies that di-
rectly or indirectly award jobs, admission to universities and profes-
sional schools, and other social goods and resources to individuals
based on the membership in designated protected groups, in order to
compensate those groups for past discrimination caused by society as
a whole.
The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 18 (Kermit L. Hall et
al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Oxford Companion].
10 See Webster's New World Dictionary 281 (1984).
11 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pcna, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995) (striking down
federal government's requirement that general contractors give preference to subcontrac-
tors controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals"); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down state's use of a set-
aside program, where state required minority subcontractors to comprise a fixed percent-
age of contracts for city projects); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (striking down University of Texas Law School's affirmative
action program in admissions). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinions in Croson and
Adarand have been praised for "her adherence to the concept of a colorblind Constitu-
tion." See, e.g., Jennifer R. Bryne, Toward a Colorblind Constitution: Justice O'Connor's
Narrowing of Affirmative Action, 42 St. Louis U. L.J. 619 (1998).
12 See Webster's New World Dictionary, supra note 10, at 65.
13 See id. at 281. See also Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 220 (1979).
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would most likely agree, an early interpretation of colorblind was
"free from racial prejudice."'14 Yet the use of colorblind has now
come to mean, especially to many black Americans, first and
foremost, a non-recognition of the historical effects of racial dis-
crimination and all that remains of that legacy. Recently, the apo-
thegm "colorblind" has changed its semantic DNA code from
positive to negative to those for which the application of the term
"colorblind" applies.
Forgotten, at least in terms of precepts and rhetoric, was the
context in which Harlan expatiated his dissent in 1896. Most
pressing is the first sentence of the paragraph which leads to the
conclusion that the Constitution is indeed "colorblind:" "The white
race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country." 5 To a
casual observer today, this statement is perhaps inane. Modem
government action does not expressly reflect the concept that ma-
jority class is the dominant class. This much may be true. 16 Yet
this model must incorporate with it an ideal that society it-
self-including the preferences attached by majority and minority
classes identified on a social level-seeks to be colorblind. The as-
sumption that the Constitution is colorblind relies not on the con-
cept of "colorblind" to eliminate all racial consciousness, 1 7 but the
concept of "colorblind" as a vehicle to end race-based oppres-
sion: 18
14 Webster's New World Dictionary, supra note 10, at 65.
15 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16 The statement that majority class preference does not indicate blatant discrimination
in favor of one race and disfavor of a minority race is true, for it is clearly unconstitu-
tional. Nevertheless, majority class preference arguably does not result in colorblindness,
as members of that majority hold as a truism. As discussed in Part I, Section B, infra, cri-
teria seemingly "objective" to values attached by the majority indicate to the majority
that those criteria are indeed blind of the class. But if different values are attached to
those "objective' criteria by the minority class, the preferences of the minority and the
majority stand as opposites. Government action which tends to reflect--rather than react
to-a majority preference which is not equivalent to the minority preference is the basis
for the argument that use of the concept of "colorblind," with respect to discrimination
against a minority, is not the equivalent as the concept of "colorblind" when it is used
with respect to reaction by government to incorporate minority preferences into the
dominant majority preferences.
17 See, e.g., Bryne, supra note 11, at 652 (stating that Justice O'Connor "maintains that
the Constitution is colorblind, not society," and accordingly, "the Constitution requires a
colorblind application").
18 See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of
320
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One of the myths we tell children and law students
is that the law is or can be colorblind. This myth
posits colorblindness, or inattention to race, as a
moral requirement of all "right" thinking people
and all good law. The truth, however, is that racial
justice and colorblindness are not the same thing.
Race-neutral policies are only as good or bad as the
results they produce. No one thinks that economic
efficiency or the labor theory of value are moral re-
quirements independent of their impact on the
components of justice. In like manner, to assume
that ignoring race in making social policy will bring
about justice or achieve morality is legal fantasy. 19
Modem "colorblind jurisprudence" dictates that race-
consciousness and colorblindness must serve as competing slogans
of government action and equality. 20 Advocates against affirma-
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 162,
171 (1994) ("The genuine moral goal associated with race is to end race-based oppres-
sion. Colorblindness may sometimes accomplish this moral goal, but it is not the goal
itself. Therefore, the colorblind principle in modem constitutional discourse must be seen
as a policy argument and not a moral precept.").
19 Id. at 162-63 (citing Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (2d ed. 1983)).
20 See Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory, 7 S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 491, 561 (1998)
("The competing slogans of equality ('color-blind' treatment of all
citizens in all respects) and fairness ('leveling the playing field' for
historically disadvantage [sic] groups) are deployed in rhetorical ex-
changes that can produce rhetorical knowledge. It is obvious that
these slogans are wielded for a variety of strategic, even bad faith,
reasons in some instances, but even the worst abuse of rhetorical
practices proves the case for rhetorical knowledge. Those seeking to
segregate and denigrate disadvantaged minorities could use the
physical coercion of an apartheid regime to secure their goal, just as
those seeking to mitigate the economic power of the majority could
incite a violent revolution in furtherance of their aims. However, the
debate about affirmative action continues, even if suboptimally, by
traversing the many discourses within society in order to align points
of shared agreement into new constellations of meaning. These shifts
in meaning represent modifications of arguments designed to secure
the adherence of the body politic which prove to be enlightening (or
not) only in the continued discourse about affirmative action. The re-
ality of rhetorical knowledge is proved not because the participants
have found the 'answer' to the question posed, but because they con-
tinue to develop the public discussion of affirmative action along
new lines of argumentation. The ongoing struggle to come to terms
322 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 7:3
tive action would not recognize co-existence, wherein the goal of
colorblindness on a societal level may not be achieved without
first utilizing race-consciousness in order to prepare society--that
is, react to and influence majority class preferences-for the ulti-
mate ideal of a "colorblind society." This necessarily means that
society, at present, is not colorblind, and protection of a "color-
blind" Constitution seeks to make insignificant the fact that white
racism caused blackness to become a relevant category not only in
history but also in present society.21 It may also be said that al-
though the Constitution attaches rights only to individuals, 22 the
institution of judicial review itself attaches and establishes rights
of a class through a means of determination of the constitutionality
of government action intended to benefit or burden that group.23
Through this process, the judiciary determines individual
rights---or on another plane, the legitimacy of legislative action to
grant governmental benefits or burdens to that class--only through
the determination of that class status. Thus, the search for a "com-
pelling government interest" 24 to determine the legitimacy of a
with affirmative action does not disprove the ability to have knowl-
edge of such matters, but rather it reaffirms that such knowledge
holds only for discrete historical situations and is tested constantly
and revised as these situations evolve.").
21 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
1060, 1087 (1991)
("[R]ecognizing race validates the lives and experiences of those
who have been burdened because of their race. White racism has
made 'blackness' a relevant category in our society. Yet colorblind-
ness seeks to deny the continued social significance of the category,
to tell blacks that they are not different from whites, even though
blacks as blacks are persistently made to feel that difference.").
22 By the terms of the 14th Amendment, "no state shall... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court has embraced and firmly established that the "rights created
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the in-
dividual." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
23 The concept that the constitutionality of a government action hinges on the appro-
priate allocation of government burdens and benefits relates primarily to an economic
view of the law. For discussion of an economic view of the law as it relates to the Equal
Protection Clause, see infra notes 36, 228 and accompanying text.
24 This refers obviously to the strict scrutiny requirement that a legislative classifica-
tion is justified only if it is a narrowly tailored measure intended to further a compelling
government interest. In terms of colorblindness, this Article regards many of the judi-
cially-created paradigms as mere rhetoric and explains how the theory of colorblindness
may support minorities in modern jurisprudence as it did in past jurisprudence.
Colorblind I/Colorblind II
legislative action which confers a benefit on a minority is a class
determination, and one that may be deemed a race-conscious de-
termination.
Part I of this Article discusses the ideal of the colorblind soci-
ety, and the implications that majority and minority public values
and preferences have to prevent society from being truly "color-
blind." Part II discusses what this Article deems as Colorblind I,
which begins with the enactment of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments and ends generally with the Court's decision in Brown L
Part II also discusses the concept of Colorblind II, which essen-
tially begins with the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown I. Fi-
nally, this Part discusses how the evolution of affirmative action
programs led to opposition based on principles anti-affirmative ac-
tion advocates deem inequitable, based on correlations in reason-
ing from the advocates of the original meaning of colorblind. Part
III, in a reflective discussion of a particularly American racial di-
lemma, places each colorblind argument in perspective, and seeks
to illustrate that the concept of colorblindness could be an ideal,
but has rather become meaningless rhetoric in an endless racial
struggle that has defined this country. Throughout the text, there
are anecdotal comments that serve not only to support understand-
ing of the text of the Article, but to portray the human realities of
the very subject matter under discussion. 25 Part IV serves as a
summary of the Article highlighting the common feeling that the
legal rules reflecting society's attitude on racism have changed
again.
Gunnar Myrdal, in his 1944 two-volume tome was right. There
is An American Dilemma.26 This Article goes further by pointing
out that racism and the apothegm "colorblind" is an American
"Legal" Dilemma too. Part V brings the reader full-circle to the
semantic apothegmatic permutation of "colorblind" and asks if we
25 Often, personal experiences or happenings relay messages in humorous, or at least,
more concrete language than narrative text, therefore I have chosen to include such anec-
dotal comments throughout the Article. These stories stem primarily from personal ex-
periences of the author but are hardly assumed to be peculiar to the author. See infra
notes 263, 576.
26 For further explanation and discussion concerning Gunnar Myrdal, An American
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944), see infra notes 235-36
and accompanying text and note 484.
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are telling white lies when we ignore racism. In short, this conclu-
sion extends the metaphor "black ice" to describe the persistent,
invisible yet highly charged danger of racism and its continuing
effects on American society.
I. A LEGAL, PHILOSOPImCAL, AND ANALYTICAL LOOK AT
RACISM--THE FOUNDATION FOR COLORBLIND
Professor John A. Powell recognizes that the position of mod-
em colorblind assertions by the new right is both conceptual and
pragmatic:27
The conceptual position claims that because race
does not have a substantial scientific basis, it is not
only an illusion but a problematic illusion. This as-
sertion is based on the assumption that that which
cannot be grounded on an objective scientific foun-
dation is not real. This claim, however, suffers from
a serious conceptual flaw. While the claim that race
is an illusion draws on the work of late- and
post-modernists-particularly the work of [Mi-
chael] Omi and [Howard] Winant, which purports
that race is socially constructed-the conclusion
that race is not real does not comport with the
deeper implication of this insight. Omi and Winant,
for example, do not support the position that race
can or simply should be dropped. Omi, citing the
Journal of Black Higher Education with approval,
notes that while race may not be a scientific reality,
it is a social fact.28
27 See John A. Powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Re-
considered, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 789, 791 (1997).
28 Id. at 791 (citing, inter alia, Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Di-
lemmas of Classification, 15 Law & Ineq. 7, 14-21 (1997)). Professor Powell also notes
that
those who would abandon race because the biological or genetic
foundation for race proves to be inadequate, fail to engage seriously
other possible ways of understanding race. Even the position that
race is socially constructed instead of biologically based underesti-
mates the force of the post-modernist claim that everything is so-
cially constructed. Not only are race and the self socially constructed,
but biology and science are as well. This does not mean that all
324
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The second colorblind position is pragmatic and po-
litical. This position errs in assuming that the major
race problem in our society is race itself, rather than
racism. Many of the proponents of moving to a
raceless, colorblind society argue that the categories
of race are both irrelevant and politically and ra-
cially divisive. Many have appropriated the lan-
guage of Dr. King and the civil rights movement to
give force to the call for colorblindness.
29
The language used by the new right of a raceless,
colorblind society is viewed by some not simply as
an error, but as a strategy or racial project to main-
tain white supremacy and racial hierarchy. Whether
it is intentional or an error, powerful evidence sug-
gests that the colorblind, race-aversive language
adopted by the new right has the effect of shoring
up racial hierarchy, while masking both the subor-
dination of the racial minority and the enjoyment of
white privilege. Indeed, in many respects the focus
on race or racelessness not only masks racism but
also actively supports it.30
The institution of racism proves problematic not only with re-
spect to claims made by promoters of the new-right colorblind-
ness, but also for political theorists as well. 31 This is not limited to
those claims involving the Constitution. For example, theories
such as pluralism, civic republicanism, and synoptism--each a
model, among others, of administrative law--have failed to com-
claims are either arbitrary or illusory, but that the way we think of
reality as being simply represented by our senses, instead of interac-
tive with our senses and language, is illusionary.
Id. at 792 (footnote omitted).
29 Id. at 793 (footnote omitted). Powell notes that the anti-affirmative action groups
used Dr. King's colorblind language in support of their own position. Powell also notes
that the King family expressed dismay over the use of this language to support the anti-
affirmative action cause. See id. at 793 n. 21.
30 Id. at 793 (footnotes omitted).
31 See Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Commu-
nity, 80 Geo. L.J. 1835, 1836 (1992). Professor Feldman finds that racism causes a fail-
ing among political theorists because "modem racism denies its own existence by insist-
ing that we already have achieved social equality and justice," and "it threatens to shatter
the premises of both pluralism and civic republicanism." Id. at 1837.
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bat racism in the distribution of government burdens caused by the
impact of environmental regulation. 32 With respect to the Constitu-
tion, problems associated with race and racism become com-
pounded, particularly because of the applicability of assuring
rights to each individual. The social aspects of race create an un-
fortunate system of group identification, where race itself, to a
large extent, determines what group with which an individual will
identify based on common personal values. When the aggregate of
personal values of one group are at odds with the aggregate per-
sonal values of the other, political theorists insist that their formu-
las for determining a reasoned and rational medium are most ap-
plicable to provide a solution in the form of government action.33
Race proves problematic within these theories because race-in
this society--necessarily causes a difference in personal values,
rather than causing a rational difference in personal values.34 But
where race does not fit comfortably within these theories, racism
"looms ... ominously" over the theories so as to intimidate the
theorists. 35 Whereas Professor Stephen Feldman concentrates upon
32 See generally, e.g., Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Participation
and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3 (1998) (finding that environmental jus-
tice preferences fail in the aggregate mix of preferences under "expertise-ism" (synop-
tism), pluralism, or civic republicanism).
33 See Feldman, supra note 31, at 1835-36. According to John Rawls,
[L]ong historical experience suggests, and many plausible reflections
confirm, that... reasoned and uncoerced agreement is not to be ex-
pected .... Our individual and associative points of view, intellec-
tual affinities and affective attachments, are too diverse, especially in
a free democratic society, to allow of lasting and reasoned agree-
ment. Many conceptions of the world can plausibly be constructed
from different standpoints. Diversity naturally arises from our lim-
ited powers and distinct perspectives; it is unrealistic to suppose that
all our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or
else in the rivalries that result from scarcity. [The appropriate view of
social organization] takes deep and unresolvable differences on mat-
ters of fundamental significance as a permanent condition of human
life.
John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. Phil. 515, 542 (1980).
34 In practical terms, it perhaps does not matter whether differences caused by race are
rational differences or differences necessarily caused by society, particularly because the
differences in values in this context are personal values. It becomes more problematic
when those differences in personal values become irrational class preferences, and those
irrational class preferences find their way into legislation.
35 Feldman, supra note 31, at 1837. Professor Feldman argues that racism threatens to
shatter the premises of both pluralism and civic republicanism. See id.
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pluralism and civic republicanism, racism may also loom, albeit
perhaps not ominously, over the economic theory as well.36
A. State Action, The Problem of Selectivity, and Racism
37
1. Individual and Social Injustice in Government Selectivity
On a definitional level, affirmative action does not bode well
with the prohibitive structure that is found in most of the amend-
ments to the Constitution,38 particularly those clauses that prohibit
forms of state action via the Equal Protection, Due Process, and
Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.39 It is quite clear that affirmative action "awards" groups
36 Judge Richard A. Posner contended in 1974 that
the proper constitutional principle is not, no "invidious" racial or
ethnic discrimination, but no use of racial or ethnic criteria to deter-
mine the distribution of government benefits and burdens. An appro-
priate question about this principle is whether racial laws premised
on what might be termed the "explosive mixture" rationale are within
its scope.
Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment
of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 25. See also Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny
and Social Change: An Economic Inquiry Into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifi-
cations, 80 Geo. L.J. 1787, 1812-21 (1992).
37 Much of this Article concentrates on government selection processes, such as those
involved in granting contracts, or the selection of students for positions at universities
and other institutions. Affirmative action extends beyond these processes of selectivity.
Processes such as racial gerrymandering and forced integration must also be viewed as
affirmative action programs, if affirmative action as a concept requires government to
achieve positive gains through law, rather than merely relying on prohibitive law to
achieve a desired result. Several of the cases discussed in this Article will involve the
latter government processes, but the Article itself will concentrate on the process of se-
lectivity.
38 Eight of the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights are prohibitive of government ac-
tion. See U.S. Const. amend. I-X. Only the Sixth Amendment (granting the right to a
speedy and fair trial by an impartial jury, etc), and the 10th Amendment (reserving pow-
ers to the States where these rights are not delegated to the United States or prohibited by
it to the States) afford rights. See U.S. Const. amend. VI and X.
39 The first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants citizenship rights to all per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States or in the jurisdictions of the United States.
See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The remainder of that section is prohibitive. Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5.
Congress enacted the first civil rights legislation during the first Reconstruction period,
but much of this legislation was struck down later because the Supreme Court deter-
mined that section 5 authorized only federal legislation prohibiting states from denying
equal protection, rather than federal legislation granting positive rights. See The Civil
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based on race, thus benefiting members of minority groups based
on membership alone.40 It is from this standard that affirmative ac-
tion is considered "antithetical to the principle of equal protection
of the laws that is the basis of equality of opportunity."'41 Yet, if
the alternative is a process of selectivity that solely benefits one
race-namely the "white" race42-and completely (or nearly com-
pletely) excludes a minority race,43 whether the theory is process-
based or result-based cannot seem to matter.44 Irrespective of the
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-12, 23 (1883).
40 See The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 18-19
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Oxford Companion]. Even this publication
defines affirmative action in a light at odds with the Equal Protection Clause:
Affirmative Action is a term of general application.., that directly
or indirectly awards jobs, admission to universities and professional
schools, and other social goods and resources to individuals on the
basis of membership in designated protected groups, in order to
compensate those groups for past discrimination caused by society as
a whole. For political as well as prudential reasons reflecting racial
sensitivities, public justification of affirmative action has tended to
describe it as a logical extension of equality of opportunity for indi-
viduals. In fact, affirmative action embodies ideas that are philoso-
phically antithetical to the principle of equal protection of the laws
that is the basis of equality of opportunity.
Id.
41 Id. at 19. The Oxford Companion also notes that
[a]ffirmative action focuses on the results of procedures used by pub-
lic and private organizations measured with respect to racial balance,
rather than on the existence of procedures that assure equal treatment
of individuals irrespective of race, ethnicity, or sex. It can therefore
be described as a civil rights policy premised on the concept of group
rather than individual rights, which seeks equality of result rather
than equality of opportunity.
Id.
42 "White" race here refers to the "monolith" or "macro-culture" that is the dominant
culture of society; that is, the "white race," even if that race is made up of smaller micro-
cultures found within that macro-culture. See James A. Banks, Multi-Ethnic Education
74-75 (1988); James A. Banks, Teaching Strategies for Ethnic Studies 3-8 (1984).
43 "Minority race" in this Article concentrates on those of African decent, although the
themes in this Article certainly are not inapplicable to the Asian-American, Hispanic-
American, Native American, or any other minority culture.
44 See Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equity 13, 57 (1996).
According to Professor Koppelman,
[m]any and perhaps most Americans readily endorse the following
propositions. (1) Part of what defines a free society is that it is none
of the government's business what citizens believe and that the shap-
ing of citizen's beliefs is not a legitimate task of a liberal state. (2)
Racism, sexism, and similar ideologies are so evil and destructive of
the proper workings of a free society that the state should do what-
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ultimate outcome, opponents of affirmative action urge that the
Constitution demands even a process-based theory of selectivity-
one they deem "colorblind"-which effectively eliminates minori-
ties, as opposed to a result-based affirmative action program.
45
Much of the problem stems from the Equal Protection Clause
itself. Commentators have observed that "no content can be found
in the Equal Protection Clause without the aid of some kind of in-
terpretive theory:"'46
The words-no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws"-do not state an intelligible rule of decision.
In that sense the text has no meaning. The Clause
contains the word "equal" and thereby gives consti-
tutional status to the ideal of equality, but that ideal
is capable of a wide range of meanings. The ambi-
guity has created a need for a mediating principle. 4
7
One solution for the ambiguity that is the Equal Protection Clause
has been the recognition that the rights protected under the clause
are afforded to the individual. 48 Thus, the concept of "equality" or
"equal protection" necessarily relates, it would seem, to individual
injustice, rather than group injustice. 49 A state's action of selectiv-
ever it can to eradicate them.
Id. at 1. Professor Koppelman discusses process-based and result-based anti-
discrimination legislation and how it relates and furthers the goal of social equality. See
id.
45 If one could consider the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), as a "victory" for the colorblind Constitu-
tion, it must be questioned as well whether the Constitution must remain so blind that
only four black law students out of a total of 468 total students entered the 1997 Fall
class at the University of Texas Law School. See Associated Press, Minority Enrollment
at UT Law School Is Up, Figures Show, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 28, 1998 (noting
that eight black law students entered U.T. Law School in 1998, out of a class roughly the
same size as in 1997).
46 Koppelman, supra note 44, at 14 (commenting on an observation by Owen Fiss).
47 Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in Equality and Preferential
Treatment 84, 85 (Marshall Cowen et al. eds., 1977).
48 See supra note 22 (noting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
49 See Thomas W. Simon, Democracy and Social Injustice 29-30 (1995). Simon be-
gins "an approach to injustice" by differentiating between an instance of individual injus-
tice and that of a social, or group, injustice. "An instance of individual injustice involves
harm to an individual. A person gets beaten for no appararent reason. Now add the social
dimension: a person gets beaten because of her race." Id. at 29. Professor Simon ques-
2000]
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 7:3
ity, as "law," places the individuals subject to the selection process
in the so-called spotlight of the distinction between social and in-
dividual injustice. Consider, for example, the affirmative action
program questioned in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,50 where 16 of 100 positions for admission into the Univer-
sity of California, Davis School of Medicine were reserved for mi-
norities. If one assumes that the university selected 84 white stu-
dents for the positions not reserved for minorities, the result-based
system seemingly leads to no social injustice, if social injustice
can be defined as "an infliction of social harm upon relatively
powerless individuals because of their negative group identity."
'51
By reserving the seats for the group considered "relatively power-
less" due to "negative group identity," there is clearly some inflic-
tion of social harm to the non-minority. The problem arises be-
cause a non-minority who was not included in the 84 positions
unrestricted by a group preference, was not considered for the re-
served seats. To that person, the system of selection was inherently
unjust, since the state inflicted harm upon him for the benefit of a
person identified with another group. That system of selection
therefore could not be considered "colorblind" because individual
injustice occurred based on the group identity of the person or per-
sons selected.
If the Equal Protection Clause protects such individual injus-
tice-and furthers the majority's cause for "colorblindness" in the
selection process-then the question must be what state action is
appropriate when each of the 100 positions are occupied by mem-
bers of the majority group. 52 An objective view may not reveal
anything inherently unjust about the selection process. Factors
considered as criteria may have been seemingly equal. But this
process-based system resulted in complete exclusion of one group.
tions whether the social dimension has added anything to the description of individual
injustice; whether "calling the injustice a social injustice" serves as a means to implicate
groups; or whether "social injustice says something about the underlying structure of so-
ciety." Id.
50 438 U.S. 265, 265-66 (1978).
51 Simon, supra note 49, at 30. Professor Simon used this concept as a thesis for analy-
sis.
52 This statement does not even reflect the problems of a selection process which ei-
ther does or does not consider groups based on gender, religion, or other characteristics
of group identity.
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The question, then, is whether this process-based system led to, or
at least contributed to, social injustice. For an answer, one may
consider Professor Thomas Simon's definition, and each of the
factors within it. First, was there an "infliction?" 53 Second, was
there social harm? 54 Third, were the individuals "powerless?
55
Fourth, was this process due to a negative group identity?
56
53 Professor Simon ponders,
Does [use of the word infliction] mean that someone must do the in-
flicting for there to be a social injustice? If so, does the infliction by
someone have to be intentional? [As he develops in the analysis,]
human agency, intentional or unintentional, holds a key to under-
standing social injustice. Interpreting social injustice in terms of hu-
man agency brings many cases that look like natural disasters and
natural diseases under the heading of social injustice.
Simon, supra note 49, at 30.
54 See id. at 30-31
("Individual harms make sense intuitively; group harms might not.
Those who question the existence of group harm often assume that
they have a clear understanding of individual harm when it is the
idea of individual harm that poses difficulties. The problem with
group harm lies in how to conceive of individual harm. Too often we
think of harms as individual responses that can be isolated from con-
text-historical, social, and political. A more realistic look at indi-
vidual harm will show how physical pain and psychological suffer-
ing involve social components. Besides playing a role within the
physical and psychological levels, social suffering has its own inde-
pendent functions. Social suffering involves the lowering of the
threshold of vulnerability at the physical and psychological levels,
and it constitutes an experience of suffering in its own right.").
55 Id. at 31
("Interpretations of social injustice will continue to mislead if they
focus on lack of power. The response to social harms involves more
than the lack of power of individual victims; it also involves the
powerlessness of a social group .... [Just as there exist] difficulties
with defining injustice as the absence of justice, so we shall see that
powerlessness is not simply the absence of power. Powerlessness has
its own dynamic. Recognizing powerlessness helps to reorient reme-
dies for social injustice. The remedies not only must address the im-
balance of political power but also must deal with the experiential
base of powerlessness.").
56 See id.
("[S]ocial injustice occurs when an action is done owing to an indi-
vidual's negative group identity. With this type of wrong, the injus-
tice lies not only in the harm inflicted but also in the unjustified role
the classification of an individual as a member of a group plays. The
injustice begins earlier than the overt action. It starts with the nega-
tive gathering of individuals into certain groups. The negative group
identity sets the conditions under which the members of the involun-
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Under this approach, if the lack of an affirmative action pro-
gram results in a nonsymmetrical racial balance, even taking into
consideration the majority-minority ratio among the applicants and
the particular community involved, one must question whether
there was an infliction of a harm. Professor Simon concentrates on
the fact that often society forgets that it is someone that inflicts the
harm, and rather concentrates on the fact that something was the
cause of harm.57 Social consciousness with respect to a govern-
ment selection process would not likely suffer from this phenome-
non. This does not suggest that the phenomenon would not occur
where the blame for the imbalance is placed solely on "govern-
ment," without respect to a human causal agent behind the gov-
ernment action. 58 In determining the appropriate selection process,
where race is not considered a factor, the "system" probably relied
upon the knowledge of those more suited to make a determination
of criteria for making the selection. In the case of a medical
school, the decision was obviously made by a board of regents or
similar body. These human agents base their selection on criteria
known in that field as the best means of making a determination of
those most qualified. Should the persons selected all be of one
group (namely, all selected students are white), reflection of ine-
quality on the excluded race is attributed to those human agents
who determined the criteria for selection.59
Even if it can be assumed that the result of having 100 white
medical students fill 100 positions is unjust, this does not answer
the question of whether the infliction was intentional or motivated
by a discriminatory purpose. 60 With respect to a process of selec-
tary group might be harmed.").
57 See id. at 33. Professor Simon discusses three instances where society "often for-
get[s] that someone does the inflicting." Id. Simon identifies three instances where the
inflictor is not attributed to a human, but rather to external factors: first, in cases where
the infliction is attributed to natural disasters; second, where pain and suffering is attrib-
uted to natural causes; and third, where society "pins" responsibility on the system. Id.
58 See id. at 36 ("The spotlight never reveals a single human causal agent behind an
e&isode. Injustices occur even without any readily available human agency".).5  Professor Simon proposes the use of the term "sociopolitical cause" to distinguish
"those cases in which a causal link can be made to social and political institutional struc-
tures and rules, which, in turn, have human agency components." Id. at 37. The selection
process here most likely is one of those socio-political causes.
O "Intentional," as used here, should not be inferred to sound in tort. Rather, the in-
tentional infliction of social harm relates to the Supreme Court's requirement of im-
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tion such as entrance into a medical school, there most likely does
not exist a discriminatory purpose, and the government most likely
has a legitimate government interest in determining its criteria for
making the selection. 61 On another plane, however, it does reflect
an attempt to render judgment of natural assets62 reflected more
favorably in this instance by one group and reflected as lacking in
another. It is not a secret either in society or in science that black
Americans score lower on standardized tests and intelligent quo-
tient tests than white Americans.63 With this fact 64 in mind, the
judgment of natural assets in a selection process through a means
known to be more favorable to one group than the other does lead,
at least, to an implication that the selection process inflicts the dis-
favored group with harm due to reliance on those means of selec-
tion.65 Perhaps better means do not exist to make the selection, but
the implication that these means (in this case, the standardized
tests) reflect that the minorities have less intelligence and are less
suited for selection because of this reflection does tend to show
that some degree of infliction of social harm has occurred.
66
proper motivation of a racial purpose as a basis for using strict scrutiny to evaluate a non-
race-specific classification. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("[A]n
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than an-
other.").
61 John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 611 (5th ed. 1995). Non-
race-specific classifications that lack motivation of a racial purpose are subject to rational
basis review, which will most likely uphold the classification.
62 The concept of "natural assets" stems from John Rawls' theory of justice which nul-
lifies the "accidents of natural endowment ... as counters in quest for political and eco-
nomic advantage." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 15 (1971).
63 The concept of natural assets and colorblindness is explored in more detail in infra
notes 67-70, 100-105 and accompanying text. A well-known study on "Intelligence and
Class Structure in American Life" demonstrated the disparate results of standardized
tests with respect to blacks and whites. See Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The
Bell Curve (1994). See also Leon J. Kamin, The Flynn Effect in IQ Testing: Why It's
Important to African-Americans, J. Blacks Higher Educ., Summer 1998, at 112.
64 This "fact" certainly does not mean that blacks are less intelligent as these tests tend
to show. The "fact" here is the actual test scores themselves.
65 Admittedly, it would be a stretch to imply that reliance on standardized test scores
as a means of judgment for suitability for selection in a process is an intentional inflic-
tion of social harm due to the fact that the infliction is done "knowingly."
66 If the lower standardized and intelligent quotient test scores are caused by social
factors which inhibit blacks from scoring higher on these tests, the human causal link
may be deemed the "sociopolitical cause" that Professor Simon has suggested. See
Simon, supra note 49, at 37. See also Kamin, supra note 63, at 112 (discussing a study
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The constitutional concept of individual rights protection nec-
essarily leads to a perspective that the harm caused by the inflic-
tion discussed above must be attributed to the individual.67 Group
suffering, or group harm, seems only to occur when the collective
individual rights of a group have been impeded. 68 "According to
the prevalent view, individuals, and not groups, experience suffer-
ing, whether the suffering is physical or psychological. '69 A gov-
ernment selection process must take into consideration each indi-
vidual's worth (again, the judgment of natural assets) to determine
which of those individuals are the best qualified to receive selec-
tion. If a process for admission to a university selects a white ap-
plicant and fails to select a black applicant, the harm suffered is at-
tributed only to the black applicant. The individual harm might or
might not be attributed to a racial preference in favor of the white
applicant. Without clear evidence that a racial preference existed,
the state decision-maker is powerless 70 under the colorblind Con-
that demonstrates that IQ score differences are attributable to environmental causes
rather than inferior genetic inheritance).
67 This should not indicate that the rights afforded under the Equal Protection Clause
should not extend to every individual, regardless of background. See Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225 (1995). Strict scrutiny under the recent affirmative
action programs, however, has led to a requirement that to show "compelling govern-
ment interest," the Equal Protection Clause requires the state actor to "catalogue ade-
quate findings to prove that past discrimination has impeded minorities from joining or
participating fully" in a government program. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 529 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). A state actor seeking to cure the
effects of societal discrimination is deemed to have acted beyond justification. See Wy-
gant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (finding a collective bargaining
agreement whereby minority teachers would receive preferential treatment in the event
of layoff was unconstitutional).
68 Professor Simon notes that the limits of the individual perspective of harm often
omits the social aspect of suffering by overemphasizing the individual. See Simon, supra
note 49, at 39. He uses as an example the courts' treatment of damages in sexual harass-
ment cases. See id. "[S]ome courts have demanded proof of psychological harm. The
unreasonableness of the demand stems in part from the refusal to accept ways in which
groups suffer without even psychological (or physical) manifestations of suffering." Id.
Beyond blanket recognition that African-Americans have suffered as a result of the insti-
tution of slavery and government-advocated discrimination, the Court today seems to
require that each individual African-American show specific acts of past discrimination
to allow legislative protection, which would not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
69 Id.
70 It almost seems that the state decision-maker would have the power to make the dis-
tinction between whether the applicant is white or black if it necessarily had done so in
the past. But where a colorblind policy has omitted blacks in the past, without a clear
showing that the selection process intentionally omitted blacks, colorblindness advocates
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stitution theory from making the distinction that the process fa-
vored the white applicant, since color is not a determinate factor in
the process.
Should the selection process repeatedly select a disproportion-
ate mix of races, Professor Simon suggests that it would be a mis-
take to consider the group suffering of blacks as collective group
suffering; that is, that the black "group's" collective individual
interests have been harmed:
71
The collective approach, leaping over 'groups' in
favor of 'meta-groups,' does not fair much better
than the individual perspective. Instead of reducing
group suffering to the suffering of individuals, the
collective approach claims to find commonalities
among groups that go beyond narrower notions
such as group suffering. Oppression, or a similar
concept, does the theoretical work for the collective
approach.72
Professor Simon rejects this notion because an examination of
some forms of suffering does not require "prior knowledge of peo-
ple's positive interests. '73 Moreover, an appropriate approach to
the suffering of groups "does not overly individualize by ignoring
the indefeasible social factors, and that does not overly generalize
by discounting difference among groups. Groups suffer in differ-
ent ways."'7
4
claim the Constitution prohibits a state actor from taking action to reverse this type of
trend.
71 Simon, supra note 49, at 39.
72 Id. at 39-40. Professor Simon uses as an example the work of Professor Frank Cun-
ningham, who
describes systemic oppression as "unjustified thwarting of people's
aspirations [interests] which is 'systematic'-that is, ongoing and
pervasive across categories of people (workers, women, the handi-
capped, children, and so on) in such a way this this cannot be ex-
plained by reference to accident, such as the accident of powerful
people happening to be possessed of ill will."
Id. at 40 (quoting Frank Cunningham, Democratic Theory and Socialism 204 (1987)).
73 Id. at 40. For example, "[t]he Nazis thwarted the interests of Jews and Gypsies ...
in the concentration camps. Yet, we do not need a notion of interests to acknowledge
their group suffering." Id.
74 Id. at41.
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As opposed to the notion of collective group suffering, a
group's social status might set a condition to vulnerability to
harm:
75
In most cases, people are born into conditions of
vulnerability to suffering. People are not born onto
a social tabula rasa-a blank slate. Rather, they
come into the world with labels already attached to
them-a full slate. Society lies in wait for all. Peo-
ple are born with racial, gender and ethnic tags so-
cially attached to them . .. "There is nothing just
about a communal identification that one may not
leave at will and they may doom one to social infe-
riority or to an unwarranted social identity." 76
Colorblindness on one level might seem to remove the label of be-
ing born black (and the concept of a "colorblind" Constitution
might be viewed as a protection against this labeling). 77 On an-
other level, colorblindness may in reality be an attempt only to ig-
nore race, an attempt that repeatedly only exaggerates its signifi-
cance. 78 Even a well-intentioned ignorance of race in a selection
process could be seen as "aversive racism," where the persons
making the selection act in a discriminatory manner without bla-
75 See id. at 44-46, 50.
76 Id. at 45 (quoting Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice 116 (1990)).
77 In this sense, equal protection of the law would seem to protect against unequal la-
beling based on the group identity. Yet, in another sense, equal protection could also be
seen as protection against the ills associated with the negative social identity when these
labels are attached.
78 See Ellis Cose, Color-Blind: Seeing Beyond Race in a Race-Obsessed World 189
(1997)
("The avoidance of racially sensitive topics even affected the teach-
ers' lessons on ancient Rome; the teachers simply omitted any men-
tion of slavery. Even in noting that George Washington Carver was a
great American, they thought it was important not to point out that he
was black. 'In the best of worlds, there would be no need to make
such mention, because children would have no preconceptions that
famous people are generally white,' commented [Jane] Schofield.
'However, in a school where one white child was surprised to learn
from a member of our research team that Martin Luther King was
black, not white, it would seem reasonable to argue that highlighting
the accomplishments of black Americans and making sure that stu-
dents did not assume famous figures are white is a reasonable prac-
tice."').
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tant racism. 79 With aversive racism, discrimination can take place
in situations where it can be rationalized on some other basis than
mere bigotry. 80 This is perhaps not true in situations such as uni-
versity selection, where the basis of decision will be more tangi-
ble-although not necessarily accurately reflective-forms of evi-
dence with which to make a comparison of applicants. This
aversive racism may, however, occur in a situation where a gov-
ernment contractor must make a decision as to which subcontrac-
tors to hire.8' If the decision must be made between a minority
firm and a white firm for subcontracting, the prime contractor may
decide to hire the white contractor, but for reasons rationalized on
grounds other than race. The same minority firm may bid for sub-
contracting work for another government project, but this bid may
too be rejected, on different grounds than the first prime contrac-
tor. Even if this pattern is repeated, 82 and the minority firm is ex-
cluded from all government contracting work,83 the prime contrac-
79 Id. at 190. Professor John Dovidio of Colgate University discusses the existence of
a subtle discrimination, practiced by people who do not believe they are prejudiced. See
id. (discussing Professor Dovidio's work).
80 See id.
81 Set-aside programs, such as the ones found unconstitutional in Adarand and Cro-
son, are designed to ensure that an equitable number of contractors and subcontractors on
government programs are from minority firms. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
1989).
2 Professor Dovidio, discussed in Cose, supra note 78, at 190, uses as an example a
black applying for employment where the employers are white. See id. The first em-
ployer might make the decision not to hire the black applicant because the applicant's
education is not in the desired field. See id. Thus, "that white employer leaves with a
clear conscience [certain that] no bias occurred because it was rationalizable." Id. (altera-
tion in original).
Now that same black person goes for another interview and is com-
peting against a white person with a different employer and what is
most likely to happen, according to [Dovidio's] research ... is that
the second employer will make a decision to choose the white person
over the black person, but that employer will justify it on the basis of
some factor other than race that may be totally different than the first
one. So you're groping for reasons to justify behavior that is uncon-
sciously discriminatory. So employer number two says, "Well maybe
what we need is someone who is more outgoing, who will interact
with our clientele better."
Id.
83 In Croson, Richmond (Va.) set aside 30 percent of the city's subcontracting work
for minority firms. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 477. A study had indicated that only .67 per-
cent of the city's prime contracting work had been awarded to minority firms in a period
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tor and the government entity hiring the prime contractor may still
be convinced that no discrimination has taken place.84 Under the
Supreme Court's "exceedingly myopic" view 85 of equal protec-
tion, insufficient evidence exists to justify counteractive measures
to be taken to assure some degree of equality of opportunity, 86
since a compelling government interest involves only remedy for
specific instances of past discrimination. 87
Aversive racism can account for group harm felt by blacks.
Continued denial from a government selection process, should it
involve the aversive racism described above, relates directly to the
social status of African-Americans. 88 Group harm, as opposed to
the individual directly harmed through exclusion, is not an easy
concept to define.89 This concept may be explained by viewing the
effects of exclusion of an Anglo-American, as opposed to an Afri-
can-American. Consider again the example from Bakke, with one
hundred positions available for entrance into the medical school,
without any preferential treatment for minorities. 90 If the school
fills 99 positions with white applicants, and the remaining position
may be filled with one of two applicants, one white and one black,
each with equivalent academic credentials, then the system must
choose between the applicant based on some other factor. If the
black applicant is chosen based on a race factor, the white appli-
cant will most likely feel an injustice has occurred. But can this in-
justice be attributed as a group harm, when 99 other positions are
filled by white applicants? The white applicant may turn to the
between 1978 and 1983. See id. at 479-80. Despite these findings and others, discussed
in infra notes 431-36 and accompanying text, the majority (per Justice O'Connor) con-
cluded that "[t]here is nothing approaching a prima facie case of constitutional or statu-
tory violation by anyone in the Richmond construction industry." Id. at 500.
84 If the Court cannot find any specific facts indicating past discrimination, then no
remedy is appropriate.
85 Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Thurgood Marshall's dis-
sent is discussed in infra notes 429-31 and accompanying text.
86 A colorblind argument claims that affirmative action denies equality of opportunity.
See Oxford Companion, supra note 40, at 18. One must question how this concept relates
to aversive racism, which denies the same equality of opportunity.
87 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995); Croson, 488
U.S. at 470.
88 See Simon, supra note 49, at 50.
89 Professor Simon notes that group harm seems mysterious. See id. at 47.
90 See generally Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265-
66(1978).
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Supreme Court's language that "[c]lassifications based on race
carry a stigmatic harm,"9' but it must be questioned whether this
selection has actually stigmatized this one white applicant, since in
none of the other selections has race stigmatized that group.92 This
much may be questioned, but it should lead to a conclusion that
the harm suffered is attributed to individual injustice, rather than
group harm, especially when one considers the alternative. If the
black student is excluded, the question must be what factor re-
sulted in exclusion, in the absence of some blatant discrimination.
Quite obviously, this will be a case where the black applicant
claims aversive racism and the white applicant denies it.9 3 Yet
where blacks are continuously excluded, blacks have become and
often continue to become vulnerable to harm based on the stigma
caused by the exclusion.94
91 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
92 By this statement I mean that it must be questioned whether white applicants as a
group feel the stigma of applying as "white applicants," as opposed to the stigma of a
black applicant identifying himself or herself as a "black applicant" where the selection
process typically excludes them. Those who opposed affirmative action believe that the
identification of "black applicant" in an affirmative action program immediately grants a
benefit to that black applicant, since nobody knows whether that black applicant has ac-
tually felt the effects of discrimination individually. This idea leads some to conclude
that the white applicant is denied selection "because he (or she) is white," when in reality
the "stigma" of being white does not and cannot compare with the stigma of "being
black" when all or a substantial majority of blacks are excluded. I must note that I intro-
duce this concept to illustrate that the harm felt by blacks is attributed to group harm,
whereas the harm felt by a white is an individual injustice to the white applicant.
93 According to Professor Dovidio,
[P]eople of color will have a tendency to see racism in many places,
almost everywhere, because you can't trust what somebody says.
And white people tend to see it nowhere because they only discrimi-
nate when they can justify it on the basis of some other factor other
than race. And so the dialogue begins with miscommunication. It
starts with different perceptions, but usually quickly escalates to dis-
trust because ... if a black person says, "What's going on here is ra-
cism and discrimination,". . . whites will respond and say, "No it
isn't."
Cose, supra note 78, at 190-91 (quoting Professor Dovidio) (alteration in original).
94 Professor Simon identifies vulnerability to harm as a factor for considering the so-
cial suffering related to social status. See Simon, supra note 49, at 44, 50. Based on the
foregoing discussion, I assume that the harm felt by exclusion is group harm, as opposed
to merely instances of individual injustice caused by exclusion.
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If it can be established that a selection process of a majority-
controlled government actor (a white-dominated one with respect
to race), then the latter of Professor Simon's components of social
injustice-powerlessness and negative group identity-are not dif-
ficult to establish. A critical aspect of group injustice is
the relative inability of the victim to offset or fight
against the harm. The phrase 'innocent victim' does
not adequately capture the lack of response charac-
teristic of an injustice. Caught in the entablements
of group identity an individual 'victim' cannot al-
ways successfully plead innocence. Group injustice
is signaled by the fact that group identity always
conditions the strengths and weakness of the re-
sponse to the infliction. Race, gender, and the other
group classifications will always temper or in an-
other way affect the response no matter how intense
the response might otherwise seem. 95
95 Id. at 54. Professor Simon does not necessarily link powerlessness with political
weakness, measured by voting strength.
The nonelectoral aspects of powerlessness must be kept clearly in
mind. Women, African Americans, and gays have different forms of
electoral strength. Women have sheer voting numbers; African
Americans often exhibit solidarity at the polls; and gays often have
strong interest groups. Placing too much emphasis on political power
... leads to faulty evaluations of social groups. Some theorists ...
try to dismiss a group's claim of powerlessness once groups, such as
women, attain a certain degree of political power at the electoral bar-
gaining table. The theorists assume that powerlessness is the absence
of power and that they can measure power by voting strength.
Id. at 55. Professor Simon finds that availability of electoral opportunity "cannot com-
pletely loosen the tight yet subtle grip of negative group identity," including the proce-
dural dictates in constitutional discrimination cases requiring an "onerous test of showing
intent." Id. Simon also recognizes that
[d]isadvantaged social groups do not have political organizations that
speak for the entire group. No one political organization represents
the interests, especially those regarding negative group identity, of
African Americans, women or gays. Simply because segments of the
social group coalesce into interest groups does not offset the overall
powerlessness of the group. The political organization of one seg-
ment of the group may divide the group, leaving a significant number
still powerless while the others attain formal political power.
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Powerlessness is necessarily related to negative group identity.96
The appropriate question here is whether a government selection
process which inflicts social harm by selecting a disproportionate
number of whites does so upon a group of relatively powerless in-
dividuals because of that group's negative group identity. 97 Aver-
sive racism quite clearly meets this definition and is perhaps the
clearest example.98 A state actor making a selection based on an
underlying notion of inferiority of a black applicant for a position
necessarily bases his or her decision on the negative group identity
associated with race. The feelings and emotions of powerless-
ness-not necessarily due to a stimulus of power by the person
making the decision 99-are caused by the negative group identity.
Judgments of natural assets, such as those in an academic se-
lection discussed in this Section, may also lead to powerlessness
due to a negative group identity, because it fosters feelings of
hopelessness.100 "Powerlessness finds its most parasitic niche in-
ternally when entire groups of people think of themselves as un-
worthy."'' o Publications such as The Bell Curve,10 2 even if it is be-
96 See id. at 56 ("The primary molder of powerlessness is the phenomenon [of] nega-
tive group identity.").
97 See id. at 53. A repeated exclusion of blacks would almost certainly lead to a notion
of powerlessness.
Powerlessness does not simply manifest itself in a single instance;
powerlessness persists over time. Powerlessness persists dialectically
over space and through its operation within a network of situations.
If found in the education sphere, powerlessness probably will also
manifest itself in the employment and housing fields. One reinforces
the other, creating an interconnectedness of disadvantaged condi-
tions. If hopelessness and despair predominate within the educational
sphere, they often carry over into the employment area.
Id.
98 Professor Simon offers a historical narrative to illustrate his concept of social injus-
tice. See id. at 62-64.
99 See id. at 56.
100 See id. at 53
("Hopelessness constitutes an important component of powerless-
ness. The powerless often direct their outlook toward the present.
Others criticize the powerless for their present-time concerns with
consumption and indulgence. Yet, 'I want mine right now' can be in-
terpreted as a cry of despair, a direct response to the possibilities of
the future as a powerless individual sees them").
101 Id.
("An individual or a group acts or does not act according to how
members of a group perceive or misconceive themselves. The inter-
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coming disregarded, 103 help foster the concept that blacks are
somehow inferior in cognitive ability, and thus foster the negative
identity which causes the feelings of powerlessness. The Supreme
Court does not consider this view, but instead considers the impli-
cations of a segregated admissions process as more of an evil than
reliance on these tests scores. 104 Thus, as Justice William 0. Doug-
las dissented in the first affirmative action case,
A segregated admissions process creates sugges-
tions of stigma and caste no less than a segregated
classroom, and in the end it may produce the result
despite its contrary intentions. One other assump-
tion may be clearly disproved: that blacks or
browns cannot make it on their individual merit.
This is a stamp of inferiority that a State is not per-
mitted to place on any lawyer. 105
Justice Douglas' characterization is perhaps reflective of the
view that affirmative action is in itself a social injustice. Seem-
ingly forgotten in the modem colorblind advocacy is that the proc-
ess of selection is the social injustice. Affirmative action, in its
various forms, is a reaction to the social injustice caused by the se-
lection process. One argument, rigidly refuted by many across the
board, is that blacks cannot be racist. 106 The argument that affirma-
tive action cannot be a social injustice is most likely refuted for the
same reasons as the concept that blacks cannot be racist. Neverthe-
less, if social injustice is defined as Professor Simon illustrates-
that is, it is the infliction of social harm upon relatively powerless
individuals because of their negative group identity-then affirma-
tive action does not seem to fit the definition, beyond some sort of
nalization may or may not be conscious. The symbol of power of the
big boot stomping on the helpless victim paints a very incomplete
and misleading picture of the realities of powerlessness. Internal
mechanisms go far beyond the work of the big boot.").
102 Herrnstein & Murray, supra note 63.
103 See The Student White-Out at Yale, J. Blacks Higher Educ., Summer 1998, at 74
(noting a student protest when The Bell Curve author Charles Murray lectured at Yale in
A il, 1998).
14 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissing claim that affirmative
action program violated Equal Protection Clause as moot).
105 Id. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106 This concept is analyzed in Dinesh D'Souza, The End of Racism 387-429 (1995).
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infliction. 107 Whether this sort of infliction is justified is the sub-
ject of the next two Subsections, which discuss result-based theo-
ries of social equality.
2. Result-Based Theories of Antidiscrimination Law'
08
a. Stigma
The quote above from Justice Douglas' dissent in DeFunis v.
Odegaard reflects a long-standing view of at least a minority of
the Supreme Court and antidiscrimination theorists that the central
concern of antidiscrimination law is the stigmatization of certain
groups. 10 9 The context under which the theory has been applied
also lies at the heart of the distinction between how the term "co-
lorblind" has been used to mean something completely different
than that which it is now used (against the interests of minorities in
affirmative action programs). One must consider the context in
which the following quotes were originally made: "[The Four-
teenth Amendment protects blacks] from legal discriminations,
implying inferiority in civil society;" 110 "[segregation law would
be unconstitutional if it were true that it] stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority;""' and "[segregation of blacks is un-
constitutional because it] generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be done." 112 A blanket rule that
the Equal Protection Clause protects against the types of stigma
described in the cases above logically leads to the conclusion that
the stigma placed via affirmative action is an impermissible
"stamp of inferiority" because it implies that minorities cannot
107 This statement reflects only differences in the white race and the black race. The
concept follows that whites either feel no "social" or "group" harm, or-even if some
feel they do-the harm is not inflicted upon them as "whites" as powerless individuals
due to a negative group identity. This does not illustrate the problem when one considers
the implication of group cross-identity, such as the dilemma faced by black females,
white homosexuals (regardless of gender), or a similar combination.
108 Professor Koppelman's book, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equity, supra
note 44, concentrates on the result-based and process-based theories. This Subsection
will reflect much of the content of his chapter on result-based theories.
109 See Koppelman, supra note 44, at 57.
110 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (striking down law excluding
blacks from participation on juries).
111 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
112 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) [Brown I].
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succeed based on their own merits compared to those of whites." 13
Beyond the mere logic of the language lies the comparison about
the stigma discussed by Justice Douglas in DeFunis with the
stigma caused by blatant discrimination. Thus,
when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your
mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters
and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate-
filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your
black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast
majority of your twenty million Negro brothers
smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the
midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly
find your tongue twisted and your speech stammer-
ing as you seek to explain to your six-year-old
daughter why she can't go to the public amusement
park that has just been advertised on television, and
see tears welling up in her eyes when she is told
that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see
ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in
her little mental sky, and see her beginning to dis-
tort her personality by developing an unconscious
bitterness toward white people; when you have to
concoct an answer for a five-year-old son who is
asking, "Daddy, why do white people treat colored
people so mean?"; when you take a cross-country
drive and find it necessary to sleep night after night
in the uncomfortable comers of your automobile
because no motel will accept you; when you are
humiliated day in and day out by nagging signs
reading "white" and "colored"; when your first
name becomes "nigger," your middle name be-
comes "boy"... and your last name becomes
"John," and your wife and mother are never given
the respected title "Mrs."; when you are harried by
day and haunted by night by the fact that you are a
Negro, living constantly at tiptoe stance, never
quite knowing what to expect next, and are plagued
113 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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with inner fears and outer resentments; when you
are fighting a degenerating sense of "nobodi-
ness". 114
the resulting "stigma" of an affirmative action program on blacks
does not seem to follow logically.
It is not difficult to establish that the stigma caused by the ra-
cial caste system under Jim Crow laws 1 5 is not the same type of
stigma created by affirmative action law, at least with respect to
the stigma put upon black Americans. 1 6 With Dr. King's percep-
tion of stigma as a backdrop, scholars such as Professor Kenneth
Karst advocate an antidiscriminatory law that is not "limited to the
stigma itself, but includes the whole complex of practices and in-
stitutions that are predicated upon it":117
For all its importance, status equality cannot stand
by itself. Just as Jim Crow employed a mixture of
formal legal disabilities and informal social and
economic sanctions, it will take more than the
elimination of formal legal inequalities to end the
status harm that is the main evil of a system of
caste. To speak of equal citizenship as a status goal,
then, is to identify an objective that includes a
measure of substantive equality along with formal
equality before the law. The best evidence of an end
to the harms that are black people's legacy from the
racial caste system would be for blacks and whites
to be ranged along the socioeconomic scale in ap-
114 Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in Why We Can't Wait 81-
82 (1964). This is the classic description of the American system of racism. See Kop-
?elman, supra note 44, at 60 (quoting King, supra, at 81-82).
Jim Crow laws were designed to segregate whites and blacks. These segregation
statutes served to remind blacks of their inferior status and represented the most elabo-
rate examples of white supremacy. These laws were enforced, like the Black Codes were
enforced, and, whether by custom or by law, Jim Crow kept blacks away from whites.
See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 31 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
116 Just as it is difficult to conceptualize affirmative action as creating a social injus-
tice towards whites, as discussed above, it is difficult to conceptualize whether affirma-
tive action creates a stigma on blacks similar to the stigma created by Jim Crow laws.
117 Koppelman, supra note 44, at 75 (discussing Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to
America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (1989)).
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proximately the same distribution.' 18
The argument that affirmative action furthers the goal of eradi-
cating the effects of stigma, as opposed to the concept that affirma-
tive action creates an equally prohibitive form of stigma, seems to
be meritless in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in the last
decade.' ' 9 The inability of the Court to find the necessary exis-
tence of specific instances of discrimination in affirmative action
cases seems to reflect a view held by many whites that the stigma
of racism is reflective of "the way we were" rather than "the way
we are."' 120 The vestige of Jim Crow laws and segregation in gen-
eral, therefore, is not a compelling reason to grant any special
benefits to blacks, because "it cannot be said that the government
has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining
from harming another."'121 Professor Andrew Koppelman con-
cludes that the concept of stigma is incomplete: 122
The concept of stigma suggests, but does not fully
comprehend, the harm inflicted by racism. 'Stigma'
thus appears to be an unduly limited and potentially
misleading term for the evil it seeks to describe.
The danger created by excessive emphasis on
stigma is that it will encourage an empty, symbolic
politics, more concerned with gestures of respect
for blacks than with concrete measures to improve
their lot. 123
Koppelman suggests that the stigma theory "points away from it-
self toward a larger and subtler dynamic." 124 That dynamic may
only be understood, he concludes, by understanding the "tangible
118 Karst, supra note 117, at 135.
119 I refer here specifically to the Adarand and Croson cases, see generally Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989), although this does not eliminate the racial gerrymandering cases,
see generally Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
120 See D'Souza, supra note 106, at 245.
121 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
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world that is called into being by the stigmatization of blacks.
125
That tangible world is emphasized by the group-disadvantage the-
ory.
126
b. Group Disadvantage Theory
127
Alan Freeman's view of the Court's doctrine of antidiscrimina-
tion law perhaps best illustrates the Supreme Court's limited inter-
pretation of the concept of equal protection. 128 Freeman character-
izes the Supreme Court's requirements as based on the
"perpetrator perspective."' 129 Freeman's view of the Court includes
125 Id.
126 See id.
127 Professor Koppelman explains the group disadvantage theory as follows:
[It] looks beyond process and significance to the substantive social
position of blacks and other disadvantaged groups. Both the process
and the stigma theories focus on the ideas in people's heads: either
the heads of the people doing the discriminating or those of the peo-
ple suffering the stigma, or perhaps both. Against all this, some writ-
ers object that anti-discrimination law should really be concerned
with concrete things that happen in the world. The principal com-
plaint about segregation, after all, was that it massively limited
blacks' life chances in a material way. The group disadvantage theo-
rists claim that as soon as anti-discrimination law looks away from
material results, it begins to lose its way. Their critiques of the proc-
ess and stigma theories reveal the incompleteness of those theories,
yet their own theories are equally incomplete: they do not explain
why the material disadvantaging of groups raises any greater norma-
tive concern than inequality between individuals does. Such an ex-
planation must look to what the group-disadvantage theorists deem
irrelevant: process and stigma.
Id. at 76.
Professor Koppelman analyzes a number of group disadvantage theories not intro-
duced or discussed in this Article. See id. at 76-115 (citing Shklar, supra note 76; James
S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family (1983); Stephen Macedo, Liberal
Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105
Ethics 468 (1995); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 323 (1987); Paul Gewirtz, Choice
in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728
(1986); Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy
(1975); Charles L. Black Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and Califor-
nia's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69 (1967); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959)).
128 See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049,
1052-57 (1978). See also Koppelman, supra note 44, at 76-78 (discussing Freeman's cri-
tique of antidiscrimination law).
129 Koppelman, supra note 44, at 77 (quoting Freeman, supra note 128, at 1052-53).
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the idea that
racial discrimination appears to be merely "the
misguided conduct of particular actors" in "a world
where, but for the conduct of these misguided ones,
the system of equality of opportunity would work
to provide a distribution of the good things in life
without racial disparities and where deprivations
that did correlate with race would be 'deserved' by
those deprived on grounds of insufficient 'merit."'
By requiring that any civil rights claimant show
that she is the individual victim of individual dis-
crimination, the perpetrator perspective allows the
Court to say "that Black Americans can be without
jobs, have their children in all-black, poorly funded
schools, have no opportunities for decent housing,
and have very little political power, without any
violation of anti-discrimination law."'
30
Similarly, the pioneering theorist of group disadvantage, Owen
Fiss, argues that the Constitution should include being read as pre-
emptively prohibiting any state action which "aggravates... the
subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group.' 31 The
Equal Protection Clause should protect this socially disadvantaged
group if "the group has been in a position of perpetual subordina-
tion; and ... the political power of the group is severely circum-
scribed."132
130 Id. (quoting Freeman, supra note 128, at 1054).
131 Fiss, supra note 47, at 134. See also id. at 84, 125, 127-28, 131-32; Koppelman,
supra note 44, at 81-82 (discussing Fiss' theory). Fiss identifies two distinct characteris-
tics of being a social group. First, the social group must have some distinct existence
separate from its members. One must be able to discuss the group "without reference to
the particular individuals who happen to be its members at any one moment." Fiss, supra
note 47, at 125. Second, the group must be interdependent, so that "[m]embers of the
group identify themselves.. . by reference to their membership in the group; and their
well-being or status is in part determined by the well-being or status of the group." Id.
With respect to African-Americans, "[they] are viewed as a group; they view themselves
as a group; their identity is in large part determined by membership in the group; their
social status is linked to the status of the group; and much of our action, institutional and
ersonal, is based on these perspectives." Id.
32 Fiss, supra note 47, at 131-32.
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If the Supreme Court's "colorblind" reading of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause reflects the majority's belief that racism is overem-
phasized-more of a "way we were" type of situation-then Fiss'
reading of the Equal Protection Clause is clearly at odds with
modem jurisprudence. But when does the Court allow a state actor
to react and perhaps counteract the majority's belief if the minor-
ity's assertion of racism is indeed accurate? 133 Even the arch con-
servative Dinesh D'Souza offers several comments indicating that
racism is not only a thing of the past, but is here today and may be
on the rise:13
4
" Civil rights activist Roger Wilkins: "This is a racist society,
and it will be for a long time to come."
135
" African American educator Johnnetta Cole: "[R]acism is
alive and doing too well in America.... We have a collec-
tive sense that we are still not free."'
1 36
" Coca-Cola executive Charles Morrison: "What does it take
to be successful in America? I'll tell you what it takes-
being white, that's what."'
1 37
" Legal scholar Richard Delgado: "[Racism] ... infect[s] our
economic system, our cultural and political institutions, and
the daily interactions of individuals."'
' 38
133 For a discussion of judgment of natural assets, see supra notes 100-104 and
accompanying text.
134 D'Souza, supra note 106, at 246-47. State action does not necessarily reflect that
the existence of racism is present in a selection process. Nevertheless, if the state action
reflects majority preference, and racism affects majority preference, then it should follow
that the state action reflects this majority preference as well.
135 Id. at 246 (quoting Lena Williams, Growing Black Debate on Racism: When Is It
Real, When an Excuse?, New York Times, April 5, 1992 at A-I, A-28 (statement of
Roger Williams)).
136- Id. at 247 (quoting Johnnetta B. Cole, Conversations: Straight Talk with America's
Sister President 54, 57 (1993)).
137 Id. (quoting Audrey Edwards & Craig K. Polite, Children of the Dream: The Psy-
chology of Black Success 222 (1992) (statement of Charles Morrison)).
138 Id. (quoting Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial In-
sults, Epithets, and Name Calling, in Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaul-
tive Speech, and the First Amendment 89, 90 (Mari J. Matsuda et al., eds. 1993)).
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" Henry Louis Gates, Jr.: "[R]acism has become fashionable,
once again."' 139
* Legal scholar Kimberl& Crenshaw: "[R]acism is a central
ideological underpinning of American society."'
140
" African-American philosopher Cornel West: "This society
is chronically racist, sexist and homophobic.'
14'
One group disadvantage theory, advocated by Charles Law-
rence, calls for a "cultural meaning" test to invoke heightened
scrutiny at the judicial level:
This test would evaluate governmental conduct to
see if it conveys a symbolic message to which the
culture attaches racial significance. The court
would analyze governmental behavior much like a
cultural anthropologist might: by considering evi-
dence regarding the historical and social context in
which the decision was made and effectuated. If the
court determined by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that a significant portion of the population
thinks of the governmental action in racial terms,
then it would presume that socially shared, uncon-
scious racial attitudes made evident by the action's
meaning has influenced the decisionmakers. As a
result, it would apply heightened scrutiny. 1
42
Comparing Freeman's "perpetrator perspective" view of judicial
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause with Lawrence's
"cultural meaning" test demonstrates a substantial gap between the
Supreme Court's view of racial equality and that of those seeking
139 Id. (quoting Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars 50
(1992)).
40 Id. (quoting Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma-
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1336 (1988)).
141 Id. (quoting Cornel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America 236
y1993)).
42 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 356 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection]. See also generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Book Re-
view, "Justice" or "Just Us": Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 831
(1983) [hereinafter Lawrence, "Justice" or "Just Us"] (reviewing David L. Kirp, Just
Schools, The Idea of Racial Equality in American Education (1982)).
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to protect the socially disadvantaged (or to protect against social
injustice, as defined by Professor Simon).
Much of the foregoing discussion has concentrated on what a
colorblind society is not, and offers some commentary on how ad-
vocacy of a colorblind Constitution fails to protect genuine minor-
ity interests. At the heart of the competing slogans for equal pro-
tection-present "colorblindness" and present "race-
consciousness"-are two words, disregarded by advocates of the
former and attested by advocates of the latter. Racism exists.
When the institution of racism is established, then the concepts
of social equality (or inequality) and social discrimination are not
the same concepts with respect to white Americans as they are
with respect to black Americans. In other words, white domination
that seeks to subordinate the black race is not the same concept as
legislative attempts to place the races on equal footing, via af-
firmative action. Should it be true that the Constitution absolutely
prohibits both, racism proves peculiarly problematic to the concept
of majority rule, examined in the next Section.
B. Majority Rule and the Problem of Racism143
An underlying concern of constitutional democracy is to con-
trive "ways of protecting minorities from majority tyranny that is
not a flagrant contradiction of the principle of majority rule.' 44
The Section above illustrates that the problems of social inequality
and group discrimination weigh heavily on blacks in this society-
much more heavily than they do on whites. Majority rule by white
Americans exacerbates the dilemma, since white preferences find
their way into government activity by the very process of majority
rule. The Constitution is designed to protect against such oppres-
sion, since "a majority with untrammeled power to set governmen-
tal policy is in a position to deal itself benefits at the expense of
143 Much of this discussion stems from a collection of essays on majorities and mi-
norities in Nomos XXXII: Majorities and Minorities (John W. Chapman & Alan
Wertheimer, eds., 1990) [hereinafter Nomos XXXII].
144 Ian Shapiro, Three Falacies Concerning Majorities, Minorities, and Democratic
Politics, in Nomos XXXII, supra note 143, at 79, 79-80 (quoting John Hart Ely, Democ-
racy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 7-8 (1980)).
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the remaining minority."'1 45 Until the post-modem era, however,
the Constitution provided no such protection. State governments,
reflecting white majority preferences, mandated caste systems
through as many means as they were permitted by the flexible (and
almost meaningless) interpretation of the Constitution. "Color-
blindness" in this context quite simply requires a more rigid appli-
cation of equal protection of the law. 1
46
Just as racism has reciprocated from the blatant racism of the
past to the aversive racism found today, white majority preferences
are also no longer as overtly discriminatory. Still, white Americans
are rediscovering a loyalty to their own race, something their an-
cestors took for granted. 147 New forms of prejudice have created
an academic war regarding the validity and exponents of symbolic
racism (whites see blacks as violating cherished moral precepts);
group conflict (whites equate improving the status of blacks with
lowering the status of whites); self-interest (whites see raising the
status of blacks as a direct threat to their own well-being); and
stratification beliefs (whites believe that, since individual preju-
dice has declined, blacks now have the same chances as whites to
succeed on their own). 148 According to Professors Jennifer L.
Hochschild and Monica Herk,
most whites now say "yes" to racial equality and in-
tegration, then add some sort of "but. . ." to their
affirmation. It is that phalanx of "but... s" that
blacks see when they decry white racial hypocrisy,
145 Id. (quoting Ely, supra note 144, at 7-8). See also Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice
in the Liberal State 323 (1980) ("[N]o modem contractarian has succeeded in vindicating
majority rule without, at the same time, undermining the foundation of individual
i hts.').
6This interpretation of colorblindness, as introduced by Justice Harlan in Plessy, is
the foundation of "Colorblind I" in infra Part II.
147 See D'Souza, supra note 106, at 388.
148 See generally Jennifer L. Hochschild & Monica Herk, "Yes, But...": Principles
and Caveats in American Racial Attitudes, in Nomos XXXII, supra note 143, at 308.
Professors Hochschild and Herk note that some analysts argue that prejudice has de-
clined little and discrimination hardly at all. See id. at 308 (citing Alphonso Pickney, The
Myth of Black Progress (1980); Robert B. Hill, The Illusion of Black Progress, 9 Soc.
Pol'y, 14 (1978)). The debate over symbolic racism, group conflict, self-interest, and
stratification beliefs are associated with the view that biological racism is declining, but
that new forms of prejudice have arisen. See id. I present this debate merely as introduc-
tory to illustrate potential white preferences reflected in legislative activity.
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and it is the combination of "yes" and "but" that
makes American racial politics so difficult to nego-
tiate. 149
Judicial review of affirmative action seems to reflect this
predilection, if one assumes the "yes... but" principle and caveat
are white majority preferences. The evil rendered unconstitutional
since the middle of the last decade by judicial review is the action
taken by the legislature, creating somewhat of an antilogy to the
fear of the tyranny of majority rule. One may consider the popu-
list's interpretation of voting, where the majority's opinions must
be right and respected because the liberty of the people stems from
the will of the people.' 5 0 Contrasting this limited view is the Con-
stitutionalist's argument that judicial review should be enhanced
as an effective democratic remedy against defects in majority
rule. 15 The modem colorblind theory circumvents the concept of
majority rule, instead creating a mirror argument of the first color-
blind theory, where legislative activity was motivated by prefer-
ences of white/majority domination and black/minority subordina-
tion. Colorblindness now almost seems to paint a mysterious
picture that affirmative action by the legislature creates a new
domination of sorts, and creates an undue dilemma on whites. Lost
in this argument is the fact that the white majority retains power of
the vote, and is not restricted from resorting to the polls, rather
than the courts. This Subsection reintroduces the theoretical prob-
lems 52 associated with the protection of minority rights in a ma-
149 Id. at 309. Professors Hochschild and Herk note that
the implications of this view for social scientists and philosophers
reach past American race relations. Our argument suggests the need
to move beyond aggregating data about individuals to considering
the collective impact of different, even contradictory, views. More
particularly, it suggests to social scientists a way to use survey re-
search to raise, if not resolve, issues of social structure and policy
choice. It also suggests to philosophers ways to think about shifting
the unit of analysis from individuals to collectivities without running
into the classic problems of methodological reductionism and func-
tionalism.
Id. at 309-10.
150 See Shapiro, supra note 144, at 95.
151 See id.
152 The theories discussed below consist of classic utilitarianism, pluralism, public-
choice theory, and civic republicanism. This Section concludes with a comment about
the antimajoritarian constitutional restraints. These by no means represent a full state of
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jority-ruled democracy. I chose first to discuss the concept of ma-
jority rule with respect to utilitarianism, for pluralism is largely
based on an antecedent belief in utilitarianism. We will then see
how neither pluralism nor assimilationism has been a viable tool
for protecting minorities against majority rule.
1. Underlying Utilitarian Concepts
John Stuart Mill's notion of "tyranny of the majority" has been
viewed as partial criticism of utilitarianism's "inability to provide
an adequate theoretical foundation for securing individual rights
and the protection of minorities."'153 Common criticism usually
points to the phrase "the greatest happiness in the greatest num-
ber" as a "clear declaration of majority ascendancy."' 154 Professor
Frederick Rosen centers his attention more on the position of Jer-
emy Bentham, with some discussion on John Stuart Mill (includ-
ing Mill's "tyranny of the majority" notion). 155 Rosen points to the
fact that Bentham was indifferent to the concept of majority
rule,156 noting that with respect to commentary on the first Greek
political theories. Obviously absent is economic theory, which I have chosen to omit
from the discussion.
153 Frederick Rosen, Majorities and Minorities: A Classical Utilitarian View, in No-
mos XXXII, supra note 143, at 24, 24 (observing the problem of majority rule and mi-
nority rights from the "classical utilitarianism" perspective, and suggesting that common
criticisms that utilitarianism fails to provide adequate protection for minorities in a sys-
tem of majority rule).
154 Id.
155 Id. at37.
156 See id. at 25. Rosen provides commentary from Bentham on the first Greek Con-
stitution (the Constitution of Epidaurus of 1 January 1822), which excluded Jews and
Muslims form citizenship and office, as an example of Bentham's indifference to the
concept of majority rule:
The exclusion put on this occasion upon so large a part perhaps the
largest part of the existing population is at present it would seem an
unavoidable arrangement but it is a highly deplorable one. It entails
upon the country the existing division, reversing only the position of
the condivdent races. It places the Turks under the Greeks [as] the
Helots were in under the Spartans, in the situation that the Protestants
in France were in under the Catholics, in Ireland the Catholics under
the Protestants, in the Anglo-American United States the Blacks un-
der the Whites. In no country can such schism have place but in point
of morality and felicity both races are, in howsoever shapes, sufferers
by it: the oppressors as well as the oppressed.
To lessen the opposition of interests-to bring them to coinci-
dence as speedily as is consistent with security should therefore be
an object of constant care and endeavour.
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Constitution, "Bentham's position does not depend on whether or
not those excluded [from citizenship and office] constitute a mi-
nority or a majority."' 157 Bentham offers examples of both minori-
ties repressed by majorities (American blacks by American
whites), and oppressed majorities under minorities (Irish Catholics
under Irish Protestants).
1 58
Rosen examines Bentham's approach to majority rule through
the idea of a utilitarian's "self-regarding prudence," which Rosen
says evokes the concept of self-interest:1
5 9
For the individual every object of motivation cre-
ates an interest so that each person would seem to
have an incalculable number of interests. Further-
more, each might be motivated by different goals
and desires so that his interests will be not only dif-
ficult to calculate but also potentially subjective.
Although not denying these difficulties with the
concept of an interest, Bentham would have argued
that the most important interests are those that indi-
viduals share with others, and, for purposes of leg-
islation, these might be reducible to a few essen-
tials, the most important of which is security. Each
person has an interest in his own security, which for
Bentham is so fundamental that all other interests
are subordinate to it.160
Id. at 25-26 (quoting Bentham Manuscripts, University College London, cxxvi, at 192,
and citing Frederick Rosen, Bentham's Constitutional Theory and the Greek Constitution
of 1822, 25 Balkan Stud. 31-54 (1984)) (alteration in original).
157 Id. at 26.
158 See id.
159 The concept of self-interest transcends into the more modem theory of pluralism.
See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
160 Id. at 27. Mill also emphasizes the importance of security.
Nearly all other earthly benefits are needed by one person, not
needed by another; and many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully
foregone, or replaced by something else; but security no human be-
ing can possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity
from evil, and for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the
passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of the instant
could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything
the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than our-
selves.
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The utilitarian concept of security in modem racial relations
cannot be emphasized with the same vigor as it would apply in
early periods of history. In a political context, the utilitarian's
greatest happiness principle means primarily that maximization of
security is applied to all members of society equally.' 61 The
maximization or advancement of security includes protection
against invasion, crime, famine, hunger, illness, oppression, and
the abuse of power. 162 One may place the notion of security in the
context of white majority domination-particularly the caste sys-
tem of segregation and the frequency of lynchings-to understand
Bentham's and Mill's concepts of security:
Security means, for the most part, protection
against pain, and this distribution of pain is the spe-
cial province of the legislator who, given the varie-
ties and the subjective nature of much pleasure,
cannot possibly know what will provide pleasure
for each member of society. The province of the
legislator is the protection of each individual in so-
ciety against the pains from which he, together with
all other members, wishes most to be protected.
This is the realm of security that is the main con-
stituent of the greatest happiness principle.163
Although Bentham and Mill concurred regarding the impor-
tance of security, Bentham's idea of security against rule meant
the protection of the majority from the misrule of the minority. 164
Bentham conceptualized a constitutional democracy placing sov-
ereignty into the hands of the people, so as to protect the subject
many from the ruling few.' 65 Within this framework, Bentham
emphasized the "public opinion tribunal" as the main institution
that could represent the public interest and advance reform strat-
egy. 166 By comparison, Mill warned against the "absolute author-
Id. at 27 (quoting John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in 10 Collected Works of John Stuart
Mill 251 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969) [hereinafter Collected Works]).
161 See id. at 28.
162 See id.
163 Id. at 30.
164 See id. at 31.
165 See id.
166 Id. at 39 (citing Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, in I Collected Works of
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ity of the majority of themselves" and refers to this authority's in-
fluence as extending to the "despotism of Public Opinion."'
167 Mill
advised all interest must be equally represented, for society cannot
be equal unless all interests are to be consulted: 1
68
[S]ociety between human beings, except in the rela-
tion of master and slave, is manifestly impossible
on any other footing than the interests of all are to
be consulted. Society between equals can only exist
on the understanding that the interests of all are to
be regarded equally. And since in all states of civi-
lization, every person, except an absolute monarch,
has equals, everyone is obliged to live on these
terms with somebody; and in every age some ad-
vance is made toward a state in which it will be im-
possible to live permanently on other terms with
anybody. In this way people grow up unable to
conceive as possible to them a state of total disre-
gard of other people's interests. They are under a
necessity of conceiving themselves as at least ab-
staining from all the grosser injuries, and (if only
for their own protection) living in a state of con-
stant protest against them. They are also familiar
with the fact of co-operating with others and pro-
posing to themselves a collective, not an individual,
interest as the aim (at least for the time being) of
their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their
ends are identified with those of others; there is at
least a temporary feeling that the interests of others
Jeremy Bentham 157-58, 317-21, 329-37 (J.H. Burns et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter "Col-
lected Works"]). According to Rosen, Bentham seemed to defer to public opinion as em-
bodying the greatest happiness principle. See id.
167 Id. at 37 (quoting John Stuart Mill, Bentham, in 10 Collected Works, supra note
160, at 106-07). Rosen notes that Mill makes no direct reference to Bentham when the
former introduces "tyranny of the majority" in On Liberty. See id. at 38 (citing John Stu-
art Mill, On Liberty, in 18 Collected Works, supra note 160, at 219-20). Rosen disre-
gards conceptualizing Bentham's theory of constitutional democracy as embodying the
idea of majority rule, so the concept of "tyranny of the majority," according to Rosen,
cannot apply to Bentham's theory. See id.
168 See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 40 (Oskar Piest, ed. 1957).
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are their own interests. 169
One misconception of this passage would be to conclude it
condones such actions as allocating a legislative benefit to a mi-
nority group, such as the case of an affirmative action program.
"[I]t is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to be par-
tial-to show favor or preference to one person over another in
matters to which favor and preference do not apply .... Impartial-
ity where rights are concerned is of course obligatory .... -170
The concepts of equal representation of all interests and impar-
tiality of the government actor have extended beyond utilitarian-
ism and into the more modem theory of pluralism. As this discus-
sion of utilitarianism is merely introductory, it is sufficient to note
that the utilitarian theory most likely would not support an af-
firmative action program.' 71 The concept of equal representation
of interests finds its way into the pluralist model through a belief
that one group's interests are not inherently better than an-
other's. 72 All groups stand on substantially equal footing, relating
to the impartiality of the government actor. Neither of these con-
169 Id. at40-41.
170 Id. at 56 (emphasis in original). Mill continues,
Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in it-
self, but rather as instrumental to some other duty; for it is admitted
that favor and preference are not always censurable, and, indeed, the
cases in which they are condemned are rather the exception than the
rule. A person would be more likely to be blamed than applauded for
giving his family or friends no superiority in good offices over
strangers when he could do so without violating any other duty; and
no one thinks it is unjust to seek one person in preference to another
as a friend, connection, or companion. Impartiality where rights are
concerned is of course obligatory, but this is involved in the more
general obligation of giving to everyone his right.
Id. at 56.
171 The argument would, I think, center around the greatest happiness in the greatest
number. An impartial government, considering all interests equally, would allocate a
benefit to the select few (the blacks and other minorities) at the expense of the masses
(particularly the whites). This allocation would probably not be considered maximization
of security, and the pain felt by the majority would be greater than the happiness felt by
the few. See Rosen, supra note 153, at 29.
172 Robert Dahl provides much of the empirical support for pluralism. See generally
Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (1989); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy in the
United States: Promise and Performance (3d. ed. 1976); Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?
Democracy and Power in an American City (1961); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to De-
mocratic Theory (1956).
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cepts, either in the utilitarian nor the pluralist theories, can be
deemed a "colorblind" argument. Pluralism recognizes the diver-
sity of groups in society, making distinctions and formulating
principles referring to various religious, ethnic, cultural, or sexual
diversity. 173 Nevertheless, since pluralism inherits from utilitarian-
ism the abstraction of self-interest, racism may hinder the effec-
tiveness of the diverse groups to further their own interests, par-
ticularly those groups formed through similar interests based on
ethnicity or culture. Racism causes Professor Feldman to ask,
"How can pluralists argue that individuals should rationally pursue
their preexisting private interests if, at the outset, racist attitudes
and beliefs shape perceptions of self-interest?"' 174 The following
Subsection addresses not only this question, but also the predica-
ment caused by government or judicial reflection of majority
preferences at the expense of the minority.
2. Pluralist Preference-Pushing or Assimilationist
Individualism: Blacks in a Lose-Lose Predicament
Strictly in theory, the modem constitutional polemic between
race-consciousness (at a societal, not necessarily a governmental,
level) and colorblindness would find its distinction between the
competing theories of pluralism and assimilation. As noted above,
pluralism recognizes distinctions between interests groups, for in a
pluralist structure these private interest groups are the key to un-
derstanding the public decision-making process. 175 Private indi-
viduals, furthering their own self-interests (corresponding to the
utilitarian concept of self-interest), form private interest groups in
order to press their interests before government officials: 176
One engages in political discussion, consequently,
only for purely instrumental reasons: to maximize
the satisfaction of one's preexisting self-interest.
Discussion between citizens never amounts to more
than negotiation-an effort to form coalitions by
173 See Robert L. Simon, Pluralism and Equality: The Status of Minority Values in a
Democracy, in Nomos XXXII, supra note 143, at 207, 207-08.
174 Feldman, supra note 31, at 1837.
175 This is perhaps best defined in the administrative context. See generally Steven P.
Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 (1998).
176 See id. at 31-32.
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bargaining and exchanging support with others. Po-
litical discussion and action, in other words, are
neither central to one's existence in a political com-
munity nor a means of personal or communal
transformation. One does not discuss political is-
sues with others to broaden one's perspective, to
question one's assumptions, and potentially to
transform one's political viewpoints and interests.
Instead, all individuals and groups participate in
politics only to fulfill their preexisting
self-interest. 77
Advocates of pluralism recognize the need for external checks in
the system of preference-pushing, for "[i]f [the process were] un-
restrained by external checks, any given individual or group of
individuals will tyrannize over others."'1 78 Curiously, this statement
seems to reflect more of a fear of misrule by the few over the
many, 179 rather than the opposite, but yet the term "tyranny" is
again used to describe the oppression caused by the preferences of
one group over other groups. Placing the pluralists' fear of tyranny
(or even the utilitarian's fear) in the modem context of affirmative
action, it makes little sense that the external check required to de-
177 Feldman, supra note 31, at 1841. The political process in a pluralist system is often
referred as "preference-pushing." As Professor Feldman notes,
This self-interested struggle is largely unprincipled since pluralism
condones the exercise of raw political power. The political market-
place thus often becomes a battleground: to garner political power,
one can compromise, goad and coerce others. Ethical values are rela-
tive. At the individual level, the ultimate moral standard is one's per-
sonal preferences, while at the communal level, the only legitimate
measure for choosing between competing values is the political
process itself. In determining the substantive values and goals of the
community, no criterion of validity stands higher than acceptance by
the people in the political arena.
Id. at 1841-42. Feldman offers another definition by Benjamin Barber: "[P]luralist de-
mocracy resolves public conflict in the absence of an independent ground through bar-
gaining and exchange among free and equal individuals and groups, which pursue their
private interests in a market setting governed by the social contract." Id. at 1841 n. 24
quoting Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy 143 (1984)).
8 Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, supra note 172, at 6. See also Feldman,
supra note 31, at 1841 & n. 25 (noting that the political marketplace often becomes a bat-
tleground).
179 In other words, "tyranny" reflects more of Bentham's fear of misrule than Mill's
fear of tyranny by the majority.
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fend against the oppression should be a judicial check. 180 If the
"yes.. .but" caveat is a majority preference, in the pluralist system
the majority should form its interest group 181 and press to have
government action reflect this preference. Instead, the preference
reflected benefits the minority group, and the white majority pref-
erence is reflected as a judicial check, under the semblance that the
external check is a colorblind Constitution.1
82
In a rough historical sketch, it might be argued that when gov-
ernment action reflected a domination by the white majority, the
white majority favored (or would have favored) the pluralist the-
ory. The black struggle for equality during this period did not nec-
essarily refute pluralism, but rather urged an external check to the
dominant white majority, in order to counteract the tyranny caused
by that dominant white majority preference. When government ac-
tion no longer reflected white majority preference (i.e., govern-
ment initiated the affirmative action programs), there was no
longer a need for external checks in pluralist decision-making, and
arguments supporting assimilation by whites strengthened. 183 As-
180 This statement is reflected in terms of pluralist theory, not constitutional theory.
181 The interest group preferences reflected should not indicate that the interests re-
flected are necessarily determined by the race of the person. A single African-American
preference may reflect disagreement with the institution of affirmative action, while an
Anglo-American's preference may support it.
182 One might compare this external check in a pluralist system with an external check
required when the dominant majority preference is the subordination of a minority cul-
ture. If government action reflects this preference, as it did with mandated segregation of
the races, then a judicial check is required because the majority preference creates the
feared "tyranny" by the majority.
183 Derrick Bell's interest-convergence thesis argues that blacks gain social justice
only when their interests happen to converge with those of the white majority. See Feld-
man, supra note 31, at 1842 & nn. 27, 29 (quoting Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and
American Law 39 (2d ed. 1980); Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the In-
terest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 526 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Inter-
est-Convergence Dilemma]). According to Bell, "[T]he degree of progress blacks have
made away from slavery and toward equality has depended on whether allowing blacks
more or less opportunity best served the interests and aims of white society." Bell, Race,
Racism and American Law, supra, at 39. Bell argues, for example, that the Supreme
Court ended school segregation in Brown I, only because the interests of blacks and mid-
dle- to upper-class whites happened to converge. See Bell, Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, supra, at 518, 526. Feldman compares this sentiment with that of Malcolm X,
who wrote, "Uncle Sam has no conscience. They don't know what morals are. They
don't try and eliminate an evil because it's evil, or because it's illegal, or because it's
immoral; they eliminated it only when it threatens their existence." See Feldman, supra
note 31, at 1842 n. 27 (quoting Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet (April 3, 1964), in
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similationism denies many pluralist claims. 184 In its strongest
form, 185 "normative ethnic assimilationism would deny that ethnic
diversity is even permissible within society."' 186 One assimilation
advocate argues, for example, that in a sexually equal society, no
more attention should be paid to sex than society pays to one's eye
color.187 The distinction between assimilationism and pluralism
seems to illustrate a potential distinction between the white major-
ity preference of subordination versus the white majority prefer-
ence of colorblindness, but this distinction is flawed because ra-
cism inhibits the theory of pluralism from effectively equalizing
the races.
a. Pluralism and the Dilemma of Group Harm
Pluralism's central assumption, "that self-interest is the exclu-
sive causal agent in politics,"'188 creates a serious drawback to the
pluralist theory. 189 Professor Feldman observes that extensive re-
search has shown that people are motivated to act on many consid-
Malcolm X Speaks 23, 40 (George Breitman ed., 1965)).
184 Professor Robert Simon comments that assimilation denies certain pluralistic
claims. See Simon, supra note 173, at 209. In its strongest form, Simon claims, assimila-
tion denies even minimal pluralistic claims. See id.
185 Simon considers assimilation in his article primarily with respect to the "strong"
claim. Id.
186 Id.
187 See Richard Wasserstrom, Racism and Sexism, in Today's Moral Problems 20-21
(Richard Wasserstrom, ed, 1985).
88 Daniel Farber & Phillip Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction
12 24 (1991). See also id. at 13-16; infra note 191 and accompanying text.
18§ See Feldman, supra note 31, at 1844 (noting that the narrow focus on self-interest
represents a dangerous "[m]otivational reductionism," portraying people as "rational
fools." (quoting Stephen Holmes, The Secret History of Self-Interest, in Beyond Self-
Interest 267, 275 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) [hereinafter Beyond Self-Interest] (argu-
ing that self-interest represents motivational reductionism); Amartya K. Sen, Rational
Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, in Beyond Self-
Interest, supra, at 25, 37)). Sen refutes (and illustrates the absurdities in) the notion that
people act solely from self-interest.
[The] assumption [is] that when asked a question, the individual
gives that answer which will maximize his personal gain. How good
is this assumption? I doubt that in general it is very good. ("Where is
the railway station?" he asks me. "There," I say, pointing to the post
office, "and would you please post this letter for me on the way?"
"Yes," he says, determined to open the envelope and check whether
it contains something valuable.)
Sen, supra, at 35.
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erations other than the rational pursuit of self-interest. 190 Greed
does not appear as the worst force in human psyche' 91 as a factor
often outweighing or overcoming self-interest. 192 Instead, "one of
the most ignoble forces is racism": 
193
The significance of racism in American society
renders implausible any appeal to self-interest as a
determinative force in achieving social justice for
the nonwhite poor. Studies of political issues re-
lated to race, such as school busing and affirmative
action, suggest* that racial intolerance is much
stronger than self-interest as an influence on indi-
vidual preferences. [One social psychologist] writes
that individuals "tend to perceive themselves as
having similar or identical goals to members of
190 See Feldman, supra note 31, at 1845
("For example, the simple act of voting is irrational from an eco-
nomic standpoint because the costs in time and effort clearly out-
weigh any potential benefits that are likely to flow from one's single
vote, yet many people nonetheless choose to make this economically
futile gesture. Moreover, contrary to what many believe, evidence
strongly suggests that members of Congress care about the merits of
issues and the public interest, not just reelection.").
See also id. at 1845 n. 53 (citing John Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in Beyond Self-
Interest, supra note 189, at 44, 45 (discussing forms of behavior not motivated by self-
interest); Robert H. Frank, A Theory of Moral Sentiments, in Beyond Self-Interest, supra
note 189, at 71, 75 (discussing forms of behavior not motivated by material payoffs)).
191 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 188, at 24. Farber and Frickey are concerned
with the public choice theory, which applies the capitalist economic theory to political
decision-making. The public choice theory relates to the pluralists view of self interest,
because "[the heart of the economic approach [to political decision-making] is the as-
sumption that self-interest is the exclusive causal agent in politics." See id. at 23-24;
Feldman, supra note 31, at 1840-41 & n. 21 (citing Farber & Frickey, supra note 188, at
7 13-16).
192 See Feldman, supra note 31, at 1846.
193 Id. Racism is not limited to the self-interest of a white majority consciously and
overtly seeking the domination of the black minority. It extends to a form of unconscious
racism.
[R]acism in America is more complex than either the conscious con-
spiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant big-
ots. It is part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a
part of our culture. It arises from the assumptions we have learned to
make about the world, ourselves, and others as well as from the pat-
terns of our fundamental social activities.
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 142, at 317, 330. See also
generally Lawrence, "Justice" or "Just Us", supra note 142.
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their own group and different or opposed goals to
members of other groups."'1 94 Quite simply, then,
racism prevents most whites from recognizing or
acknowledging when their interests coincide with
African-American interests. 
195
James Fishkin asserts, "I should not be able to enter a hospital
ward of healthy newborn babies and, on the basis of class, race,
sex or other arbitrary native characteristics, predict the eventual
position in society of those children." 196 Fishkin makes the distinc-
tion between two components of the idea (or ideal) of equal oppor-
tunity: first, the principle of merit ("There should be widespread
procedural fairness in the evaluation of qualifications for posi-
tions"); and, second, the principle of equality of life chances ("The
prospects of children for eventual positions in society should not
vary... with their arbitrary native characteristics").1 97 Professor
194 John C. Turner, The Experimental Social Psychology of Intergroup Behavior, in
Intergroup Behavior 66, 97 (John C. Turner & Howard Giles eds., 1981).
195 Feldman, supra note 31, at 1848 (footnote omitted). Professor Feldman continues,
Pluralistic appeals to self-interest not only are unlikely to overcome
the blinders of racism, they are also liable to increase racist beliefs
and attitudes. The white majority might occasionally cooperate with
the nonwhite poor for instrumental reasons-if cooperation appears
necessary to satisfy white interests. When circumstances appear to
shift, however, the white majority most likely will continue to follow
its self-interest, but now in new directions, which might diverge from
the interests of the nonwhite poor. Moreover, when individuals who
are generally oriented to self-interest feel threatened, they usually
become even more selfish. Any temporary cooperation based on self-
interest thus might actually propagate racism and worsen social con-
ditions. Pluralism encourages in-group members to see outsiders as
"other."
Id. (footnote omitted).
196 Simon, supra note 173, at 207 (quoting James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportu-
nity, and the Family 4 (1983)).
197 Joseph H. Carens, Difference and Domination: Reflections on the Relation Be-
tween Pluralism and Equality, in Nomos XXXII, supra note 143, at 226, 228-29 (quoting
Fishkin, supra note 196, at 22, 32). Carens refutes several assertions made by Robert
Simon, who rebuts Fishkin's concept that one should not be able to predict the eventual
social position of children on the basis of some arbitrary characteristic, such as race or
sex. See id. at 227; Simon, supra note 173, at 207-08. Simon defends pluralism, asserting
that one may attribute merit to cultural heritage. See Simon, supra note 173, at 207-08.
He implies that the success of Asian-Americans in higher education rebuts the notion
that cultural heritage is merely an arbitrary characteristic. See Carens, supra, at 227;
Simon, supra note 173, at 207-08. Carens characterizes Fishkin's comment that one
should not be able to predict social position on the basis of class, race or sex as applying
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Joseph Carens urges that the "very concept of equal life chances
presupposes a consensus on what is important in life, a consensus
that is incompatible with pluralism.' 198 He distinguishes between
advantaged and disadvantaged groups, 199 and between legitimate
inequality and illegitimate inequality,200 at least insofar as race and
sex are arbitrary and illegitimate characteristics for social selection
and exclusion.
20 1
to "members of the working class (as opposed to the upper class), blacks (as opposed to
whites), and women (as opposed to men)," rather than the comparatively more successful
groups such as Asian-Americans in higher education. Carens, supra, at 227. "For each
pair, we can predict that members of the first group will do less well on average than
members of the second with respect to such things as education and income." Id.
198 Carens, supra note 197, at 229. Carens then suggests that equal life chances is
more compatible with assimilationism. "[E]qual life chances would require 'equal devel-
opmental conditions,' which could be created only be eliminating all differences among
froups, that is, by assimilation." Id. (quoting Fishkin, supra note 196, at 32).
9 Carens uses Asian-Americans and the upper class as examples of advantaged
groups. See id.
00 Carens compares the legitimate inequality of the Amish with the illegitimate ine-
quality of the blacks. See id. at 233-39. The former segregate themselves from society,
thus creating for themselves an unequal life, at least in terms of materiality. See id. at
233-35. The latter has "less of what most Americans want," but not by their own choice.
Id. at 235.
201 Carens recalls a story by Malcolm X, when the latter was an eighth grade student.
See id. at 227. He was at the top of an integrated class. See id. A teacher (described as
well-meaning and full of advice) asked whether Malcolm had given any thought to a ca-
reer. See id. Malcolm replied he wanted to be a lawyer. See id. The teacher replied,
Malcolm, one of life's first needs is for us to be realistic. Don't mis-
understand me, now. We all like you here, you know that. But
you've got to be realistic about being a nigger. A lawyer-that's no
realistic goal for a nigger. You need to think about something you
can be. You're good with your hands-making things ... Why don't
you plan on carpentry?
Id. at 228 (quoting Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X 36 (1966)). Carens
responds,
It is impossible to hear such stories without having the reaction that
this sort of thing is so unfair, so arbitrary. It is arbitrary not in the
sense that it is random or that we cannot offer social explanations of
the phenomenon or that it does not contribute to the preservation of
patriarchy and racial domination. Rather it is arbitrary from the
moral point of view, arbitrary in the sense that there is no morally le-
gitimate reason for treating people this way. To call race and sex ar-
bitrary characteristics in this context then is not to deny that they
may be central to a person's identity and sense of self. It is to say that
they are illegitimate criteria of social selection and exclusion. To say
"because you are a woman" or "because you are black" is not to of-
fer an adequate reason for denying someone an opportunity to de-
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Carens' concentration on illegitimate inequality, similar to
Feldman's concentration on rejection of pluralism because of ra-
cism, centers on the continued effect of domination by white soci-
ety.202 He refers to a suggestion that inequality today is caused not
by domination, but by differences between blacks and whites.
203
Some authors, he notes, have suggested that the black culture does
not strive for educational achievement, which is an important key
to employment and income: 204
Why might that be? One plausible answer is that
black culture is in important respects a culture of
subordination. Socialization is a source of power,
and cultural differences between groups may reflect
and embody relations of domination and subordina-
tion. Children from dominant and subordinate
groups receive different sorts of socialization. Chil-
dren from subordinate groups are taught by schools,
but also by their families and peers, not to aspire to
positions possessed by members of the dominant
groups, not to expect equal treatment from authori-
ties, not to challenge the status quo or to show ini-
velop his or her talents to pursue a career. If group differences and
inequalities are connected in this way, they are morally wrong.
Id.
202 Carens himself recognizes racism as a "powerful and pervasive force in American
life, often openly influential, but even more often covertly and in ways the people in-
volved do not themselves understand." Id. at 235. Carens advocates affirmative action
programs because he does "not think it possible in most spheres to create procedures for
evaluating merit that are free of racism, at least of the unconscious variety." Id. at 235-
36. "In a multitude of ways, American society creates a hostile environment for blacks,
one in which it is harder for them than for whites to develop their potential and to flour-
ish." Id. at 236.
203 See id. at 236-37.
204 See Carens, supra note 197, at 236-37. Many of these same authors, Carens argues,
believe that racial discrimination is a thing of the past.
They point out that laws mandating segregation have been replaced
by laws prohibiting discrimination in education, housing, and em-
ployment.... They point to the success of other groups like Jews
and Asian-Americans who have also been the victims of discrimina-
tion and exclusion and who now do better in many ways than others.
They conclude that the lower than average success rate of black





tiative, and so on. In some respects this reflects a
prudent recognition of the dangers of excessive
ambition, but it also reflects, at least in part, inter-
nalization of subordination. A group that has con-
sistently been denied access to things the dominant
groups in society value may come to say it does not
want these things anyway .... A group culture that
has been significantly shaped by this sort of adapta-
tion cannot be used to legitimate the inequality of
which it is a product.20 5
These arguments against political pluralism asseverate many of
the same claims as the psychological and sociological claims that
group harm and stigma affect blacks, as a subordinated group in
society,20 6 differently (and more inequitably) than they do whites.
The effect of centuries of group oppression by the white majority
has placed the group of black Americans in a position of a subor-
dinated class, which should be a basis for rejecting pluralist ideals,
particularly because legislation reflected this white majority pref-
erence. At the same time, however, the group struggle to achieve
equality has bound blacks together, and created strength in press-
ing the black Americans' interests in the legislative process, albeit
with substantial resistance from the white establishment:
"Defensive" identification with an ethnic or reli-
gious group has always been a major source of cul-
tural pluralism in America; the victims of domina-
tion become bound together in a community, a
"fraternity of battle." Yet when the members of cul-
tural minorities have intensified their group attach-
ments by living in ethnic neighborhoods, or focus-
ing their economic dealings within the ethnic
communities, or founding ethnic social or political
organizations, the outside world has been ready to
call them "clannish" and unassimilable. Like many
another process involving social subordination, this
one is circular. The exclusion of members of the
cultural minority from full participation in the lar-
205 Id. at 237-38.
206 See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
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ger society causes them to focus their need to be-
long on the cultural group itself; and this very soli-
darity stimulates further outside suspicion and hos-
tility.207
The struggle of black American interest groups to press the in-
terests has been and will most likely continue to be an escalating
struggle against hostile opposition. Through this struggle, the
black interest groups have pressed legislation to counter the white
domination preference from being reflected in the legislative ac-
tion. This does not suggest that political pluralism is the ideal for
achieving equality, for racism of the aversive variety could easily
hinder the ability of the pluralist system to achieve equality.
Moreover, it would be a mistaken assumption that blacks desire to
continue this escalating struggle to have their preferences pressed
through legislative action. Just as blacks have made gains through
the pressing of their interests, interest groups may likewise press
legislation in the opposite direction. Black interest groups may be
able to withstand the opposition in the political realm, but the op-
posing forces have chosen a different route-one that circumvents
the legislative process altogether and relies on the judicial process
that failed the blacks from the drafting of the Equal Protection
Clause until midway through this century.
b. Assimilationism on White Terms
The first Section of this Article concentrated on how racial
attitudes affect blacks in the United States much differently than
whites. The effects of the racial imbalance may be viewed through
the pluralist theory, since white society banded together to push its
collective interest to subordinate members of the black race. Dat-
207 Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. Rev. 303, 326 (1986) (footnotes omitted). See also William Carey McWiliams,
The Idea of Fraternity in America 542 (1973); Ronald H. Bayor, Neighbors in Conflict:
The Irish, Germans, Jews, and Italians of New York City, 1929-1941 (1978). Professor
Karst comments that
[p]ersonalism and nepotism have been seen as ways of surviving in a
hostile environment. Some forms of economic activity are suited for
this kind of defensive response to adversity, for they are "located
within a particular kind of social network: close quarters, daily rou-
tines, local connections, personal service, familial cooperation."
Karst, supra, at 326 n. 149 (quoting Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 161 (1983)).
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ing beyond Jim Crow laws and the Black Codes, black Americans
began to bind together even within the context of slavery. The
slaves themselves were culturally diverse, just as the Germans,
Italians, English, Irish, Russians, Bosnians, and Serbs are distinct
and culturally diverse, yet the common bond of slavery "welded
them into one people. ' 20 8 Slavery helped shape the diversity of
ethnic groups and the pressing of interests in favor or in opposition
of those group interests, because "[e]thnic pluralism in America
has its origins in conquest, slavery, and exploitation of foreign la-
bor. ' 209 As slavery evolved into the Black Codes, 2 10 and the Black
Codes evolved into mandated segregation, the caste system con-
tinued to remain engrained in society. When the Supreme Court
altered its approach to the caste legislation by stressing individual
rights, it first recognized oppression based on group membership
as a violation of equal protection:
Racial segregation not only stigmatizes its victims;
it also excludes them from full participation as
members of society, treating them as members of a
subordinate caste. An earlier generation of Supreme
Court Justices left the matter of segregation to ma-
joritarian politics, which meant, given the disen-
franchisement of blacks, the reinforcement of a sys-
tem of racial subordination in all phases of life.
After holding Jim Crow unconstitutional [in Brown
1], the Supreme Court pronounced the demise of
"caste legislation" in America. The attack on caste
employed the rhetoric of individualism: henceforth,
an individual was not to be treated as less than an
equal citizen because of his or her membership in a
racial ... group. This "anti-discrimination princi-
ple" is individualistic in outlook: treat each person
208 See Karst, supra note 207, at 320. See also, e.g., John W. Blassingame, The Slave
Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South 147 (rev. ed. 1979); Ira Berlin,
Time Space, and the Evolution of Afro-American Society on British Mainland North
America, 85 Am. Hist. Rev. 44, 66 (1980); Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in
American Institutional and Intellectual Life 8 1-90 (3d ed. 1976); Leon F. Litwack, Been
in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery 514 (1981).
209 Steven Steinberg, The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America 5
1981).
10 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).
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as an individual, not on the basis of group member-
ship. 211
Colorblindness today hinges on the individual, and all racial
classifications are deemed inherently destructive.21 2 Justices rely-
ing heavily on the concept of a colorblind Constitution seek to re-
place all racial preferences with equal opportunity for all, as if all
citizens have been given an equal opportunity to succeed in the
first place.213 Some critics point to the fact that although affirma-
tive action was initiated as a temporary measure, it has failed to be
"temporary," 214 as if to reverse the effects of slavery, exclusion,
forced conformity and subordination will take merely one genera-
tion to accomplish. 215 Moreover, critics point out that the young
people affected by affirmative action "cannot understand affirma-
tive action's application of different rules to different groups.
' 216
211 Karst, supra note 207, at 323-24 (footnotes omitted). Professor Karst continues,
Yet stigma, like caste, is a group experience. A characteristic like
race, unorthodox religion, or ethnicity is identified as deserving of
stigma, and the stigma imposed on the whole group of people who
share the characteristic. When we invent a "stigma-theory" to justify
the stigma, we incorporate our assumptions about the whole group
rather than picking on the particular characteristics of this or that in-
dividual.
Id. at 324 (footnotes omitted).
212 See Jennifer R. Byrne, Comment, Toward a Colorblind Constitution: Justice
O'Connor's Narrowing of Affirmative Action, 42 St. Louis Univ. L. J. 619, 622 (1998)
(citing Mary C. Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors-Keeping Score in the Af-
firmative Action Ballpark from Weber to Johnson, 30 BC.L. Rev. 1, 47 (1988)).
213 Id. at 622.
214 See id. at 621; Terry Eastland, Support is Fading for Racial, Gender, Ethnic Pref-
erences, The San Diego Union-Tribune, July 7, 1996, at GI, available in 1996 WL
2168215.
215 See Karst, supra note 207, at 325
("Virtually every cultural minority in America has had to face exclu-
sion, forced conformity, and subordination. All these patterns of na-
tivism are variations of the same theme: those who are different can-
not belong as full members of the community. The victims of
cultural domination, therefore, face a serious problem: they must
necessarily live their lives within the larger society, and in order to
define themselves they must satisfy their basic needs for connection.
They may choose to turn inward to solidarity of the excluded group,
banding together to confront the larger society. Alternatively, indi-
vidual members of the cultural minority may, as to some aspects of
their lives and in varying degrees, be assimilated into the culture of
the larger society.").
216 Byrne, supra note 212, at 622 (citing Eastland, supra note 214, at GI).
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Individualism in this oblique colorblind argument stresses the "I"
in every opinion regarding preferences to help the oppressed and
long excluded group enter a society that has never welcomed them
(that is, "I've never participated in the discrimination, so why
should I have to pay the consequences of it"). White individuals
may deny they "belong" in any sense to a white dominant major-
ity, and since the Constitution protects only individual rights, they
may at the same time enjoy the benefits of a society that does not
require them to conform. Blacks, on the other hand, are better
served by forgetting they are black and conforming to white soci-
ety's terms.
The utilitarian principle of self-regarding prudence may now
be considered in another light.217 Originally, affirmative action
threatened white society's "security" in its own domination. The
idea that subordinate blacks would infiltrate and become equal
members of a dominant white society was deemed the legislative
abuse of power that the utilitarians recognized as a fear against a
person's sense of security.218 As the white self-interest evolved,
through what this theory inherited from utilitarianism, the overt
subordination of the minority class was no longer the prescription
for pluralism. 2 19 Instead, white self-interest overtly blinds itself to
the underlying racism and discrimination, and expresses fear of the
loss of individual security because the white person's self-interest
is not being considered equally with the black American's interest.
The utilitarian's answer, much like the judiciary's answer, is to
eliminate the cause of the insecurity to the white person's interest.
Objectively, blacks will continue to be treated "equally," so their
sense of security cannot be said to be violated or cause pain. At the
same time, the pain through insecurity felt by whites by affirma-
tive action is relieved, and the greatest happiness is achieved in
society.
The conclusion that the end of racial preferences causes a
greater happiness (or somehow grants equal opportunity to all) ad-
heres as much to the majority preference as blatantly discrimina-
tory self-interests of white Americans expressed through govern-
217 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
219 See Karst, supra note 207, at 324-25.
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ment action. It ignores the barrier of conformity that is necessary
for blacks to succeed in the white society; thus, the greatest happi-
ness achieved is the greatest happiness in white society. Assimila-
tion to blacks is synonymous with conformity to white society. 22 0
"Anglo-conformity" has long come to "dominate the idea of as-
similation and thus to redefine the qualifications for being received
in our Alma Mater's lap."' 22' At a group level, "unassimilable" his-
torically implied that the group seeking to assimilate to the white
American society was "not sufficiently similar to the old stock to
adapt themselves to a society defined by the old stock's world
view, and, therefore, that they should be excluded from the Ameri-
can community. '222 As Professor Karst notes, "It is no wonder that
220 Professor Jerome Culp, Jr. introduces his article on the effect of the Brown I deci-
sion by discussing the misconception that blacks who wish to remain bound to their own
culture are now part of the problem since they refuse to assimilate to white society.
Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture and the Brown
Case, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 665, 666-67 (1995). As an example, he discusses an inci-
dent at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill:
[B]lack students... demanded from a recalcitrant administration that
the university create, or-after they were able to secure financial
support from Michael Jordan's mother-permit the creation of a
black cultural center on campus. Paul Hardin, Chancellor of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina and dedicated and principled liberal, ap-
peared to do everything in his power to avoid meeting the students'
demand. He said he was afraid of separatism and balkanization
among students. Chancellor Hardin, a good and decent man, first ar-
gued that the university did not have the resources to undertake such
an endeavor. He then argued against locating the cultural center near
the center of campus. He resisted the students' demands that the cen-
ter be placed near the seats of intellectual and institutional power on
the central campus. In previous years, a number of black students ob-
jected to the portrayal of black students in an art work that has one
male blackstudent twirling a basketball and one black female figure
carrying books on her head. These and other incidents on campuses
across the country prompted Garry Trudeau to create a Doonesbury
comic strip in which black students demanded separate water foun-
tains .... The Trudeau cartoon illustrated what many people believe:
that our desire for the full integration of black Americans has come
full circle. Many white liberals, and a few blacks, contend that Afri-
can Americans are now not part of the solution but instead part of the
problem.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Joe Drape, UNC Faces Turmoil over Black Cultural Cen-
ter, Atlanta Journal, Sept. 13, 1992, at A3, available in 1992 WL 4620955; Garry Tru-
deau, Doonesbury, Wash. Post, Sept. 12, 1993 (Sunday Comics section)).
221 Karst, supra note 207, at 312.
222 Id. at 312. Professor Karst comments that "Congress implemented this policy of
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the members of some ethnic groups today bristle at the very word
'assimilation' and take it as an affront. ' 223 Where pluralism had
been white America's prescription for the subordination of racial
minorities, forced conformity has been its prescription for assimi-
lation. "These two forms of cultural suppression reinforce each
other":224
The pressure to conform carries with it an implica-
tion that members of the unorthodox cultural group
are inferior. Correspondingly, the subordination of
a cultural group, even while it intensifies the
group's cohesion, undermines confidence in the
group's values and perspectives, with the long-term
effect of impairing the perceived worth of the
group's ethnic identity and thus of promoting con-
formity to the dominant cultural norms.225
exclusion by denying members of various racial or cultural groups entry into the country
and by denying the benefits of citizenship both to certain classes of aliens and to Ameri-
cans who were black or Indian." Id. at 312-13 (footnotes omitted).
223 Id. at 313.
224 Id. at 324.
225 Id. at 324-25 (footnote omitted). Professor Karst admits an exact definition of as-
similation is nearly impossible, but that "there are some measures of assimilation upon
which observers can agree: language usage, educational integration, occupational disper-
sal, residential dispersal, and intercultural marriage." Id. at 333. "By these tests, it is
plain that a common pattern prevails for nearly all the ethnic groups in American history:
eventually they become largely integrated into the American cultural mainstream." Id.
Karst continues:
What causes assimilation to take place? The details of the mecha-
nism are not well documented, but three generalizations seem true,
even in the absence of hard evidence. First, the commonly assumed
assimilating effects of occupational mobility in an open society illus-
trate a larger truth: assimilation is advanced when the members of a
cultural minority take part in the institutions and activities of the lar-
ger society. It is often said that assimilation is promoted by such be-
havior as speaking English, attending the public schools, listening to
the national broadcast media, entering the job market, joining a un-
ion, moving away from the ethnic neighborhood, and voting in pub-
lic elections. But a person who engages in a significant number of
these kinds of behavior is assimilated. No bright line differentiates
the measures of assimilation from the mechanisms that produce as-
similation. The various forms of behavior that indicate assimilation
tend to reinforce each other, accelerating assimilation. The rein-
forcement takes place in people's minds. It is circular: the more a
person engages in "mainstream" behavior, the more that person is apt
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Even if the overt preference of whites is not suppression of
blacks through conformity, the preference of "Yes, I want racial
equality and integration, but not at my expense,"226 (or something
to that effect) indicates an unwillingness to incur any pain on the
dominant white culture, regardless of the pain felt by the black
culture. If "greatest happiness in the greatest number" is indeed re-
flective of utilitarianism's representation of majority ascendancy,
then this majority preference has in fact become reflected in the
law. Needless to say, utility is merely one standard by which to
judge this preference. But judged by other standards, the ultimate
outcome seems generally to favor the white majority preference,
no matter what labels are placed on the preferences or values
within the political theory. For example, a civic republican's de-
liberation for the "common good" most likely will not result in an
outcome different from that of one that desires the greatest happi-
ness of all.227 Similarly, an economic theorist would be unable to
base the distribution of government benefits and burdens on some
abstract or arbitrary principle as the race of the group to be bene-
fited or burdened. 228
That many of the political theories fail to consider black
American's concerns and reflect a dominant white preference
would not be as problematic were it not for the role the Supreme
Court has played in race relations. The Court's role in race rela-
tions due to Plessy, however improper and incorrect, was at least
to perceive himself or herself as part of the wider American culture
and to be disposed to participate in it still further.
Id. at 333-34 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
226 See Hochschild & Herk, supra note 148, at 309.
227 Professor Feldman, for example, finds that pervasive racism presents enormous
pitfalls for both the theories of pluralism and civic republicanism. See Feldman, supra
note 31, at 1840. "Political pluralism-because it emphasizes individualism and
self-interest-most likely will not lead Americans to any long-term commitments to so-
cial justice for the nonwhite poor. On the contrary, pluralism is likely to propagate ra-
cism and to weaken efforts made toward social justice." Id. He does, however, suggest
that civic republicanism is the strongest approach to reducing racism. See id.
228 Judge Posner summarizes the essence of the economic theory's approach to the
Equal Protection Clause in his commentary on DeFunnis v. Odegaard: "I contend, in
short, that the proper constitutional principle is not, no 'invidious' racial or ethnic dis-
crimination, but no use of racial or ethnic criteria to determine the distribution of gov-
ernment benefits and burdens." Posner, supra note 36, at 25. See also generally Stout,
supra note 36 (exploring "some of the implications of social choice for judicial review of
statutes that burden fundamental rights or employ suspect classifications").
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non-intrusive on the legislative process. Several authors have
noted that where the court found constitutional violation in
Brown I, it delayed the elimination of constitutional harm by re-
quiring desegregation with "all deliberate speed"229 in Brown ii.230
Professor Jerome Culp charges that the Supreme Court did not
wish to protect the culture or values of the black community in
Brown II, but that the Court assumed there were no values worth
protecting in the black community. 23' The Court's passive role in
the years immediately following Brown II led the federal govern-
ment to step up and assure through national legislation that blacks
would be guaranteed the civil rights that the Equal Protection
Clause should have afforded them in the first place. In this era of
judicial activism in the area of civil rights, on the other hand, it is
no longer the legislature that necessarily fails to protect the black
interest; instead, the Supreme Court has assumed the new role of
reflecting the white majority preference. Under a cloak that "Our
Constitution is colorblind," the Supreme Court assumes that blacks
seek or should seek assimilation, and the Court has imposed "neu-
tral" rules on the discourse between black and white communi-
ties.232 Under this assumption, the quiddity of new era colorblind-
ness is more to the effect that "yes, blacks may assimilate in
society, but not at the expense of the existing dominant culture."
The Court's neutral, colorblind position thus enforces the existing
power of the white majority to dominate the concerns of black
citizens. The reflection of the dominant white majority in the law,
either through legislative initiative or through judicial activism, is
the essence of "Colorblind I, Colorblind II," a historical journey of
black suppression and the Supreme Court's role considered in the
next Section.
229 Brown v. Board of Education [Brown II], 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
230 See Culp, supra note 220, at 678. See also Louis Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard Core
of Racism, 13 Buff. L. Rev. 450, 457-59 (1964) (suggesting that Brown I was the first
time the Court ignored remedying constitutional harm suffered by individual plaintiffs in
order to fashion a remedy for an entire class of individuals).
231 See Culp, supra note 220, at 678.
232 See id. Professor Culp's comments refer to the racial gerrymandering cases of the
1990s. Several of his comments will again be considered at infra notes 581, 587 and ac-
companying text.
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C. Does Race Matter
It seems that an increasing number of people have come to be-
lieve that race does not matter. Public ideology teaches equality
and non-racism, and no one today would bar a black child from re-
ceiving an education. Contrary to these claims, America is, and
always has been, a color-conscious and not a colorblind society.
233
Race is such a powerful aspect of our lives that overcoming it may
well be impossible; however, to claim that race should be ignored
simply disregards the American reality. 234 In his classic study of
race relations in America, Gunnar Myrdal observed: "The subor-
dinate position of Negroes is perhaps the most glaring conflict in
the American conscience and the greatest unsolved task for
American democracy. ' '235 Myrdal claimed that the Negro problem
is really a white problem as the United States was truly a white
man's country, and therefore the Negro's entire life was in some
way or another a reaction to white pressure.
236
Fifty years after Myrdal, the racial debate continues and the
task is yet unsolved. The shift has merely been one of lateral posi-
tioning-from subordinate black to non-black black. In public de-
bate about racial issues today, as in the past, many people claim
that society must be bound by the same morality that would be
suitable to a just society-that morality being reflected in the apo-
thegm "colorblind". 237 This is a natural tendency if one exists in an
ideal world. The harsh reality however, is that this is not an ideal
society-it is rather a society of racial injustice and preferences. It
is a society riddled with disparity and unfairness, where a child's
life chances vary with his or her color.238 Racism today is at once
inconsistent with the dominant public ideology and yet embedded
233 See W.H. Knight and Adrien Wing, An Essay to Our Children About Affirmative
Action, in African Americans and the Living Constitution 208, 222 (John Hope Franklin
& Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995).
234 See id.
235 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modem Democ-
racy. (1944). See also supra note 26 and accompanying text and infra note 484 and ac-
companying text (discussing Myrdal).
236 See Myrdal, supra note 235, at xiv-lix.
237 See K. Anthony Appiah & Amy Gutman, Color Conscious: The Political Morality
of Race 109 (1998).
238 Seeid. at 110.
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(if only unconsciously) in each of us. 239
While our country respects individual achievements, it also
recognizes that what people have achieved often depends on the
family they grow up with, the schools they have attended, and the
neighborhood they grew up in, besides their own ability. People
rightly seek a society in which racial prejudice no longer limits
opportunity. 240 However, any observer who looks closely enough
at American society will see the many conscious and unconscious
ways in which the cultural patterns and teachings of racism inter-
fere with an open and just society. As testimony, when an inter-
viewer interested in nomenclature asked the distinguished social
psychologist Kenneth Clark, "What is the best thing for blacks to
call themselves," Clark replied: "White."'241 Similarly, Cornel
West, in Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America, sug-
gests that it takes all that is within him to remain hopeful about the
struggle for human dignity and existential democracy, noting that
not since the 1920s have so many black folk been disappointed
and disillusioned with America.
242
West also expresses concern that the cultural structures (those
created by black foremothers and forefathers out of the antecedent
fragments of religious and civic traditions, mostly of the cultures
around them) that once sustained black life in America are no
longer effective, as evidenced by the fact that until the early seven-
ties black Americans had the lowest suicide rate in the United
States, but now young black people lead the nation in the rate of
increase in suicides.243 West has put forth two significant reasons
why the threat is more powerful now than ever: (1) the saturation
of market forces and market moralities in black life and (2) the
present crisis in black leadership. 244 These forces, according to
West, have left more and more blacks vulnerable to daily lives en-
dured with little sense of self and fragile existential moorings.245
239 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 142, at 322.
240 See Sam Roberts, Conversations/Kenneth B. Clark: An Integrationist to This Day,
Believing All Else Has Failed, N. Y. Times, May 7, 1995, § 4, at 7.
241 See id.
242 See Comet West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America xvii (1993).
243 See Cornel West, Race Matters 24 (1993)
244 See id.
245 See id. at 25.
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Poverty, after all, has a habit of keeping one occupied with the
more mundane aspects of life, rather than the politics or capitalis-
tic tendencies of the free market system.
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. would agree with West concerning a
black leadership crisis. Gates expresses that the real crisis in black
leadership is that the very idea of black leadership is in crisis-that
black America needs politics whose first mission is not the rein-
forcement of the idea of black America, and a discourse of race
that is not centrally concerned with preserving the idea of race and
the unanimity of race.246 Gates writes that blacks need something
they do not yet have: a way of speaking about black poverty that
does not falsify the reality of black advancement, and a way of
speaking about black advancement that does not distort the endur-
ing realities of black poverty.247 In short, blacks have yet to realize
the full impact of their electorate powers and their own voices, or
the potential of leadership currently limited by economic and, to a
lesser degree, intellectual suppression. Given the brief duration of
"antidiscrimination" as compared to the length of "discrimination"
practices, this is not surprising. Gates does emphasize the area of
black arts, as there are so many black artists and intellectuals that
matter to demonstrate what can happen when black potential is re-
alized.
Simply then, it would seem that there is a disproportionate
voice in the chorus of the nation's population that has yet to be
heard, a voice which should not be heard if the nation as a whole is
to prosper from its own resources. Whites need not understand or
live in a black world in order to survive, but blacks continue to be
forced to live in two worlds, or in a colorblind society, in essence,
a white world, to survive. 248 It is this prospect, one of disregard or
ignorance of color, that denies race as the constant that it is, that
prompts these intellectuals to reiterate that race does matter, and in
a rapidly changing demographic picture, it matters all the more.
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II. SOME IMPOSSIBLE FEAT:24 9 THE TREACHEROUS JOURNEY OF
"COLORBLINDNESS;" THE GRAVAMINA
John W. Davis, in the first closing arguments of Brown J,250
grasped a quote from black civic leader W.E.B. Du Bois and
struck a blow to the back of the collective heads of black Ameri-
can leaders trying to end the institution of segregation.251 Du Bois'
statement indicated it would be a mistake to allow black children
into the same schools as white children, raised by parents who
hated black children. Thurgood Marshall, NAACP counsel arguing
249 See Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait 134 (1964). See also The Misin-
terpretation of the Words of Martin Luther King Jr., J. Blacks Higher Educ., Summer
1998, at 21. Several opponents of affirmative action have used Martin Luther King's
words as an attack on affirmative action programs, with one commenting to the Wall
Street Journal, "Martin Luther King's legacy was not built upon fighting for racial pref-
erence policies, and it's unfortunate that we've reached a point now when we're trying to
sweep this history under the rug." Id. (quoting the statement of Gerald A. Reynolds, ex-
ecutive director of the Center for New Black Leadership, to the Wall Street Journal).
In 1964, King wrote:
Whenever this issue of compensatory or preferential treatment for
the Negro is raised, some of our friends recoil in horror. The Negro
should be granted equality, they agree; but he should ask nothing
more. On the surface, this appears reasonable, but it is not realistic.
For it is obvious that if a man is entering the starting line of a race
three hundred years after another man, the first would have to per-
form some impossible feat in order to catch up with his fellow run-
ner.
King, supra, at 134.
250 Brown I was first argued in December 1952. See Carl T. Rowan, Dream Makers,
Dream Breakers: The World of Justice Thurgood Marshall 195-99 (1993). The Court de-
termined it needed more information on the school segregation cases. See id. at 203. The
case was reargued in December 1953. See id.
251 See id. at 199. Davis relied on a quote from Du Bois which apparently supported
the separate but equal doctrine:
It is difficult to think of anything more important for the develop-
ment of a people than proper training for their children; and yet I
have repeatedly seen wise and loving parents take infinite pains to
force their little children into schools where the white children, white
teachers, and white parents despised and resented the dark child,
make mock of it, neglected or bullied it, and literally rendered its life
a living hell. Such parents want their children to "fight" this thing
out-but, dear God, at what a cost!
We shall get a finer, better balance of spirit; an infinitely more
capable and rounded personality by putting children in schools where
they are wanted, and where they are happy and inspired, than in
trusting them into hells where they are ridiculed and hated.
Id. at 199-200.
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for desegregation, later recalled, "Here was the Devil quoting
phony Scripture .... ",252 Some twenty-eight years later, in Ful-
lilove v. Klutznick,253 the Supreme Court upheld a program requir-
ing at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for public works to
be used to procure services or supplies from African-American
businesses. 254 Justice Potter Stewart dissented on the grounds that
a program granting preferences to members of minority classes
was essentially inseparable from the type of legislative action that
separated the races in Plessy in 1896.255 Not unlike Davis' quote
of Du Bois, Justice Stewart utilized a symbolic maxim or apo-
thegm as a vice, which would lead quickly to a judicial disman-
tling of affirmative action: "Our Constitution is colorblind .... ,,256
A short history of constitutional interpretation following Ful-
lilove will tell us that the Court altered its standard within 15 years
after Fullilove, deciding cases such as Croson and Adarand under
the doctrine of strict scrutiny.257 Yet whether the Court seeks to
252 Id. at 200. Justice Marshall rebutted,
The significant factor running through these arguments is that for
some reason, which is still unexplained, Negroes are taken out of the
mainstream of American life, in these states. There is nothing in-
volved in this case other than race and color .... If Ralph Bunche
were assigned to South Carolina, his children would go to a Jim
Crow school. No matter how great anyone becomes, if he happens to
be born a Negro, regardless of his color, he is relegated to that
school.
Id.
253 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
254 See id.
255 See id. at 522-23 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
256 Id. at 522. Justice Stewart continued,
[Justice Harlan's] colleagues disagreed with him, and held that a
statute that required the separation of people on the basis of their race
was constitutionally valid because it was a 'reasonable' exercise of
legislative power and had been 'enacted in good faith for the promo-
tion [of] the public good .... I think today's opinion is wrong for the
same reasons that Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong ....
Id. at 523.
257 City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 489 (1989), decided in 1989,
struck down a set-aside program patterned after the one in Fullilove. A year later, the
court upheld a federal set-aside program in Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990), subjecting it to intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, on the basis
that it was a federal action rather than a state action. The Court overturned Metro Broad-
casting in 1995, declaring in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995),
that all racial classifications would be subjected to strict scrutiny. This Article does not
discuss the racial gerrymandering cases, see Lawyer v. Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997);
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find an important government interest or a compelling government
interest does little to explain what the concept of colorblindness
has to do with the burden-shifting of the Court's interpretation.
258
In other words, where between important and compelling govern-
ment interests does the Constitution become colorblind? If the
shift in abstract quality and meaning of colorblindness came into
being somewhere between 1980 and 1995, the Constitution is not
only colorblind, it is also nearsighted. It also fails to recognize that
two justices-both affirmative action beneficiaries of sorts259-
have penned opinions against affirmative action.260 It also brings
to mind the proverb that "[e]verything is according to the color of
the glass with which one views it.' '261
The last Part ended by suggesting the Supreme Court's role in
equal protection jurisprudence during the last decade has allowed
white majority preferences to be reflected in the law. This Part ex-
plores the role the judiciary has played in defining colorblindness
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 14 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See generally Melissa
L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 Mich. L. Rev.
245 (1997).
258 Several commentators have explained that the heightened standard of review is
nothing more than an evidentiary device, "designed to facilitate judicial identification of
instances of special treatment that lack an adequate public purpose justification." Saun-
ders, supra note 257, at 307. See also John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 147 (1980);
Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality of Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and De-
mocratic Theory, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1049, 1077 (1979); Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal
Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1033-36
(1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 140-43; Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 344, 356 (1949).
259 See Jennifer R. Byrne, Comment, Toward a Colorblind Constitution: Justice
O'Connor's Narrowing of Affirmative Action, 42 St. Louis Univ. L. J. 619 (1998).
President Ronald Reagan nominated Justice O'Connor in 1981 as a fulfillment of a cam-
paign promise to nominate a woman to the Court. See Nancy Maveety, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor: Strategist on the Supreme Court 16-17 (1996). Clarence Thomas was
nominated by President George Bush in 1991 as a replacement for Justice Thurgood
Marshall, the only other African-American Justice on the Supreme Court. See The Ox-
ford Companion to the Supreme Court 870-71 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) [herein-
after Oxford Companion].
260 Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion in Croson and the majority opinion in
Adarand, as well as several of the racial gerrymandering cases. Justice Thomas con-
curred in Adarand.
261 A Dictionary of American Proverbs 106 (Wolfgang Mieder et al. eds., 1992).
382 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 7:3
throughout several periods in history. A complete historical outline
is not offered here, however, for such an effort would prove fu-
tile. 262 This Part concentrates primarily on two distinct uses of "co-
lorblind," through the voices of several justices on the Supreme
Court: Justice Harlan in his dissents in Plessy and The Civil Rights
Cases; future Justice Thurgood Marshall as a lawyer for the
NAACP in Brown I; Chief Justice Earl Warren in his opinions in
Brown I and Brown II; Justice Lewis Powell in Bakke; then-Justice
Marshall in Fullilove and Croson; Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in
Croson and Adarand; and Justice Clarence Thomas in Adarand.
A. The Etymology of Colorblind en Breve
263
A brief etymology at this point, although certainly not exhaus-
tive, affords critical understanding of the semantic doublings of
the term "colorblind". The power of discourse arises from its abil-
ity to construct a public narrative and then obstruct counter-
262 Admittedly, not only would such an effort be futile, it has also already been done
several times over. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education estimates that in the last
five years alone, more than 100,000 books and articles have been published on the issue
of affirmative action. See The Arrival of the Bowen-Bok Study on Racial Preferences in
College Admissions, J. Blacks Higher Educ., Summer 1998, at 120.
263 While the author was a student at The Hague Academy of International Law in The
Hague, Holland, during a tour of the International Court of Justice, it was noted that the
statue of lady justice did not have a blindfold as we normally see her cloaked. This
earthly concept was that justice should not be blind. In time this led the author to a re-
consideration and evaluation of the conflicting concepts of the term colorblind. Can jus-
tice in America not take color into account in light of color-based discrimination or a
documented historical reality of colorblind discrimination as a continuing part of the na-
tion's legacy? Yet, the author believes that the nation is seeking to solve and resolve the
"American Dilemma" of racial and social injustice and its effects. As Ellis Cose stated,
America came into existence as a divided personality-a nation that
celebrated freedom and proclaimed the equality of man, yet tolerated
race-based slavery and offered naturalization only to persons who
were free and white. Even in the aftermath of the Civil War, when
the nation finally acknowledged that blacks were fully human, too,
Americans struggled to find a way to embrace simultaneously the
warring gods of social justice and injustice. Justice Joseph Bradley's
insistence that before the Civil War, "free colored people" enjoyed
"all the essential rights of life, liberty and property the same as white
citizens," is a reflection of the need-both legal and psychological-
to locate a justification for inequality within an argument for equal-
ity. That has been America's dilemma from the beginning.
Ellis Cose, Color-Blind: Seeing Beyond Race in a Race-Obsessed World 180 (1997).
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explanations for social reality.264 Since "colorblind" is both a his-
torical and "philosophical" term, the derivation of the term is in-
trinsically intertwined with both of these aspects. Andrew Kull
traced the language of colorblindness back to petitions that anti-
slavery activists submitted to legislatures of free states in the
1830s. 265 Bonnie Wisdom, Judge John Minor Wisdom's wife,
traced Justice Harlan's maxim to a metaphor from Albion Winegar
Tourgre, a plaintiff's attorney:266 "Justice is pictured blind and her
daughter, the Law, ought at least to be colorblind.'267 Tourgre was
employed by a "Comit6 des Citoyens to Test the Constitutionality
of the Separate Car Law" in Louisiana, organized in 1891 after the
Louisiana legislature passed a separate-car bill required "equal but
separate" accommodations on all passenger railways.268 Tourgre,
along with Louis Martinet, a prominent lawyer, doctor and news-
paper editor, and New Orleans criminal attorney James C. Walker,
sought to find a "nearly white" person as a "test case" for the sepa-
rate-car act:
269
264 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 Cal. L.
Rev. 1581, 1585 (1993) (stating that narratives both filter and construct a reality).
265 See Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution 22-66 (1992). Kull also argued
that historical evidence strongly refutes the argument that the framers intended the Equal
Protection Clause to "require color blindness on the part of government .... " Id. at vii.
266 John Minor Wisdom, Plessy v. Ferguson-O0 Years Later, 53 Wash & Lee L.
Rev. 9, 10-11 (1996) [hereinafter J. M. Wisdom, 100 Years] (citing Bonnie Wisdom,
Crusading Carpetbagger 25 (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter B. Wisdom, Crusading
Carpetbagger]). See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
267 J. M. Wisdom, 100 Years, supra note 266, at 10-11 (emphasis added) (citing B.
Wisdom, Crusading Carpetbagger, supra note 266, at 25 (finding that the quote actually
came first from a hero in a novel written by Tourgre)).
268 Id. at 13-14. Louisiana at the time was a prime example of the effect of Jim Crow
laws in the South. "In Louisiana there weie almost as many black voters as white voters
until the Constitution of 1898 disfranchised 98 percent of the African American voters in
the state." Id. at 13. In 1890, the Louisiana legislature had enacted a statute requiring
"equal but separate accommodations" on railroad trains. Id. As the legislature convened,
many citizens organized to oppose the legislation, arguing "Citizenship is national and
has no color." Many blacks in New Orleans were "Creole," referring, among others, to
African-Americans who were descendants of blacks and whites. See id. Many were well-
educated and descendants of free African-Americans. See id. at 13-14. These "Creoles"
provided leadership for the blacks of New Orleans. See id. at 13.
69 According to Judge Wisdom, the lawyers were concerned with the complexion of
the skin of the person chosen for the first test case. See id. at 14. Martinet, who was a
leader among the groups opposing the act, objected that in New Orleans "persons of tol-
erably fair complexion, even if unmistakably colored, enjoy a large degree of immunity
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Tourg~e expected to argue that the unreasonable-
ness of segregating such persons was a deprivation
of property and a violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was also a
stigma of slavery and therefore violated the Thir-
teenth Amendment. A few blacks, very few, had an
additional point in wishing to pass as white.
270
After the first test case failed,27' Walker, with the apparent co-
operation of the railroads, arranged another suit involving Homer
Plessy, a man who was seven-eighths white. 272 In the all-too-
familiar story, Plessy was arrested for refusing to remove himself
to the "colored persons" section. Judge Wisdom notes that a New
Orleans police detective apparently had knowledge of the plan.
273
Tourg~e and Walker took the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court
after Plessy was convicted.2 74 At the time the case was decided in
front of the Louisiana Supreme Court, interracial marriage was
still legal. 275 In the plaintiffs brief, Tourg6e argued,
A man surely has an absolute right to the compan-
ionship and society of his wife; and on the other
hand, a wife has claims which cannot be denied on
the protection of her husband .... The statute
from the accursed prejudice." Id. Martinet continued, "but I am one of those whom a fair
complexion favors. I go everywhere, in all public places though well-known all over the
city, and never is anything said to me." Id.
270 Id. Martinet pointed out that these critics had contributed little to the movement
against the separate-car act. See id. Walker, the third attorney, wanted to challenge the
separate-car law as a burden on interstate commerce. See id. Tourg6e replied, "'What we
want is not a verdict of not guilty, not a defect in this law but a decision whether such a
law can legally' exist under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. (quoting
letter from Tourg6e to Walker). The first test case involved Daniel Desdunes, who pur-
chased a ticket from New Orleans to Mobile. See id. He was arrested, but Desdunes plea
of not guilty was sustained because the Judge determined the law did not apply to inter-
state travel. See id. at 14-15.
271 Desdunes' case was never brought before the Louisiana Supreme Court. See id. at
15.
272 Desdunes was seven-eighths white as well. See id. at 14, 15. Incidentally, the same
judge who sustained Desdunes' plea of not guilty also sat for Plessy's first case. See id.
at 15.
273 See id.
274 The Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court had signed the Separate-Car bill
two years earlier while governor of Louisiana. See id.
275 See id.
Colorblind I/Colorblind II
[also] actually separates parent and child ... the
bottom rail is on top; the nurse is admitted to a
privilege which the wife herself does not enjoy.
276
The first Section of this Article introduced the problems race
causes when one attempts to conceptualize the ideal of "equality"
in a modem context. Social inequality and social justice are not the
same terms when applied to blacks as when these terms are ap-
plied to whites. Similarly, whites do not suffer the stigma and
group discrimination from which blacks suffer. In trying to guar-
antee "equality" to all, theorists have often struggled with a gov-
ernment of majority rule protecting the rights of minorities. Justice
Henry Billings Brown's majority decision in Plessy at the very
least illustrates the problem caused by majority rule protecting mi-
nority rights. The Plessy decision was so unjust, it is worth but a
scarce glance at the blatant racism and white domination that ex-
isted at the time. But if "Our Constitution is colorblind" is the an-
tithesis to the race-conscious approach found in the majority opin-
ion, and modem cases such as Fullilove were decided on grounds
just as wrong as Plessy, then it should follow that the reasoning
given by the majority in Plessy would not at all reflect the "equal-
ity" sought by the opposition of affirmative action.
Justice Brown recognized that "[t]he object of the [Fourteenth]
[A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of
the two races before the law .... ",277 Yet, "in the nature of things,
it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality,
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to ei-
ther. ' 278 Though this statement is an affirmation that the Constitu-
276 Id. at 15-16 (alteration in original). Judge Wisdom notes, "A good deal of the brief
is spent attacking the arbitrary, uncontrolled authority delegated to the conductor. A
similar argument was successfully made in the 1960s based on the delegation of arbitrary
discretion to registrars of voters who tested applications on the understanding of the
Constitution." Id. at 16 (citing United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La.
1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)).
277 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
278 Id. Justice Henry Billings Brown supports his race-conscious argument by arguing
that
[l]aws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places
where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been gener-
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tion is race-conscious (in that sense, flagrantly racist), it is quite
clearly not the same argument that state action may overcome so-
cial prejudice through legislation that makes distinctions based on
race.
Ian F. Haney Lopez's general definition of race "as a vast
group of people loosely bound together by historically contingent,
socially significant elements of their morphology and/or ancestry"
seems applicable in the context of colorblind jurisprudence. 279 Fur-
thermore, American blacks come from many different back-
grounds, and have but one common characteristic, that being skin
color. Yet colorblind jurisprudence, through the recent body of
Supreme Court precedents, promote the ahistorical view that racial
classifications have been the cause of the racism. 280 Colorblind ju-
risprudence then, in reality, disregards actual experiences of racial
discrimination in the promotion of white dominance.
Justice Brown made three critical assumptions of Tourgre's
argument on behalf of Plessy. First, he considered the plaintiffs
argument assumed that the separation of the races stamped the
colored race with a badge of inferiority (the same stigma argument
used in Brown I, 58 years later). To this, Justice Brown replied,
"[i]f this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.' '281 As discussed ante, the result-based theory concentrat-
ing on stigma often concentrates on the "badge of inferiority"
caused to blacks as a result of affirmative action on the part of the
legislature. 282 The Section above also ponders what effect aversive
ally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the
state legislatures in the exercise of police power. The most common
instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate
schools for white and colored children, which have been held to be a
valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where
the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most
earnestly enforced.
Id.
279 Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illu-
sion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1994).
280 See Conference, Race, Law, and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American
Dilemma, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 567, 586 (1996).
281 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
282 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (affirmative action programs, as "benign" discrimination,
386
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racism has on the process of selection. If a process excludes essen-
tially all of one race for positions (e.g. four positions for blacks in
a public law school), and the blacks blame it on racism, the gov-
ernment actor essentially by denying racism tells those blacks it is
by their own construction that they deem the policy racist.
Second, Justice Brown considers Tourgfe's argument to as-
sume that "social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and
that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an en-
forced commingling of the two races. ' 283 Obviously, this assump-
tion was based on a principle of government action assuring equal-
ity, rather than according preferences to a class. Nevertheless, in
considering Justice Brown's rejection of this assumption, one must
consider the implications of assimilationism in today's society
compared with the preference-pushing in the pluralist theory: "If
the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. '284 In 1896,
legislation reflected the dominant majority preference. If social
equality were to occur in that era, under Justice Brown's analysis,
it could only have occurred if the general sentiment of the com-
munity was for blacks and whites to choose to do so mutually.
285
As Professor Karst explains, white America will subordinate a
class of persons until that class of persons assimilates with the
"teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their pa-
tronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of
superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who
believe that they have been wronged by the government's use of
race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority
and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude
that they are 'entitled' to preferences.").
283 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
284 Id.
285 Justice Brown quoted King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883):
This end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which
conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom
they are designated to operate. When the government, therefore, has
secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law and equal
opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished the
end for which it is organized and performed all of the functions re-
specting social advantages with which it is endowed.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (quoting King, 93 N.Y. at 448).
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dominant society.286 In the years following Plessy, this subordina-
tion took the form of Jim Crow laws.287 History tells us this much.
But curiously, it was the landmark case declaring the Constitution
is conscious of race that alluded to assimilation, while the "color-
blind" decisions today do essentially the same thing.
Finally, and most importantly, the Plessy decision declared the
power of the dominant race to enact legislation on its own
terms.288 Justice Brown concentrated on the converse:
[the plaintiffs argument assumes] that if... the
colored race should become the dominant power in
the state legislature .. . it would thereby relegate
the white race to an inferior position. We imagine
that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in
this assumption. 289
Justice Brown's characterization of the power of the legislature
paints a peculiarly powerless legislation and Constitution, further-
ing the notion that white majority preference not only happened'to
be reflected in government action, but that those preferences were
almost necessarily reflected in the action:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts,
or to abolish distinctions based upon physical dif-
ferences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.
286 See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity,
64 N.C. L. Rev. 303, 320 (1986).
287 See id. ("Jim Crow illustrates the main technique of nativist domination: the en-
forced separation of members of the subordinate cultural group from a wide range of
public and private institutions that, in the aggregate, constitute 'society."'). See also su-
Sra notes 115-16.
88 The majority decided Plessy under a standard of review more akin to the modem
rational basis standard: "[E]very exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and
extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion for the public
good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class." Plessy, 163 U.S. at
550. Moreover, the court decided the case by giving
large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the
question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the
established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a
view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the
public peace and good order.
Id.
289 Id. at 551.
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If the civil and political rights of both races be
equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or
politically. If one race be inferior to the other so-
cially, the constitution of the United States cannot
put them on the same plane. 290
Ninety-nine years later, Justice Thomas found a similar passivity
of the Constitution and of the powerlessness of government: "I be-
lieve that there is a 'moral [and] constitutional equivalence' be-
tween laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute
benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion
of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only recog-
nize, respect, and protect us as equal ....
In the same dissent Justice Harlan penned the colorblind apho-
rism, he also warned against the judicial activity several of the lat-
ter-day justices believe is the only appropriate means by which to
guarantee equality. The standard of the day in 1896 was merely to
judge the reasonableness of the legislative activity, and Harlan be-
lieved the courts lacked the puissance to dictate the "policy or ex-
pediency of legislation":
292
"[T]he courts have no other duty to perform than to
execute the legislative will, without any regard to
their views as to the wisdom or justice of the par-
ticular enactment. .. ." There is a dangerous ten-
dency in these latter days to enlarge the functions of
the courts, by means of judicial interference with
290 Id. at 551-52.
291 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice John Paul Stevens, in Croson, places the
power to fashion remedies solely in the hands of the judiciary:
Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules
to govern future conduct .... It is the judicial system, rather than the
legislative process, that is best equipped to identify past wrongdoers
and to fashion remedies that will create the conditions that presuma-
bly would have existed had no wrong been committed. Thus, in cases
involving the review of judicial remedies imposed against persons
who have been proven guilty of violations of law, I would allow the
courts in racial discrimination cases the same broad discretion that
chancellors enjoy in other areas of law.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-14 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissent-
292 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 558 (quoting Sedg. St. & Const. Law 324).
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the will of the people as expressed by the legisla-
ture. Our institutions have the distinguishing char-
acteristic that the three departments of government
are coordinate and separate. Each must keep within
the limits defined by the Constitution. And the
courts best discharge their duty by executing the
will of the law-making power, constitutionally ex-
pressed, leaving the results of the legislation to be
dealt with by the people through their representa-
tives .... If the power exists to enact a statute, that
ends the matter so far as the courts are con-
cerned. 29
3
That Harlan discussed the judiciary's role in determining the
power of the legislature, restricted by the Constitution, immedi-
ately before discussing the colorblindness of the Constitution, in-
dicates that Harlan was more concerned with the power of the leg-
islature to require separation of the races. This sentiment can be
squared with the modern use of strict scrutiny to strike down legis-
lation, but the famous colorblindness argument centered on the
dominance of the white race. The legislature was powerless under
the Constitution to separate the races, because the Constitution
prohibits a superior, dominant class of citizens. The dissent says
little in support of the notion of the legislature coming to the aid of
the minority, since it is apparent that Harlan was concerned that
the mandatory separation of the races would allow the dominant
class of citizens to circumvent the Reconstruction amendments
and place a badge of slavery on the blacks.294
Modern race-blindness indicates that the legislatures are pow-
erless either to eradicate racial differences or to enact laws de-
signed to cause detriment or grant a benefit to a certain class based
on membership in a class. To attain this reasoning, one cannot
293 Id. (quoting Sedg. St. & Const. Law 324).
294 Harlan issued a famous warning, comparing the Plessy decision with that of Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 40 years earlier: "In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in
time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott case." Id. at 559. Moreover, "[tihe arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of
race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with
the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution. It can-
not be justified upon any legal grounds." Id. at 562.
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look solely to the dissent of Justice Harlan for the basis of this
powerlessness; instead, one may only look to Justce Harlan's dis-
sent for an axiom claiming the prohibitive nature of the Constitu-
tion. To assert that the legislature is powerless to eradicate past
discrimination is to assert the same passivity indicated by the
Plessy majority. However the reasoning is attained, Harlan mani-
fested only a disdain for the dominant white class to subordinate a
minority class, rather than to advocate a Constitution declaring all
race-consciousness is forbidden. Judge Wisdom says he admired
Harlan, but that Harlan refused to "go all the way with his strong
words":295
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are
both color-blind and color-conscious. These
amendments took cognizance of the Founding Fa-
thers' decision in 1787 not to face up directly to the
issue of slavery-in the interest of putting together
a viable national government and creating what is,
in effect, national citizenship. I see these amend-
ments as reversing Dred Scott, bringing the Decla-
ration of Independence into the Constitution, mak-
ing freed men and their descendants free men and
full American citizens. Justice must be color-
295 J. M. Wisdom, 100 Years, supra note 266, at 19. Judge Wisdom suggested to the
Washington and Lee University School of Law Class of 1995 that "[w]hen any person
becomes discouraged by what appears to be the failure of African Americans today to
recognize the extent of the advances in civil rights since the Brown I case in 1954, I sug-
gest that person bear in mind the prophetic words of Albion W. Tourgre in 1890.
'It is easy for us to excuse ourselves for the wrongs of slavery, but
day by day it is growing harder for a colored man to do so; and it is
simply to state a universal fact of human nature to declare that a
great and lasting wrong like slavery done to a whole people grows
blacker and darker for generations as they go away from it. The edu-
cated grandchild of a slave who looks back into the black pit of slav-
ery will find little excuse for the white Christian civilization which
forbade marriage, crushed aspiration, and after two centuries and a
half offered the world as the fruits of Christian endeavor five mil-
lions of bastard sons and daughters-the product of a promiscuity
enforced by law and upheld by Christian teachings. Slavery will be a
more terrible thing to the Negro a hundred years hence than it was to
the calloused consciousness of his nameless father .....
Id. at 19 (quoting Albion W. Tourgre, Address at the First Mohonk Conference on the
Negro Question in 1890, at 11 (1880), quoted in Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right
of Negro Freedom, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 387, 440-41 (1966)).
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conscious as well as color-blind-color-conscious
when it becomes necessary to remedy the evils of
past discrimination based on color or to prevent
new evils of discrimination based on color.
296
B. Colorblind I: White Majority Dominance Reflected in
Legislative Action
1. The First Reconstruction, Civil Rights, Harlan's 'Dissent-
ery,' 297 and Plessy
The history of the Reconstruction following the Civil War re-
veals that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to combat the
notorious "Black Codes" of the South following the Civil War:298
The codes were not segregation laws of the kind the
South later imposed, though Mississippi, for exam-
ple, did discourage white persons from assembling
or habitually associating with Negroes. Rather, they
were an attempt to restrict the Negro's labor and
movements in such a way as to continue his eco-
nomic dependence on the former master class, and
to deprive him of the political rights by which he
might enlarge his freedom of choice in economic
life. These restrictions were favored by the white
upper classes, who feared Negro rebellions and dis-
turbance of traditional relations between workers
and employers, and by the lower classes, who wel-
comed the suppression of competition from the
freedmen. 299
296 Id. at 19-20.
297 According to the Oxford Companion, "So frequent and vigorous were Harlan's
disagreements with the Supreme Court with the majority on everything from civil rights
and due process to the federal income tax and antitrust law that he was joshingly said by
his colleagues to suffer from 'dissent-ery."' Oxford Companion, supra note 259, at 362.
298 Monroe Berger, Equality by Statute 4-5 (1978). The same legislatures that had led
the South to rebellion enacted these codes. See id. The southern states established the
rights of the newly freed slaves to hold property and regularized their family status, but
severely restricted their freedom to work and travel. See id.
299 Id. at 4-5. Berger notes that because of the confusion created by the presence of
federal troops in the south, the Southern states were unable to enforce the Black Codes
strictly or uniformly. See id. at 5 ("The codes nevertheless attested to the Southern lead-
392
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Several commentators have relied primarily on the concerns of the
Black Codes as proof that the Equal Protection Clause was in-
tended to outlaw all race-based laws; thus, according to their view,
all race-based state action is preemptively unconstitutional. 300 Pro-
fessor Melissa Saunders, however, disputes this contention, based
on an examination of the record of the 39th Congress, which
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment:
30 1
[F]ew of the members who objected to the Black
Codes did so on the ground that race had no proper
place in governmental decision making. Some
found the Codes offensive because they reduced the
freedmen to a condition approaching involuntary
servitude, thereby undermining the command of the
Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth
Amendment. Others complained that they denied
the freedmen rights that were inherent in their citi-
zenship or belonged to all free men as a matter of
natural law. Still others opposed the Codes because
they 'discriminated against' the freedmen by sin-
gling them out for special disadvantage. 302
ers' unwillingness to accept change, which aroused the United States Congress to legis-
late the political reorganization of the South and the protection of the rights of Ne-
groes.").
0 Saunders supra note 257, at 271. See also William Bradford Reynolds, Individual-
ism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 Yale L.J. 995, 995-1001 (1984). See
also generally William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1979).
301 See Saunders, supra note 257, at 271.
302 Id. at 271-72 (internal citations omitted). Professor Saunders offers a thorough his-
tory of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. She finds that the Equal Protection
Clause adopted an antebellum doctrine that prohibited allocating "special benefits or
burdens" to certain individuals or classes.
The general principle that emerged from the [antebellum] cases was
something like this: Courts would disfavor laws that singled out cer-
tain individuals or classes for special benefits or burdens but would
uphold such laws upon a showing that the "discrimination" they
worked was designed to further some legitimate "public purpose"-
that is, to benefit the citizenry as a whole, as opposed to purely "pri-
vate" interests of a certain class. Of course, distinguishing "discrimi-
nation" that had a legitimate "public purpose" from that which was
designed to advance only the special interests of a particular class
was enormously difficult. This distinction seems dubious to us today,
steeped as we are in modem political theory's teaching that the de-
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In addition to the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, Congress
enacted eleven civil rights laws between 1866 and 1875.303 The
last of these laws, effective March 1, 1875, was intended to resist
the tendency of refusal to serve blacks in places of public accom-
modation. 30 4 By that time, however, Congress and the Supreme
Court had begun to weaken the force of the Reconstruction
Acts.30 5 In 1883, the Act of March 1, 1875 came before the Su-
preme Court in The Civil Rights Cases, as did the question of the
extent of federal power to enforce the equal protection guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.306 In short, no such federal power
existed:
[T]he legislation which congress is authorized to
adopt in this behalf [via section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment] is not general legislation upon the
rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that
is, such as may be necessary and proper for coun-
teracting such laws as the States may adopt or en-
mocratic process is nothing but a struggle between competing inter-
est groups and that all legislation is intended to favor one interest
group at the expense of another. But it was a distinction that made
sense to lawyers and judges in antebellum America, and it was one
with which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were inti-
mately familiar.
Id. at 261-62.
303 See Berger, supra note 298, at 6. The eleven acts were of April 9, 1866; May 21,
1866; March 2, 1867; March 23, 1867; July 19, 1867; March 11, 1868; May 31, 1870;
February 28, 1871; April 20, 1871; and March 1, 1875.
304 See id. at 7. This law declared that
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be enti-
tled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only
to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
conditions of servitude.
Id.
305 See id. at 11. In 1878, Congress attempted to repeal the "enforcement acts" but
President Rutherford B. Hayes rejected the effort.
306 The question before the Supreme Court in The Civil Rights Cases was essentially
one of federal power versus state power. Congress based its power for the 1875 act from
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under that section, "The Congress shall have
the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 5. This Section of the Article is concerned more with Justice
Harlan's dissent than it is with the constitutionality of the Civil Rights laws.
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force, and which by the amendment, they are pro-
hibited from making or enforcing, or such acts and
proceedings as the States may commit or take, and
which by the amendment, they are prohibited from
committing or taking. It is not necessary for us to
state, if we could, what legislation would be proper
for Congress to adopt. It is sufficient for us to ex-
amine whether the law in question is of that charac-
ter.307
Justice Harlan dissented, saying the case proceeded "upon
grounds entirely too narrow and artificial, ' 308 finding that the Act
in question was to prevent racial discrimination. 309 Harlan's opin-
ion itself means less to the idea of colorblindness than the concep-
tual framework he would set forth in the opinion regarding the
blacks' legal right to public accommodations, privileges, and fa-
cilities of public conveyances, inns, and places of amusement. 31
0
Harlan concentrated on restraints of such rights through local laws
307 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883).
308 Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan continues,
'It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes
the law: the letter of the law is body; the sense and reason of the law
is the soul.' Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of lib-
erty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if
need be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to
American citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat the ends
the people desired to accomplish, which they attempted to accom-
plish, and which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in
their fundamental law. By this I do not mean that the determination
of these cases should have been materially controlled by considera-
tions of mere expediency or policy. I mean only, in this form, to ex-
press an earnest conviction that the court has departed from the fa-
miliar rule requiring, in the interpretation of constitutional




("The purpose of the [Act] was to prevent race discrimination. It
does not assume to define the general conditions and limitations un-
der which inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement
may be conducted, but only declares that such conditions and limita-
tions, whatever they may be, shall not be applied, so as to work dis-
crimination, solely because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.") (emphasis in original).
310 See id. at 37.
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as a "badge of slavery" forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment:
[I]t would seem that the right of a colored person to
use an improved public highway, upon the terms
accorded to freemen of other races, is as fundamen-
tal ... as to be deemed the essence of civil free-
dom .... But of what value is th[e] right of locomo-
tion, if it may be clogged by such burdens as
Congress intended by the act of 1875 to remove?
They are burdens which lay at the very foundation
of the institution of slavery as it once existed. They
are not to be sustained, except upon the assumption
that there is, in this land of universal liberty, a class
which may yet be discriminated against, even in re-
spect of rights of a character so essential and so su-
preme, that, deprived of their enjoyment in com-
mon with others, a freeman is not only branded as
one inferior and infected, but, in the competitions
of life, is robbed of some of the most necessary
means of existence; and all this solely because they
belong to a particular race which the nation has lib-
erated. The Thirteenth Amendment alone obliter-
ated the race line, so far as all rights fundamental
in a state offreedom are concerned.31'
Justice Harlan quoted William Blackstone's Commentaries in
both The Civil Rights Cases and later in Plessy. "Personal liberty
consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or re-
moving one's person to whatever places one's own inclination
may direct, without restraint, unless by due course of law.
'312
More significantly, Harlan began to echo the warnings of the tyr-
anny of the majority class dominating the minority class, some-
thing the Court had effectively stripped from the power of the fed-
eral government to control:
311 Id. at 39-40 (emphasis added).
312 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (quoting I William Blackstone,
Commentaries *134); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 39-40 (quoting 1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries * 134).
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At every step in this direction the nation has been
confronted with class tyranny, which a contempo-
rary English historian says is, of all tyrannies, the
most intolerable, 'for it is ubiquitous in its opera-
tion and weighs, perhaps, most heavily on those
whose obscurity or distance would withdraw them
from the notice of a single despot.' Today it is the
colored race which is denied, by corporations and
individuals wielding public authority, rights fun-
damental in their freedom and citizenship. At some
future time it may be some other race that will fall
under the ban. If the constitutional amendments be
enforced, according to the intent with which, as I
conceive, they were adopted, there cannot be, in
this republic, any class of human beings in practical
subjection to another class, with power in the latter
to dole out to the former just such privileges as they
may choose to grant.313
By the time The Civil Rights Cases were decided, the subordi-
nate status of blacks was already becoming clear, even allowing
for the fact that to an extent that blacks and whites had become ac-
customed to intimate contact.314 Interestingly, Plessy can also be
viewed as a lawsuit concerning a claim to whiteness, in that
Homer Adolph Plessy asserted that the refusal to seat him in a
white passenger car interfered with his reputation as a white indi-
vidual.31 5 With the 1883 case, conditions worsened, just as Justice
Harlan had predicted. Whites resumed total power, disenfran-
chised the Negro, failed to allow the Negro to become economi-
cally independent, and then segregated the Negro not only in
places where custom had already done so, but in other places as
well.316 With Congress powerless (and perhaps unwilling as well)
313 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 58.
314 See Berger, supra note 298, at 12.
315 See Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation 152-73
1987).
16 See Berger, supra note 298, at 12. Berger explains three reasons why the Recon-
struction measures failed. See id. First, Congress impeded the separation of state and
federal power, and the Supreme Court was not willing to subject the Southern states to
the wrath of the central government completely. See id. Second, interests in civil rights
waned, and the changes in the law were not reinforced by changes in the workplace,
2000]
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 7:3
to end the white majority dominance, race relations deteriorated,
more appreciably in the late 1880s and early 1890s:
317
Political, economic, and social unrest were mani-
fested in the rising strength of the Farmers' Alli-
ance and the Populist Party. The growing power of
poorer whites did not bode well for blacks, since
the former's precarious social and economic status
inclined them toward measures highlighting their
racial superiority. At the same time, conservative
wealthier whites, who traditionally had inclined to-
ward more paternalistic attitudes toward blacks,
were now impelled to emphasize racial distinctions
in order to disrupt prospective economic and politi-
cal alliances between poor black and poor white
farmers. Whatever the precise political dynamic,
the upshot was a dramatic deterioration in southern
race relations during the 1890s .... 318
Professor Michael Klarman, in contextualizing the time period
in which Plessy was decided, found that Plessy "was, indeed, so
fully congruent with the dominant racial norms of the period that it
elicited little more than a collective yawn of indifference from the
nation. ' 319 The press met the decision primarily with apathy, ac-
cording to Charles Lofgren, a foremost academic authority on
housing, etc. See id. Third, the reconstruction acts were overly broad and required a spe-
cial means of enforcement. See id. When the means of enforcement failed, so too did the
effectiveness of the Acts. See id. Finally, the blacks lacked economic power, education,
organization and leadership to maintain enough of a collective voice to maintain the
momentum when other forces failed. See id. at 12-13.
317 See Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 Vand. L.
Rev. 881, 888 (1998).
318 Id. See also C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 31-44 (2d rev.
ed., 1974). Woodward paints a different picture of race relations during this period. He
has been criticized for painting "too rosy" a portrait of racial segregation in Southern cit-
ies during that time period. John Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South Caro-
lina During Reconstruction 274-75, 298-99 (1965). See also generally Howard Rabi-
nowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890 (1978). Professor Klarman
describes conditions in northern cities worsening, thus compounding the difficulties in
race relations during the 1890s. He writes, "The inclination of southern whites to further
subordinate blacks was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the deterioration in
American race relations that occurred in the 1890s. Without northern acquiescence, con-
ditions could not have worsened as much as they did." Klarman, supra note 317, at 890.
319 Klarman, supra note 317, at 895.
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Plessy.320 State and lower federal courts had generally construed
the Equal Protection Clause and the common law to allow separate
but equal facilities; thus the Supreme Court "was not about to rule
otherwise as American race relations began a long spiral down-
wards."'321 Several modem commentators have also argued that the
Constitution itself was never intended to be colorblind, but merely
a prohibition against unequal treatment of different groups, sup-
porting the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Plessy.32
2
While Plessy was the first pronouncement of the colorblind
ideal, modem interpretations of Justice Harlan's dissent purport
that the ideal was merely a shorthand for the concept that the Four-
teenth Amendment prevents our law from enshrining and perpetu-
ating white supremacy. 323 Furthermore, Harlan's discussion re-
garding colorblindness was connected to his conviction that whites
held, and would continue to hold the dominant position in the
United States.324 Therefore, at its very inception, the doctrine of
judicial colorblindness was deemed to be perfectly compatible
with the perpetuation of white dominance.
2. The Uneasy Task of Counteracting the Dominant Majority
Preference
Where The Civil Rights Cases left the federal government un-
able to counteract the dominance of the white majority, Plessy left
the judiciary (and, hence, the Constitution) unable to counteract it.
At the mercy of the southern state governments were the blacks,
who were subjected to the informal terrorism of mob lynchings,
effectively disenfranchised, and not afforded adequate educational
320 See Lofgren, supra note 315, at 5, 196-98.
321 Klarman, supra note 317, at 895.
322 Professor Saunders argues that the Plessy Court continued the antebellum tradition
of the Court's disapproval of granting special burdens and special benefits to a single
class of citizens. See Saunders, supra note 257, at 298-99. Judith A. Baer argues that the
framers of the Equal Protection Clause "had little concern with race as an abstract cate-
gory." Judith A. Baer, Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth
Amendment 92-93 (1983). Nelson Lund expresses doubt that through the Equal Protec-
tion Clause the farmers sought to impose a general rule of colorblindness on the states.
Nelson Lund, The Constitution, The Supreme Court, and Racial Politics, 12 Ga. St. U. L.
Rev. 1129, 1148-50 (1996).
323 See Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law be Co-
lorblind?, 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 201, 203 (1986).
324 See id. at 203.
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opportunity. 325 Each of the southern states adopted measures in-
tended either to completely disenfranchise the black or substan-
tially curtail the blacks' ability to participate in the government
process. 3
26
First of all, the plan[s] set up certain barriers such
as property or literacy qualifications for voting, and
then cut certain loopholes in the barrier through
which only white men could squeeze. The loop-
holes to appease (though not invariably accommo-
date) the underprivileged whites were the 'under-
standing clause,' the 'grandfather clause,' or the
'good character clause.' ... [I]f the Negroes did
learn to read, or acquire sufficient property, and
remember to pay the poll tax and to keep the receipt
on file, they could even then be tripped by the final
hurdle devised for them-the white primary. 327
The measures taken under mandated segregation were even more
bereft of reason. For example, some requirements included that the
textbooks of "Negroes and whites be stored separately, and that
they never be interchanged" (Florida and North Carolina); separate
telephone booths were required "whenever whites demanded such
separation" (Oklahoma); "required segregation at the circus" (Lou-
isiana and South Carolina); "forbade anyone to print or circulate
printed or written material advocating social equality or interracial
marriage . . ." (Mississippi); "prohibited interracial fraternal or-
ganizations" (North Carolina and Virginia); "required segregation
in hospitals" (fifteen states); required black nurses for black pa-
tients "and white nurses for white patients" (Alabama, Mississippi,
and South Carolina); forbade chaining together white and black
chain-gang prisoners (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North
325 See David A. J. Richards, Conscience and the Constitution 163 (1993).
326 See Woodward, supra note 318, at 83-84.
327 Id. at 84. South Carolina (1895), Louisiana (1898), North Carolina (1900), Ala-
bama (1901), Virginia (1902), Georgia (1908), and Oklahoma (1910) each incorporated
some variation of this scheme into their Constitutions. Florida, Tennessee, Arkansas and
Texas each adopted the poll tax. See id. In Louisiana, for example, there were 130,334
registered Negro voters in 1896. See id. By 1904, there were 1,342. See id. Between
these two dates were the adoption of the literacy, property, and poll-tax qualifications.
See id. at 85.
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Carolina and South Carolina); and "required separation of Negro
and white paupers" (West Virginia and Alabama).
32 8
In a reaffirmation of the value of whiteness, white racial classi-
fication in the United States in effect became a form of property
right contingent upon the white racial label. 329 Cheryl Harris out-
lines this development as follows:
Following the period of slavery and conquest, white
identity became the basis of racialized privilege that
was ratified and legitimized in law as a type of
status property. After legalized segregation was
overturned, whiteness as property evolved into a
more modern form through the law's ratification of
the settled expectations of relative white privilege
as a legitimate and natural baseline. 330
Whiteness continues to be significantly valued, and for much of
our nation's history, whiteness was a condition for citizenship and
naturalization. 331
For its "moral grandeur" in determining that segregation in
public schools was unconstitutional, Brown I did little to assert the
power of any entity to counteract the dominance of the white ma-
jority preference. 332 C. Vann Woodward characterizes the decision
as the marking point towards the declining years of Jim Crow,
333
but it would be another decade before the federal government em-
braced the Supreme Court's proclamation that racial discrimina-
tion violated national policy.334 Hugh Davis Graham writes that
when Congress and the President in 1964 determined the need for
national legislation to protect the civil rights of blacks, the major-
ity coalition supporting the Civil Rights Act shared two assump-
328 Rowan, supra note 250, at 185-86.
329 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1714 (1993).
330 Id.
331 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1856) (holding that free blacks
whose ancestors were enslaved could not be considered citizens for federal constitutional
protection purposes).
32 See Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of Na-
tional Policy 1960-1972 366-370 (1990).
333 See Woodward, supra note 318, at 149.
334 See Graham, supra note 332, at 366-70.
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tions about the decisions of Brown I and Brown II.335 First, they
assumed Brown I had overturned the separate-but-equal doctrine in
Plessy, thus enshrining into law Justice Harlan's colorblind
maxim.336 Second, in a view more commonly held by liberals than
conservatives, the Court made a "shameful retreat" from Brown I
and its proclamation.
337
If the Brown I decision embraced colorblindness as Justice
Harlan recognized it in 1896, the Plessy dissent was noticeably ab-
sent from Chief Justice Warren's opinion. The Brown I decision
instead hinged on the stigma assumption dismissed by the Plessy
majority (the "badge of inferiority") and centered on the psychol-
ogy of separating children on the basis of race. 338 The only direct
rejection of the Plessy decision was a rejection of any contrary
findings of "whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time [of the Plessy decision]. 339
In both Plessy and Brown, then, the key to violating
the equal protection clause appeared to be not ra-
cially different treatment or the denial of benefits
on racial grounds, or even the intent of the legisla-
tures in framing the segregation laws. Rather, it lay





338 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) [Brown I]. Gra-
ham notes the concentration of Chief Justice Earl Warren on modem social science au-
thorities in the controversial Footnote 11 of the majority opinion, which cited K.B. Clark,
Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White
House Conference on Children and Youth 1950); Personality in the Making: The Fact-
Finding Report of the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth
(Helen Leland Witmer & Ruth Kotinsky eds., 1952); Max Deutscher & Isidor Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforce Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.
Psychol. 259 (1948); Isidor Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation
Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion & Attitude Res. 229 (1949);
Theodore Brameld, Educational Costs, in Institute for Religious and Social Studies, Dis-
crimination and National Welfare: A Series of Addresses and Discussions 37 (R.M. Ma-
dver ed., 1949); E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States 674-81 (1949);
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modem Democracy
(1944). See Graham, supra note 332, at 367.
39 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
340 Graham, supra note 332, at 367 (citing Edward J. Erler, Sowing the Wind: Judicial
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The effect of the Brown I decision on white majority prefer-
ence was a curious one. Although Brown I reversed the separate
but equal doctrine, it did not address the ways in which systems of
white privilege could be undone. 341 Harris asserts that by accept-
ing substantial inequality (whiteness) as a baseline, material ineq-
uities between blacks and whites were normalized, as were the
subordination mechanisms that produced the inequalities. 342 This
animosity to connections of blackness, whether individuals were
light-skinned like Plessy or had any black ancestry at all, remained
at the core of racism squarely in the face of the Brown opinions. If
the Constitution prohibited the dominant preference of segregation
to be reflected in state action, the extent of this prohibition would
be unclear for another year. Woodward writes,
For a time after the decision of 17 May 1954, there
appeared to be grounds for optimism. The Court's
precedent breaking opinion seemed to destroy all
legal foundations for segregation. Yet there were no
sensational outbursts of defiance. The restrained
tone of the Southern press and Southern leaders
was the subject of wide comment and congratula-
tions. The comment of the Nashville Tennessean on
the day following the decision was not unique: 'It is
not going to bring overnight revolution,' said the
editorial, 'but the South is and has been for years a
land of change. Its people-of both races-have
learned to live with change. They can learn to live
with this one. Given a reasonable amount of time
and understanding, they will.'
343
Some signs of white resistance to desegregation appeared, espe-
cially in Mississippi, the same state that had resisted Reconstruc-
tion in 1875 and disenfranchised the Negro in 1890. 344 "Citizen
Councils" were started to wage a war in defense of segregation. 345
Oligarchy and the Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
399, 409-13 (1985)).
341 See generally Harris, supra note 329.
342 See id. at 1714.
343 Woodward, supra note 318, at 150.
344 See id. at 152.
345 See id.
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Nevertheless, there was little hysteria in the year that followed the
Brown I decision. 346
With the Jim Crow system shaken,347 the remaining question
was the extent of judicial activism (and discretion) in limiting the
unimpeded legislative will of the majority. The celebrated Foot-
note Four of United States v. Caroline Products348 indicated that
while the Court should customarily yield to the legislative will of
the majority, there "may be a narrower scope" in judicial reaction
to a law that deprives "discrete and insular minorities" of funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 349 The Brown I de-
cision, however, found the "chief offense of segregation lay in
perceptions of stigma rather than in racially triggered state behav-
ior. .... -350 This being so, "then the latter was merely instrumental
to the former, and only the federal bench could make the finely
calibrated judgments about what state behavior was acceptable and
when it became unacceptable. ' 351 Graham notes that at the time
Brown I was decided, "Harlan's vision of the colorblind Constitu-
tion still appeared too radical and sweeping. '352 Correspondingly,
the judiciary's prohibition against legislation reflecting white
dominance necessarily must have been too radical, which became
clear a year later in Brown II.
Exemplifying the fact that the twin Brown cases did not mark
the end of Justice Harlan's colorblindness (in terms of white
dominance reflected in state action) is the fact that Linda Brown,
346 See id.
347 See id. at 151
("Surveying all these changes in established Southern practices,
changes few thought they would live to see, men of good will began
to entertain hopeful expectations about the future. The Jim Crow sys-
tem still stood, but its foundation had been shaken. Segregation was
on the defensive; in some quarters it was in retreat. If all this had
been accomplished without bloodshed, reasoned the optimists, per-
haps a new day had really dawned. Perhaps the South might eventu-
ally take the transition to unsegregated public schools in stride as
well.").
348 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
349 See id; Graham, supra note 332, at 369.
350 Graham, supra note 332, at 368 (emphasis in original).
351 Id. ("Such a flexible formula could strategically accommodate quite gradualist and
tokenist school policies during Brown's first decade, when judicial authority risked con-
certed defiance.").
352 Id. at 370 ("[C]aution was in order, else all hell might break loose.").
404
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an elementary student in Topeka in 1954, would eventually gradu-
ate from all-black schools.353 The Court in Brown II rejected the
NAACP's call for "majestic instancy," particularly because of a
fear against southern backlash against the Court's decision.
354
When the Court's implementation decision was an-
nounced on May 31, 1955, the white South re-
sponded with a sigh of relief that the NAACP's call
for "majestic instancy" had been rejected, and that
instead the five cases were remanded to the local
federal district courts. In a cautious gesture that was
designed in part to forestall a violent southern reac-
tion against the Court's call for a social revolution
in Brown I, the Court in Brown II asked not for ad-
mission to public schools on a nondiscriminatory
basis, but only for a "prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance." Warren's opinion bor-
rowed the phrase "all deliberate speed" from an ob-
scure opinion by [Justice Oliver Wendell] Holmes.
But the enigmatic modifier "deliberate" (if not, in-
deed, the full oxymoron) was inserted at the in-
stance of Felix Frankfurter, who feared a disastrous
southern backlash against a Court that could not en-
force its decree. This sealed the bargain between
Warren and the more conservative justices, with the
unanimous decision in Brown I balanced by a con-
stitutionally novel remedy in Brown II that would
deny Linda Brown her individual relief, but would
buy time for a gradual enforcement by local federal
judges who would be provided no clear judicial
guidelines or deadlines. 35
5
353 See id. at 370.354 Id. at 371.
355 Id. (footnotes omitted). Graham refers to a comment by Columbia law professor
Louis Lusky, who had drafted, while a law clerk to Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, Footnote
Four of Caroline Products: "Conceptually, the 'deliberate speed' formula is impossible
to justify." Id. (quoting Louis Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A
Problem in Nullification, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1171, n. 37 (1963)). Judicial review is
grounded in a duty to give a litigant his or her right under the Constitution, but the Court
only guaranteed that at some indefinite time in the future, other people would have the
rights that the Court declared the litigants had in Brown L See id.
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Southerners expected the federal District Court judges to side
with them. Voiced explicitly by the Lieutenant Governor of Geor-
gia, "A 'reasonable time' can be construed as one year or two
hundred.... Thank God we've got good Federal judges.' ' 356 In
the summer of 1955, the NAACP filed petitions on behalf of local
blacks with 170 school boards in 17 states.357 The "good Federal
judges" would enforce the Supreme Court's decree in 19 school
segregation cases through January 1956.358 A panic, "bred of inse-
curity and fear," spread through the southern whites, and race rela-
tions deteriorated. 359 Whites began to resist, forming Citizens
Councils to fight in defense of segregation in the states of Missis-
sippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, Arkansas, Florida and Geor-
gia.360 One official claimed membership in these Citizens Councils
reached 500,000 in 11 states. 361 The preference of the dominant
white majority was found in clear acts of defiance, with southern
leaders calling for "massive resistance" to segregation 362 and
claiming the right of "interposition" of state authority against al-
leged violations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court.
363
If one needs an illustration of dominant white majority prefer-
ences reflected in state legislation, he or she need not look further
than the anti-desegregation provisions enacted by several southern
states in 1956. In the first three months of that year, Alabama,
Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia adopted no less
than 42 pro-segregation measures. 364 In enacting a version of Vir-
ginia's interposition plan, Alabama actually used the words "null,
void, and of no effect" to describe the Brown decisions.365 South
Carolina avoided the word "nullification" but passed a resolution
356 Woodward, supra note 318, at 153 (quoting statement of Ernest Vandiver, Georgia
Lieutenant Governor).
311 See id. at 154.
358 Id. By that time, school segregation laws were toppled in Florida, Arkansas,
Tennessee and Texas. See id. at 153-54.
359 Id. at 154-55.
360 See id. at 155.
361 See id.
362 Id. at 156 (noting that "[i]t was Senator Harry F. Byrd [of Virginia] who called
upon the South for 'massive resistance'...33 id.
364 See id. Several other measures were pending in 1956. See id. By July 1956, 12
new segregation bills had been approved by the Louisiana legislature. See id.
365 Id. Georgia also adopted the "null and void" approach. See id.
406
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with a defiant "condemnation of and protest against the illegal en-
croachment of the central government.
'366
In addition to these more or less rhetorical gestures
of defiance, four states bluntly proclaimed a policy
of open resistance by imposing sanctions and penal-
ties against compliance with the Supreme Court's
decision. The Louisiana legislature would withhold
approval and funds from 'any school violating the
segregation provisions' of its laws. Georgia made it
a 'felony for any school official of the state to
spend tax money for public schools in which the
races are mixed.' North Carolina would also deny
funds to local authorities who integrated their
schools, and Mississippi made it unlawful for the
races to attend publicly supported schools together
a the high school level or below. Both Mississippi
and Louisiana amended their constitution to pro-
vide that to promote public health and morals their
schools be operated separately for white and Negro
children.367
The Southern defiance would lose continually in the courts be-
tween 1954 and 1964,368 but the result of this defiance was clear in
the realm of public education. One decade after Brown I, only 2.3
percent of the Southern black schoolchildren attended desegre-
gated schools. 369 Segregation in places of public accommodations
was falling, but at an unsatisfactory rate.370 Despite the Supreme
Court's announcement in 1963, that "it is no longer open to ques-
tion that a State may not constitutionally require segregation in
public facilities," 37' resistance continued. If the courts were declar-
ing some vision of race-blindness in the law, it was met with a
fight for pure race-consciousness at every comer. In 1964, it would
366 Id. at 157.
367 Id. at 157-58.
368 For a discussion of school desegregation cases, see Berger, supra note 298, at 133-
142.
369 See Graham, supra note 332, at 372-73.
370 See Berger, supra note 298, at 130.
371 Johnson v. Virginia, 373 US. 61, 62 (1963). See also Berger, supra note 298, at
130-31.
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not be the colorblind Constitution that would end the madness.
When Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, colorblindness
through federal legislation seemed the answer. In terms of public
accommodations, the Act required that "All persons shall be enti-
tled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation.., without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin. ' 372 The
Supreme Court upheld these provisions as a proper exercise of
power under the commerce clause in Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States373 and Katzenbach v. McClung.374 Following the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the patience of the federal
courts with respect to segregation grew thin.
375
White domination reflected in state legislative action was le-
gally dead after the Civil Rights Act of 1964,376 but did this end
the issue of "colorblindness" in government action? In the South,
resistance continued to take the form of violence against African-
Americans. 377 Schools in the South were not yet integrated. Of the
acts passed by Congress in the 1960s that affected civil rights-
The Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Immigra-
tion Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968-none re-
ferred to a specific class of individuals to which to grant protec-
tion. But as the federal government began in the late 1960s and
early 1970s to enact race-conscious measures in an effort to help
minorities achieve equality, it would be simplistic to assert that we
somehow shifted from being color-blind to color-conscious. 378
372 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1994).
373 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
374 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
375 See Graham, supra note 332, at 373.
376 Discrimination and segregation still flourished despite changes in the law, but no
longer did either the Constitution or the federal government permit such activities. See
Woodward, supra note 318, at 186-87.
377 See id. at 184-186.
378 Nathan Glazer made this assertion in 1983 in Nathan Glazer, Racial Quotas, in
Racial Preferences and Racial Justice: The New Affirmative Action Controversy 5 (Rus-
sell Nieli ed., 1991) [hereinafter Racial Preferences and Racial Justice].
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Affirmative action first began as a goal to "try harder"-to do
something more than merely prohibit discrimination.379 The time
frame overlaps with the efforts to end discrimination.380 Color-
blindness between the two types of action by the government had
some oblique meaning. The first-prohibition of discrimination by
the Constitution (protected by the courts) and prohibition by fed-
eral law-sufficiently counteracted majority dominance in state
action. The second-setting goals to create an equal plane for the
long-repressed minorities-was required by the federal govern-
ment to counteract the effects of the long history of majority
dominance. "Colorblindness" in the judiciary, however, would
take a furtive turn.
"Colorblindness is the insistence in law that the government
should never take race into account, regardless of the context in
which race is used."'381
Four key dynamics distinguish the development of
colorblind jurisprudence: (1) the removal of the his-
torical meaning of race from the analysis of racial
discrimination; (2) the removal of societal dis-
crimination from the analysis of racial discrimina-
tion; (3) the judicial view of race-conscious, racial
justice efforts as harmful stereotyping; and (4) the
judicial excision of race from racial discrimination
379 See id. at 6
("Color consciousness meant, in a term just beginning to come into
use in the middle 1960s, 'affirmative action'-doing more than just
stopping discrimination. Did blacks and other minorities know that
an employer did not discriminate? Seeing very few of their kind
among his employees, did they pass him by in their search for em-
ployment? Did he recruit in high schools, colleges, neighborhoods
where there were very few blacks or other minorities? Did he adver-
tise in media they did not see or hear? Did he make any effort to re-
cruit them into training programs? The employer, the institution,
were expected to try harder, and there were government programs
making it incumbent on both to try harder.").
380 Glazer sees the first instances of color-consciousness in the acts of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), requiring employers to report the numbers
of minorities employed in different job categories. See id. at 5. This first began in 1964.
See id.
381 Tanya Kateri Hernandez, "Multiracial Discourse": Racial Classifications in an Era
of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 Md. L. Rev. 97, 139 (1998). See also T. Alexander Al-
einikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1060, 1063 (1991).
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discourse. 382
Recent cases demonstrate the judicial shift toward a presumption
of colorblindness, and as Colorblind II will discuss, this is at best
impossible in a society that has established the baseline of color-
blindness on a white dominance premise. This "Myth of Color-
blindness '383 serves merely to reinforce race-based privilege, mask
racial disparities, and promote white dominance under a simulta-
neous disavowal of race, or color, in American law.
C. Colorblind II.: A Vicious Circle384
1. The Contrast of Immediate Effects Versus Cautionary and
Deliberate Effects
The Civil Rights Era during the decade of the 1960s ended the
four-hundred-year era of treating blacks in this country as subhu-
man.385 The same majority action in the federal government that
essentially ended state-mandated repression also sought to eradi-
cate the harm caused through steps designed to place blacks in a
position for which they should have been but for the four-hundred-
year repression. Despite these actions, thirty years later, the annual
income of an African-American employed full-time is approxi-
mately 60 percent of that of white Americans. 386 The black unem-
ployment rate nearly doubles that of the entire country.387 The
proportion of African-American male high school graduates to as-
cend to college was lower in 1994 than it was in 1975, with more
young black males in prison than in college. 388 Race-blindness re-
quires that government ignore these facts, placing race "beyond
382 Hernandez, supra note 381, at 141.
383 David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 119.
384 Bernstein's Reverse Dictionary describes "vicious circle" as "problems pile up;
solution of one raises another and leads back to the original one." Theodore M. Bern-
stein, Bernstein's Reverse Dictionary 135 (1975).
385 Dinesh D'Souza quotes contemporary film producer Spike Lee, "[W]hen you're
told every single day for four hundred years that you're subhuman, when you rob people
of their self-worth, knowledge and history, there's nothing worse you can do." Dinesh
D'Souza, The End of Racism 7 (1995) (quoting Barbara Grizzuti Harrison, Spike Lee
Hates Your Cracker Ass, Esquire, Oct. 1992, at 137 (statement of Spike Lee)).
386 See id. at 6 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United





the reach of the government. '38 9
Has white dominance disappeared to such a degree that no
government interest may compel the government-in the eyes of
the Court-to eradicate the effects of racial discrimination? The
answer must be yes, for the Court's preoccupation with the appro-
priate standard of review for racial classifications has not led to an
alternative answer. One century after Plessy, the Fifth Circuit de-
termined that the University of Texas Law School, where "[m]any
of these applicants have some of the highest grades and test scores
in the country," lacked a compelling interest in granting prefer-
ences to minority students. 390 As noted above, 391 four black stu-
dents entered the law school at the University of Texas at Austin
in 1996. The national percentage of blacks in law school in 1997
and 1998 was 6.9 percent, with a total of 9,132 black law students
nationally. 392 In 1998, seven of the eight law schools in Texas
were below the national average, and the total number of black
students at these schools accounted for only 3 percent of the total
number of black law students in the United States. 393 Texas South-
ern University Law School, a traditionally black law school, ad-
mitted more than the combined total of the seven other law schools
in Texas. 394 The same law firm that argued on behalf of Cheryl
389 See Heath Foster, Strategies of Civil Rights Movement Now Work Against It, Se-
attle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 15, 1998, at P1. According to this article, the Washington
D.C. law firm which argued on behalf of the plaintiffs in Hopwood v. Texas in 1996 is
deliberately using NAACP tactics to end affirmative action. See id. That law firm seeks
now to extend the Hopwood ruling nationally, hoping to set a firm foundation against
affirmative action. See id. According to one civil rights leader, "They're just praying that
they get a case that will take them to the Supreme Court. It's obvious." Id.
39  Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934-35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
1996).
91 See supra note 45.
392 See Ranking the Nation's Law Schools According to Percentage of Black Stu-
dents, in J. Blacks Higher Educ., Summer 1998, at 88-89 [hereinafter Rankings].
393 See id. Of the seven schools, Southern Methodist enrolled 51 blacks (6.6 percent);
Texas Wesleyan University enrolled 41 blacks (6.2 percent); South Texas College of
Law enrolled 65 blacks (5.4 percent); St. Mary's University enrolled 40 blacks (5.2 per-
cent); University of Texas-Austin enrolled 70 blacks (4.8 percent); Texas Tech Univer-
sity enrolled 11 blacks (1.7 percent); and Baylor University enrolled four blacks (1.0 per-
cent). See id. The combined total of these schools was 282 blacks students, or 3.1 percent
of the 9,132 blacks enrolled in law schools nationally. See id.
394 Texas Southern enrolled 327 students in 1997-98. See id. The percentage of black
students enrolled was 54.9 percent of the total enrollment. See id. Only Howard Univer-
sity enrolled more black students (362), and only Howard and Southern University (210
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Hopwood and her co-plaintiffs in Hopwood is now arguing on be-
half of a white woman rejected at the University of Washington, 395
where, in 1997-98, only 14 blacks students were enrolled.396
Constitutionally, both the federal and state governments are to
ignore statistics such as these unless there is a clear showing of in-
tentional discrimination on their own part.39 7 Not only are black
Americans the unfortunate victims of a long history of oppression,
they are the victims of the Supreme Court's enlightenment with
respect to racial classifications. First, the Supreme Court's preoc-
cupation with the appropriate standard of review in cases involv-
ing a racial classification stems, in part, from the previous failures
to protect blacks from discrimination. In those previous failures,
racism was an obvious constant, with the white dominance re-
flected in government action. Under today's standard, racism is
generally disregarded; whatever meaning those advocates attach to
"colorblindness" is, in reality, an intentional ignorance of race.
One scholar explains "the colorblind approach" as follows:
All racial classifications are deemed suspect be-
cause racial categories are viewed as inherently rac-
ist.... Supporters of this response would have us
believe that cultural meanings 400 years in the
making will disappear if we prohibit reference to
those meanings in public law and policy. Although
the colorblind approach makes explicit racial cate-
gories unlawful, this does not mean they no longer
exist, nor does it change their meaning.
398
black students) enrolled a higher percentage of blacks at their schools (86.4 percent at
Howard; 64.4 percent at Southern University). See id.
395 See Foster, supra note 389, at P1.
396 See Rankings, supra note 392, at 89.
397 Strict scrutiny requires a government actor to demonstrate past discrimination and
show that its racial classification is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government
interest. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
398 Charles R. Lawrence ItI, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Trans-
formation, Forward to Symposium, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 819, 836 (1995) (footnote omitted). See also supra note 143.
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Yet, as we saw in the first Part of this Article, racism does mean
something different when applied to a black individual and some-
thing else when applied to a member of the white majority. 399 Sec-
ond, history has taught us that, due to racism and white suprem-
acy, the Constitution will either favor blacks or whites, not both.
Plessy and Brown II (the latter to an extent) favored the white su-
premacists, and the effect was immediate. The reason? The domi-
nant majority has the means to see its preferences reflected in state
action. The decisions and government measures favorable to
blacks400 have been met with caution and resistance. By compari-
son, Brown I was a decision favoring blacks, but the effect of the
case was anything but immediate. The reason? The dominant ma-
jority preference of racism counteracted the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. The Hopwood decision-the latest great victory for "color-
blindness"--disfavored blacks, and the effect was again
immediate.
2. Standards of Review, Judicial Politics and the Intentional
Ignorance of Race
Twenty-four years after Brown I, four justices in Bakke made
the bold assertion that the understanding of a colorblind Constitu-
tion was merely an ideal:
[C]laims that the law must be "color-blind" or that
the datum of race is no longer relevant to public
policy must be seen as aspiration rather than a de-
scription of reality. This is not to denigrate aspira-
tion; for reality rebukes us that race has too often
been used by those who would stigmatize and op-
press minorities. Yet we cannot . .. let color blind-
ness become myopia which masks the reality that
399 I say this with reference to Justice Lewis Powell's plurality opinion in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), which held that "[t]he guar-
antee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color." Id. 289-90.
400 This Article has not discussed the higher education cases from the late 1930s to
early 1950s, such as State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938);
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); or McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(1950). It is enough to say (for the purposes of this Article) that each of these decisions
met with extreme resistance from the white supremacists.
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many "created equal" have been treated within our
lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their
fellow citizens. 40
1
Bakke has been either embraced or criticized for a number of rea-
sons, most particularly for Justice Powell's application of strict
scrutiny to racial classifications intended to benefit minorities.
40 2
The analysis embraced by Justices Marshall, William Brennan,
Byron R. White, and Harry Blackmun also began a direct attack on
the concept of colorblindness:
40 3
The assertion of human equality is closely associ-
ated with the proposition that differences in color or
creed, birth or status, are neither significant nor
relevant to the way in which persons should be
treated. Nonetheless, the position that such factors
must be "constitutionally an irrelevance" summed
up by the shorthand phrase "[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind," has never been adopted by this Court
as the proper meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause.404
401 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
402 See id. at 289-291 (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). See also
Richard B. Sobol, Against Bakke, in Racial Preferences and Racial Justice, supra note
378, at 167, 169
("The fundamental analytical error of the court was its conclusion
that the petitioner's special admissions program created a 'suspect'
classification, subject to review under a 'strict scrutiny' standard.
Thus, the university's voluntary efforts to further racial equality were
misjudged by standards developed to protect disadvantaged minori-
ties from majoritarian governmental action that stigmatizes, sepa-
rates, injures, or discriminates against them on the basis of race.").
See also generally Stanley Mosk, For Bakke, in Racial Preferences and Racial Justice,
supra note 378, at 159 (arguing against classifications that disadvantage a majority
V op).
03 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
404 See id. (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941 (Jackson, J., con-
curring); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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In support,40 5 these justices cited a 1971 case, McDaniel v.
Barresi,40 6 where the Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court
because the latter had held a desegregation plan was invalid as it
was not colorblind. Similarly, in Board of Education v. Swann,
407
the Court held that a statute requiring colorblind school-
assignment plans failed as a desegregation remedy since it would
"render illusory the promise of' Brown L408 At the same time,
these justices also recognized that government classifications
should be subject to strict scrutiny, reiterating "the traditional view
that racial classifications are prohibited if they are irrelevant.
'40 9
The important distinction in this concurrence-and one that repre-
sents the battle of protecting minority interests in a majoritarian
government-is the recognition that whites are not a suspect class:
"whites as a class [do not] have any 'traditional indicia of suspect-
ness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraor-
dinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' 41 0
Race-consciousness is required, because "[i]n order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other
way."'411 Justice Marshall summarized his position on race-
conscious remedies:
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that
we now must permit the institutions of this society
to give consideration to race in making decisions
405 The concurring justices also noted that "[o]ur cases have implied that an 'overrid-
ing statutory purpose' could be found that would justify racial classifications." See id. at
356 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)). See also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. Unitea States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v.
United Sates, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
406 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
407 402 U.S. 43(1971).
408 Id. at 45-46. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
409 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). See
also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
art and dissenting in part).
10 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
411 Id. at 407 (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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about who will hold the positions of influence, af-
fluence, and prestige in America. For far too long,
the doors to those positions have been shut to Ne-
groes. If we are ever to become a fully integrated
society, one in which the color of a person's skin
will not determine the opportunities available to
him or her, we must be willing to take steps to open
those doors.412
For a short time, the majoritarian state and federal govern-
ments sought to benefit black Americans in an effort to achieve
equality, and the judiciary exercised self-restraint in shutting the
doors on the compromise.4 13 Granting preferences was subject to a
heightened scrutiny, but the preferences were sufficiently impor-
tant. This view was short-lived. Chief Justice Warren Burger, who
wrote the majority opinion in Fullilove, upholding a federal set-
aside program, retired in 1985 and was replaced by Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist. 414 Justice Rehnquist-who as a Supreme Court
clerk for Justice Jackson in 1952-53 wrote a memorandum sup-
porting the "separate but equal" doctrine 415-had dissented in
412 Id. at 401-02 (separate opinion of Marshall, J.). Justice Marshall would reiterate his
position two years later in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522 (Marshall, J. concurring).
13 Chief Justice Warren Burger, in his opinion for the Court in Fullilove, quoted Jus-
tice Robert Jackson, a supporter of judicial restraint:
The Supreme Court can maintain itself and succeed in its tasks only
if the counsels of self-restraint urged most earnestly by members of
the Court itself are humbly and faithfully heeded. After the forces of
conservatism and liberalism, of radicalism and reaction, of emotion
and of self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process and av-
eraged and come to rest in some compromise measure ... a decision
striking it down closes an area of compromise in which conflicts
have actually, if only temporarily, been composed. Each such deci-
sion takes away from our democratic federalism another of its de-
fenses against domestic disorder and violence. The vice of judicial
supremacy, as exerted for ninety years in the field of policy, has been
its progressive closing of the avenues to peaceful and democratic
conciliation of our social and economic conflicts.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490 (quoting Robert Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy
321 (1979)) (alteration added).
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Fullilove rested on the power of Congress
to recognize remedies appropriate under the Constitution. See id. at 490. He had joined
Justices Stevens, Potter Stewart, and William Rehnquist two years earlier in Bakke. See
generally Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14  See Oxford Companion, supra note 259, at 709.
415 See id. at 715.
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Bakke and was at that time the most conservative justice on the
Court.4 16 Replacing Justice Rehnquist as Associate Justice was
Antonin Scalia, whose views are more conservative than even
Chief Justice Rehnquist's views.4 17 The third of President Ronald
Reagan's appointees to the Court, Anthony Kennedy, replaced
Justice Powell and concurred in Croson one year later.
41 8
If the methodical conservative court-packing caused the Equal
Protection Clause to render government essentially powerless to
eradicate social differences, the appointments of Justices
O'Connor and Thomas by Presidents Reagan and Bush, respec-
tively, further solidified the Court's attitude. In fact, a number of
commentators view the retrenchment in antidiscrimination law as
the result of the 1980s Reagan-led white backlash against institu-
tions perceived as sympathetic to black interests. 419 Justice Tho-
mas' contribution to the affirmative action cases has not been as
substantial, but the mere fact that the only black American Justice
opposes affirmative action does not bode well for those advocating
more government power to help the cause of equality.420 Justice
O'Connor is best known in affirmative action decisions for her ad-
herence to the standard of strict scrutiny for all racial classifica-
tions;42' ironically, she succeeded Justice Stewart, who had dis-
sented in Fullilove explicitly on the grounds of colorblindness.
422
O'Connor's adherence to strict scrutiny has been highlighted by a
rigid application of the language of strict scrutiny, and this can be
seen in her concurrence in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
416 See id. at 709.
417 See id. Not suprisingly, Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in both Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) and Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
418 In Justice Anthony Kennedy's first term, he voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist in
90 percent of the cases and with Justice Scalia in 89 percent of the cases. See Oxford
Companion, supra note 259, at 483.
419 See David Kairys, Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race, 45 Am. U. L. Rev.
729, 735 (1996).
420 I say this on the basis of impromptu and informal discussion about affirmative ac-
tion. More often than I had expected, opponents of affirmative action argued Justice
Thomas' position, implying that if the only African-American on the Supreme Court op-
poses affirmative action, it must be a violation of equal protection. See, e.g., Cose, supra
note 263, at 101-02, 210; West, supra note 242, at 35-39.
421 See Byrne, supra note 259, at 619.
422 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-23 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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tion.423 Justice O'Connor rejected the view of Justices Marshall,
Brennan, and Blackmun in Bakke that strict scrutiny must serve an
"important government objective" if it is "substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. '424 Although she finds that the
distinction between a "compelling" and "important" government
interest "may be a negligible one," 425 Justice O'Connor has never
found a compelling government interest in a case involving the al-
location of government benefits or preferences.42 6 In Wygant,
O'Connor also rejected the arguments that a government has an in-
terest in remedying "societal discrimination"-"that is, discrimina-
tion not traceable to its own actions"-because it is not "suffi-
ciently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict
scrutiny. '4
27
Justice Marshall defended the lesser standard in both Wygant
and Croson in dissent. His rejection of the "compelling interest"
standard had become a minority view on the Court, but as he noted
in Wygant, "it should not matter which test the Court applies.
What is most important, under any approach to the constitutional
analysis, is that a reviewing court genuinely consider[s] the cir-
cumstances of the provision at issue. '428 When the Court struck
423 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Wygant involved a collective
bargaining agreement where African-American teachers were given a preference in the
event of a layoff over other teachers. See generally id.
424 See id. at 285 (quoting Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 359 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.)).
425 Id. at 286.
426 This is true of Wygant, 476 U.S. 267; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 508 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 200 (1995).
This is true, to an extent, of the racial gerrymandering cases. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
427 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
428 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall showed the need for
preferences for the African-American teachers originating in 1969, when the minority
representation of teachers was 3.9 percent in that district. See id. at 297. The board took
affirmative steps towards improving the number of minority teachers-by 1971, the per-
centage had increased to 8.8 percent-but the necessity of faculty layoffs would have
reversed the trend since the minority teachers had no seniority. See id. at 298. At least 80
percent of the union was white, but the union nevertheless ratified the collective bargain-
ing agreement six times. See id. at 299. Marshall refrained the issue to the Court:
The sole question posed by this case is whether the Constitution pro-
hibits a union and a local school board from developing a collective-
bargaining agreement that apportions layoffs between two racially
determined groups as a means of preserving the effects of an affirma-
418
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down a plan in Richmond, Virginia apportioning 30 percent of its
contracting funds to minority businesses, Marshall struck back one
last time in rebuttal:
It is a welcome symbol of racial progress when the
former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly
to confront the effects of racial discrimination it is
midst.... The essence of the majority's position is
that Richmond has failed to catalog adequate find-
ings to prove that past discrimination has impeded
minorities from joining or participating fully in
Richmond's construction contracting industry. I
find deep irony in second-guessing Richmond's
judgment on this point. As much as any municipal-
ity in the United States, Richmond knows what ra-
cial discrimination is; a century of decisions by this
and other federal courts has richly documented the
city's disgraceful history of public and private ra-
cial discrimination. 429
It almost seems a foregone conclusion that "colorblindness" had
assumed a contraposition with affirmative action. No longer was
the Court's interpretation merely Equal Protection jurisprudence.
It had become, in itself, affirmative action jurisprudence.
tive hiring policy, the constitutionality of which is unchallenged.
Id. at 300.
429 Croson, 488 U.S. at 528-529 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Marshall
continues,
[T]he Richmond City Council has supported its determination that
minorities have been wrongly excluded from local construction con-
tracting. Its proof includes statistics showing that minority-owned
businesses have received virtually no city contracting dollars and
rarely if ever belonged to area trade associations; testimony by mu-
nicipal officials that discrimination has been widespread in the local
construction industry; and the same exhaustive and widely publicized
federal studies relied on in Fullilove, studies which showed that per-
vasive discrimination in the Nation's tight-knit construction industry
had operated to exclude minorities from public contracting. These
are precisely the types of statistical and testimonial evidence which,
until today, this Court has credited in cases approving of race-
conscious measures designed to remedy past discrimination.
Id. at 529 (emphasis in original).
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[T]oday's decision marks a deliberate and giant
step backward in this Court's affirmative-action ju-
risprudence. Cynical of one municipality's attempt
to redress the effects of past racial discrimination in
a particular industry, the majority launches a grape-
shot attack on race-conscious remedies in general.
The majority's unnecessary pronouncements will
inevitably discourage or prevent governmental enti-
ties, particularly States and localities, from acting to
rectify the scourge of past discrimination. This is
the harsh reality of the majority's decision, but it is
not the Constitution's command. 430
Justice O'Connor rejected Justice Marshall's characterization
that she views "racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of
past" or that "government bodies need no longer preoccupy them-
selves with rectifying racial injustice. ' 431 She defended her version
of strict scrutiny by attacking the lesser standard advocated by Jus-
tices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun. 432
[Justice Marshall's] watered-down version of equal
protection review effectively assures that race will
always be relevant in American life, and that the
"ultimate goal" of "eliminat[ing] entirely from gov-
ernmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as
430 Id. at 529-530 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
431 Id. at 494. Justice O'Connor explained that "States and their local subdivisions
have many legislative weapons as their disposal both to punish and prevent present dis-
crimination and to remove arbitrary barriers to minority advancement." Id.
432 See id. at 494-95.
("Under the standard proposed by Justice Marshall's dissent, 'race-
conscious classifications designed to further remedial goals,' are
forthwith subject to a relaxed standard of review. How the dissent ar-
rives at the legal conclusion that a racial classification is 'designed to
further remedial goals,' without first engaging in an examination of
the factual basis for its enactment and the nexus between its scope
and that factual basis, we are not told. However, once the 'remedial'
conclusion is reached, the dissent's standard is singularly deferential,
and bears little resemblance to the close examination of legislative
purpose we have engaged in when reviewing classifications based on




a human being's race" will never be achieved.433
Curiously, Justice O'Connor's view seems to indicate that the
standard of judicial review will determine the equality of govern-
mental action. 434 She defends judicial inquiry of the remedial ac-
tion by the fact that Richmond's population at the time Croson
was decided was 50 percent black, thus refuting the argument that
the judiciary should protect these blacks because they are not a
"discrete and insular minority. '435 Bad facts indeed lend them-
selves to bad law. That Richmond's city council was comprised of
a black majority "would seem to militate for, not against, the ap-
plication of heightened judicial scrutiny .. . [J" thus turning the
problem of majority rule dominating a minority on its head.
436 Jus-
tice O'Connor twice cited John Hart Ely, a proponent of affirma-
tive action, because his suspect class concern hinges on majority
rule.437 Croson presented an unusual case where the white major-
ity had not placed a burden on itself; instead "a law that favors
Blacks over Whites [is] suspect if it were enacted by a predomi-
nantly Black legislature.
'438
One year later, Justice O'Connor offered an eight-page expla-
nation that strict scrutiny should be the appropriate standard of re-
view of federal government programs. 439 Once again, under her
433 Id. at 495 (internal citations omitted, first alteration added, second alteration in
ori inal).
43, Justice O'Connor would later comment,
The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is ir-
relevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a
mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable
claims of past wrongs. "Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent
of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority
groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbi-
trary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classi-
fications ...."
Id. at 505-506 (quoting Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
296-97 (1978)).
435 Id.
436 Id. at 496.
437 See John Ely, Democracy and Distrust 170 (1980); John Ely, The Constitutionality
of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 739 (1974) [hereinafter Ely,
The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination].
438 Croson, 488 U.S. at 496 (quoting Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, supra note 437, at 739).
439 See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602-610 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dis-
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view, strict scrutiny would have struck down an affirmative action
program. 440 She claimed,
This dispute regarding the appropriate standard of
review may strike some as a lawyers' quibble over
words, but it is not. The standard of review estab-
lishes whether and when the Court and Constitution
allow the Government to employ racial classifica-
tions. A lower standard signals that the Government
may resort to racial distinctions more readily. 441
Justice O'Connor, and her vision of "colorblindness" won in 1995,
as she wrote the majority opinion requiring strict scrutiny for all
racial classifications, including those proscribed by the federal
government. 442 The Adarand decision does little to change the fo-
cus of the evolved "colorblind" argument. It merely extended strict
scrutiny to the federal government.443
A remedy for societal discrimination will not pass under strict
scrutiny; that much is certain. 444 What must also be certain is that
societal discrimination may exist while every legislative actor,
state and federal, is powerless to eradicate it, unless the govern-
ment actor has sufficient and convincing evidence that the societal
discrimination has been reflected in the government action. 445
Does this contradict the erroneous principle that "[i]f one race be
inferior to the other socially, the constitution of the United States
senting).
440 See id. at 602-603.
441 Id. at 610.
442 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
443 See id. at 255-256 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens berated Justice
O'Coimor's majority opinion for the latter's failure to recognize precedence in the two
previous affirmative action cases, Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, and Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 256 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
444 See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[A] government agency's interest in remedying 'societal' discrimina-
tion, that is discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently
compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny."). See also Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (noting that the
Supreme Court has consistently rejected remedying "societal discrimination" as a basis
for affirmative action).
445 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. (A government actor "must ensure that ... it has
convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted."). See also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at
950.
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cannot put them on the same plane"? 446 Unlike the Constitution in
1896, the Constitution today prohibits such dominance to be re-
flected in government action, but does it also prohibit the govern-
ment to do anything more? To find a compelling government in-
terest, the government actor must look to its own actions and
initiatives to find compelling evidence that the societal discrimina-
tion has been reflected in its decisions in order to eradicate the ef-
fect of the discrimination. Without such evidence, the government
must turn its back on societal discrimination; a government actor
who takes notice of the discrimination must intentionally ignore
any societal racism or discrimination. "Our Constitution is color-
blind" are merely words, and the maxim is another example of the
Court treating "some of the language [the Court has] used in ex-
plaining [the] decisions as though it were more important than
[the] actual holdings.
'447
3. Some Indicia of Colorblind II Jurisprudence
McClesky v. Kemp was one of the early Supreme Court cases
to champion the colorblind ideal as more significant than the real-
ity of racial discrimination in the constitutional analysis of the
equal protection claim.448 The McClesky court reviewed a habeus
corpus petition that claimed the Georgia capital sentencing process
was administered in a racially discriminatory manner. McClesky
supported his claim with statistics from a study (the "Baldus
Study") covering over two thousand Georgia murder cases from
the 1970s. 449 Although the study contained reliable data clearly
demonstrating that on the basis of race, black defendants were
more likely to receive the death penalty than were whites, and that
the lives of white victims were seen as more valuable than the
lives of the black victims, the Court refused to acknowledge that
the process at issue could have been infused with racism. 450 In-
stead, the court imposed a narrow "intent to discriminate" standard
on the defendant, effectively barring any historical data of racism
to enter the courtroom discussion. 451 McClesky, in what the author
446 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
447 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 255-256 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
448 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See also Strauss, supra note 383, at 140.
449 See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 286-287.
450 See id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
451 Id. at 293.
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considers as the apex of Colorblind II jurisprudence, extended the
Court's "myopic" approach to racial discrimination demonstrated
in the Washington v. Davis case 11 years prior.452
The Court stated that historical evidence must be reasonably
contemporaneous with the challenged decision; official actions
taken long ago is of little probative value to show evidence of cur-
rent intent.453 By doing so, the Court disengaged history from
claims of racial discrimination for the purpose of pursuing a color-
blind aim. The ideal of reaching for a colorblind society was held
to be more relevant to the constitutional analysis at issue in
McClesky than were the realities of racial discrimination in the ap-
plication of the death penalty. 454 The Court's colorblind ideal is
revealed by its desire to ignore the clear systemic indications of
racial bias and its preferences for searching for an individual with
particularized discriminatory intent.455 In turn, the great esteem
that the Court places on colorblind (jurisprudence) obscures the
harms stemming from the status quo existence of race-based privi-
lege in the life-and-death context of McClesky.456
Affirmative action questions the settled expectations whites
have because they are white; therefore, the affirmative action con-
text particularly highlights the link between the jurisprudential
preference for colorblindness and its consequent reinforcement of
race-based privilege. 457 As discussed previously in Part II(B), Cro-
son demonstrated the Court's narrow search for particularized dis-
crimination rather than societal discrimination. This blatant disre-
gard for the harms of societal discrimination is clearly reflected in
the race neutral strict scrutiny test applied, which inevitably treats
racial discrimination redress as just as discriminatory as the actual
racial discrimination itself.
Four years after Croson, the Court's colorblind jurisprudence
forwarded the premise that forthright considerations of racial dif-
ference also are a form of stereotyping that is again just as harmful
452 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
453 See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 321.
454 See id. at 314-19.
455 See id. at 292.
456 See id. at 312.
457 See Harris, supra note 329, at 1779.
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as acts of discrimination.458 Shaw v. Reno challenged reappor-
tionment in North Carolina congressional districts that proposed
the creation of new districts to strengthen minority votes.459 White
voters challenged the plan. The Court held that racial reappor-
tionment made solely for the purpose of strengthening minority
voting was a race-based stigma and served to segregate citizens on
the basis of race.460  This effectively established race-
consciousness, not colorblindness as the Court required. In effect,
the Supreme Court appeared to demand that racist practices re-
solve themselves without any affirmative action acknowledgment
that racial bias is at work.
461
In its effort to enforce colorblind jurisprudence, the Shaw
Court was willing to ignore the facts that there had not been a sin-
gle black member of Congress from North Carolina since Recon-
struction and that white residents persisted in their refusal to vote
for black candidates. 462 To state the case in concrete terms, the co-
lorblind approach maintained bloc voting by whites. 463 Aside from
doing for whites what the Court says cannot be done for blacks,
Shaw preserves white privilege in the name of colorblindness and
raises the principle of colorblindness to such an apex of negativity
that any attempt to redress racial discrimination will be thwarted
by the Court.464 While McClesky demonstrated this unparalleled
height of irrational jurisprudence in a life-and-death matter, the
very same principle today threatens the future of our nation's edu-
cational system as exemplified in the colorblind Hopwood deci-
sion.
458 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
459 509 U.S. 630.
460 See id. at 657.
461 See id. at 659. (White, J., dissenting).
462 See id.
463 See Theodore Reuter, The Politics of Race: African Americans and the Political
Ss tem 5, 6 (1995).
See Hemandez, supra note 381, at 151
("The Court's position conflates the solidarity effects of racial op-
pression with actual racial bias and obfuscates the actual manifesta-
tions of racial discrimination. The MCM [Multicultural Category
Movement] also confuses the solidarity effects of racial discrimina-
tion with racial stereotyping when it disregards a sociopolitical view
of race in favor of a cultural view of race.").
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4. Turning a Colorblind Eye in the Fifth Circuit and
Elsewhere: The Hopwood Decision
The progression in the Supreme Court's development of color-
blind jurisprudence laid the groundwork for the radical Hopwood
v. Texas decision in 1996.465 This decision is considered radical
because it is a departure from Supreme Court precedent estab-
lished in Bakke, and because it is the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of the direction of the colorblind jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court.466 The Fifth Circuit held, ignoring Supreme Court prece-
dent, that race could not be used as even one of a multiplicity of
factors in law school admissions, because it was inappropriate to
continue elevating some races over others to the "detriment" of
whites, even to correct a perceived racial imbalance in the student
body.467
When the Fifth Circuit extended the strict scrutiny analysis to
the University of Texas Law School in rejecting UT's affirmative
action admissions process, the staggering result was not merely the
statistical drop in students but the immediacy of the decline. Not
only was the effect felt at the law school-it enrolled four black
students in 1997 and eight in 1998 468-but it expanded throughout
much of the state. In 1997, only one student of 200 entering the
medical school at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center in Dallas was black, down 90 percent from 1996.469 Even
private universities felt the impact, such as Southern Methodist
University in Dallas, which saw its minority enrollment cut in half,
to 11 percent in 1997.470 The trend continued in 1998. Of the
49,000 undergraduates at the University of Texas at Austin, only 3
465 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
466 See generally id.
467 Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1996) (opinion of Ginsburg, J., respect-
ing the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari.).
4 See supra note 45 (discussing the effects of the Hopwood decision on black en-
rollment at the University of Texas Law School).
469 See Jayne Noble Suhler, Affirmative Action Case Has Ripple Effect: UT South-
western, SMU Say Black Enrollment Down, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 21, 1997, at
19A. The source indicating the decrease in enrollment was University President Kern
Wildenthal. See id.
470 See id. The source indicating the decrease in enrollment was Leon Bennett, legal
counsel for SMU. See id.
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percent were African-American. 471
The Hopwood Court hinged its rejection of a dual system of
admissions on the rejection of two familiar arguments: it rejected
diversity as a compelling government interest,472 and it failed to
find that the affirmative action admissions process was designed to
remedy the effects of past discrimination. 473 The rejection of di-
versity also rejected the plurality opinion of Justice Powell in
Bakke, who said "attainment of a diverse student body.... clearly
is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education.... The freedom of a university to make its own judg-
ments as to education includes the selection of its student body.
474
Moreover, it rejected Justice Powell's assertion that race may be a
"plus" in admissions, where other criteria are considered equal.4 75
According to the Fifth Circuit,
[w]ithin the general principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the use of race in admissions for di-
versity in higher education contradicts, rather than
furthers, the aims of equal protection. Diversity fos-
ters, rather than minimizes, the use of race. It treats
minorities as a group, rather than as individuals. It
may further remedial purposes but, just as likely,
may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fuel-
471 See Christy Hoppe, Building on the Past: UT's First Black Student Returns as
Alumni Leader to Help Draw Blueprint for Future, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 9, 1998,
at IA.
472 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 (noting that "[n]o case since Bakke has accepted di-
versity as a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny analysis").
473 See id. at 955.
474 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978)
(Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). See also Leslie Yalof Garfield, Hop-
wood v. Texas: Strict in Theory or Fatal in Fact, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 497, 504 (1997).
475 See Garfield, supra note 474, at 504-05.
For example, assume two applicants, one minority and one non-
minority, have the same UGPA and MCAT scores. Under Justice
Powell's opinion, an admissions committee can offer admission to
the minority applicant before it offers admission to the non-minority
applicant since a diversity viewpoint "plus" UGPA and MCAT score
is of more value to the school than a non-diversity viewpoint an the
same 'objective' test scores.
Id. at 505 n. 36 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
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ing racial hostility.476
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning then indicates that the distinction be-
tween blackness and whiteness is no longer a distinction recog-
nized by the courts, regardless of the formation of the beliefs and
behavior of persons of different races.477 "The use of race, in and
of itself, to choose students simply achieves a student body that
looks different. Such a criterion is no more rational on its own
terms than would be choices based upon the physical size or blood
type of the applicants. ' 478 While social science and political theory
appreciate that "being black" fosters particularized thoughts and
beliefs due to membership in a repressed minority group, "[tjhis
assumption, however, does not withstand scrutiny. '479
A rejection of "being black" as an assumption able to justify
race-consciousness on the grounds of diversity would not have
been so appalling, but the rejection of the school's asserted "pre-
sent effects of past discrimination" as a compelling reason to im-
plement the affirmative action admissions program renders "color-
blindness" into something more of "turning a (color) blind eye" to
the problems of race.480 The District Court acknowledged three
present effects of past discrimination as (1) a "lingering reputation
in the minority community ... as a 'white school;"' (2) minority
under-representation in the student body; and (3) a perception that
the law school was a hostile environment for minorities. 481 None
476 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
477 See Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) ("Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behavior reflect their
background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate benefits
and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines
how they act or think."). See also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946.
478 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
479 See id. at 946. According to the Hopwood court, "The assumption is that a certain
individual possesses characteristics by virtue of being a member of a certain racial
roup." Id. This is the assumption the court rejected. See id.
80 Id. at 952. "[T]he relevant governmental discriminator must prove that there are
present effects of past discrimination of the type that justify the racial classifications at
issue .. " Id. The Hopwood court quoted a Fourth Circuit case, Podberesky v. Kirwan,
38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1128 (1995): "To have a present
effect of past discrimination sufficient to justify the program, the party seeking to im-
plement the program must, at a minimum, prove that the effect it proffers is caused by
the past discrimination and that the effect is of sufficient magnitude to justify the pro-
ram." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952 (quoting Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153).
8, Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F.Supp. 551, 572 (W.D. Tex. 1994). See also Hopwood,
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of these garnered recognition of a compelling interest to aid
blacks, even if these present effects were reflections of the white
dominant majority at the law school. 4
82
The statistics show some resulting negative effects of the
Hopwood decision, and the case itself says little for the future of
affirmative action in the courts. The courts seem to be setting up a
certiorari "demand" for Supreme Court review, since there is cur-
rently a see-saw effect in the district and circuit courts on the issue
of diversity as a compelling interest. Perhaps an argument could
be framed where racial diversity created a compelling interest, but
the argument would most likely be one advocating Justice Pow-
ell's argument in Bakke and rejecting the Fifth Circuit's analy-
sis. 483 Unless there is a strong indication that a government entity,
within a fact pattern before the Supreme Court, can document sub-
stantial present effects of past discrimination, affirmative action
programs will lose continuously in the judiciary.
Furthermore, Hopwood has opened the door in California,
Florida, Michigan, Virginia, Georgia, Oklahoma, Ohio, Washing-
ton, and New York for attacks on admission policies in higher
education and on affirmative action in general. Since Hopwood,
this "colorblind" movement has reached far beyond the boundaries
of Texas and the Fifth Circuit, as discussed in detail in the next
78 F.3d at 952.
482 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-55.
483 See Garfield, supra note 474, at 512-513 (noting that the District Court in Hop-
wood embraced Justice Powell's vision of diversity while the Fifth Circuit rejected it). In
five recent cases, various lower federal courts have rendered conflicting opinions regard-
ing whether student body diversity can be a compelling enough interest to survive strict
scrutiny analysis. Compare Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 (concluding that diversity cannot
be a state interest compelling enough to meet the "steep standard of strict scrutiny"),
Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (ruling in accord with Hopwood), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (ruling, in accord with Hopwood, that diversity is not a
compelling state interest for purposes of admission to the University of Michigan Law
School, and disagreeing with the earlier ruling in its companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger,
122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000), which held that diversity is a compelling state
interest for the purposes of admission to the University of Michigan proper), with Smith
v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000)
(ruling that diversity can be a compelling state interest, at least until the Supreme Court
overrules that part of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke that so recognizes it), and Gratz,
122 F. Supp. 2d at 820 (disagreeing with Hopwood and ruling, in accord with Justice
Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke, that diversity is a compelling state interest).
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Part. Within Texas, back-and-forth opinions from the Texas Attor-
ney General's office and a pending appeal on the Hopwood deci-
sion have caused further tension within the higher education ad-
missions framework.
484
III. THE AMERICAN 'LEGAL' DILEMMA... 485 To BE CONTINUED
A. The Concrete Costs of Diversity
The Hopwood case argued affirmative action as a remedial
measure, as United States District Court Judge Sam Sparks, in
agreement with the law school, put it, to "remedy the legacy of the
past which has left residual effects that persist into the present"
and which can be seen "in the diminished educational attainment
of the present generation" of blacks and Mexican-Americans resi-
484 Jeffrey Selingo & Stephen Burd, Texas Attorney General Rescinds Opinion Bar-
ring Race-Exclusive Scholarships, Chron. Higher Educ., September 17, 1999, at A44.
Selingo and Burd discuss Texas Attorney General John Comyn's rescission of his prede-
cessor Dan Morales' 1997 legal opinion on the Hopwood decision's bar on Texas col-
leges offering race exclusive scholarships. See id. Cornyn, while withdrawing the prior
interpretation of Hopwood as too broad, has also cautioned colleges not to change their
financial-aid policies as yet. See id. Cornyn bases this advice on the absence of clear
guidance from the Court at this time. See id.
85 In 1944 Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist, published a massive study he un-
dertook at the request of the Carnegie Corporation. This book, entitled An American Di-
lemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944), became one of the most
influential studies presented at the time on the Negro problem in America. See also supra
text accompanying notes 235-36. Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Ar-
nold Rose, compiled an epic tome concerned with one pervasive, unifying theme. This
theme asserted that white Americans experienced a troubling dilemma because of the
discrepancy between the hallowed "American Creed," whereby they think, act, and talk
under the influence of egalitarian and Christian precepts, and the oppressive way they
treated Afro-Americans. See David Southern, Gunnar Mrydal and Black-White Rela-
tions: The Use and Abuse of An American Dilemma, 1944-1969 xiii (1987). Myrdal
hailed this dilemma as America's greatest scandal, and predicted that this moral dilemma
would soon force fundamental changes in American race relations. Myrdal was not with-
out credibility, and eventually morality won in the form of Civil Rights legislation. How-
ever, passage of this legislation did not ensure compliance by the white majority with the
"American Creed," necessitating intervention by the courts. Not surprisingly, Americans
were forced by the courts to reconcile its blatant racist practices with the words of equal-
ity under the Constitution and subsequent legislative acts through legal channels, creating
an ever increasing and complex American legal dilemma. In 2001, the Court and the leg-
islature have run the gamut of civil rights legislation, remedial action, racial preferences,
and diversity selectivity, only to find themselves further mired in a continual cycle of
racism and an American "legal" dilemma.
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dent in the state of Texas, a state which had not only been a slave-
holding state but a Jim Crow state, complete with segregated edu-
cational systems. 486 This argument could not be sufficiently justi-
fied by the law school.
Justice Powell would have argued, as in Bakke, that an institu-
tion of higher education must have the latitude to select a diverse
student body. Justice Powell meant not mere racial diversity, but a
broader diversity that results from a class made up of students of
different races, geographical and cultural backgrounds, and special
talents and abilities-students that can contribute "something that
a white person cannot offer. ' 487 Because diversity was the founda-
tion on which the edifice of affirmative action in admissions had
for so long been built, the Fifth Circuit's ruling sent shock waves
through the world of higher education.48 8 Those officially desig-
nated as minorities for purposes of affirmative action have under-
gone what must feel like an ongoing experiment at the hands of
higher education. 489 This experiment has not been without costs,
both immediate and far-reaching.
1. Texas Schools following Hopwood
While the battle over racial diversity in the courts has centered
on the question of a compelling government interest, the real battle
in Texas has been for state lawmakers to maintain a minority
population at its more prestigious institutions. Hopwood began to
place Texas schools at a competitive disadvantage for recruiting
minority students who could benefit from affirmative action pro-
grams in other states. 490 Texas Attorney General Dan Morales,
who openly opposes affirmative action, released an Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion interpreting the Hopwood decision to bar affirma-
486 See Terry Eastland, Ending Affirmative Action: The Case for Colorblind Justice
75-76 (1996).
487 Id. at 78. See also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
322-23 (1978) (commenting on Harvard College's admission process).
488 See Tanya Kateri Hemandez, "Multiracial Discourse": Racial Classifications in an
Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 Md. L. Rev. 97, 107 (1998).
489 See id. at 145-46.
490 See Christy Hoppe, UT Regents Vote To Appeal Hopwood Case, Dallas Morning
News, May 14, 1998, at I A (quoting Don Evans, the chairman of the University of Texas
System Board of Regents, as saying, "Right now, there's one standard for Texas and a
standard for all the other 49 states. We think that's unfair.").
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tive action programs in admissions and scholarship programs at all
Texas public schools. 491 When the University of Texas regents
voted to appeal the Hopwood decision, Morales said that the "most
compelling argument" that he would approve would be that Texas
schools are at a competitive disadvantage because out-of-state
schools were in a better position to recruit minority students with
their affirmative action programs.492 Morales' successor as Texas
Attorney General, John Cornyn, has since issued a statement re-
scinding the office's earlier opinion on Hopwood.493 Comyn
agrees with college officials and state legislators in Texas that the
previous application of the Hopwood decision to include race-
based financial aid as well as race preferences in college admis-
sions is too broad an application, absent clear guidance from the
Court.494 Cornyn has advised Texas institutions of higher educa-
tion to maintain the status quo regarding policies on admissions
and financial aid pending further appeal of the issues decided in
Hopwood.495
However, maintaining racial diversity in a "colorblind" sys-
tem, although not compelling by judicial standards, nevertheless
appears to be a costly endeavor. Out-of-state schools not affected
by the Hopwood decision have won the "bidding wars" for Texas
minority students. 496 For example, in response to perceived legal
vulnerability, as early as April 1996, privately operated Rice Uni-
versity abandoned its race-sensitive admissions program.497 As a
result, the percentage of blacks in the freshman class dropped from
10 percent in 1995 to 7.7 percent in 1996 and to 4.2 percent in
491 Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. LO 97-001 (1997). See also Hoppe, supra note 490, at IA
(quoting Texas Attorney General Dan Morales as saying, "In my judgment, if minorities
are to succeed in the next century, it will not be based on the continued reliance on these
artificial crutches."); Jayne Noble Suhler, Affirmative Action Case Has Ripple Effect:
UT Southwestern, SMU Say Black Enrollment Down, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 21,
1997, at 19A.
492 Hoppe, supra note 490, at IA (quoting statement of Texas Attorney General Dan
Morales).
493 See Jeffrey Selingo & Stephen Burd, Texas Attorney General Rescinds Opinion
Barring Race-Exclusive Scholarships, Chron. Higher Educ., September 17, 1999, at A44.
494 See id.
495 See id.
496 Hoppe, supra note 490, at IA.
497 See News and Views, J. Blacks Higher Educ., Summer 1999, at 11.
432
Colorblind I/Colorblind II
1997.498 After the 1998 fall term (with lowered minority enroll-
ment) had begun at Texas schools, lawmakers began to realize the
key to maintaining a diverse classroom was to offer more scholar-
ship and grant money.499 Texas A&M University showed an ap-
proximately 20 percent decrease in the enrollment of blacks and
Hispanics, forcing the university to design an intensive review
process to mitigate the loss of scholarship funding and the result-
ing reduction in the ability to attract students of color.
500
One commission, the Texas Commission on a Representative
Student Body, comprised of educators and business leaders, called
for the Texas State Legislature to contribute more than $500 mil-
lion for financial aid, scholarships and grants for minority stu-
dents.501 The Commission recommended "that need- and achieve-
ment-based grants go to students from disadvantaged
backgrounds, regardless of race or gender. However, because low-
income and first-generation college students are disproportionately
black or Latino, such a program could also help increase minority
enrollment. '502 Law-makers would later claim this amount was too
costly, but legislators indicated there would be an increase in funds
for aid to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. 50 3 The com-
mission also recommended building partnerships with private
groups not bound by constitutional restraints, simplifying the fi-
nancial aid process at the state schools, and giving technical col-
lege degrees greater recognition in determining admissions stan-
498 See id.
499 See Renee C. Lee, Funding Called the Key to Minority Enrollment, Fort Worth
Star-Telegram, Sept. 30, 1998, at 1.
500 See Bonnie Ortiz, If the Truth Be Cold, Black Issues Higher Educ., August 19,
1999, at 109.
501 See Suhler, supra note 491, at 33A
("Money is the main reason minority and low-income students do not
enroll in college, according to the commission's report .... Of the
students who do enroll, including first-generation students, many
leave before they earn a degree .... 'A student from a family with
an income above $75,000 a year has an 86 percent chance of entering
college before age 24, while a student from a family earning less
than $10,000 per year has a 38 percent chance,' the report says.").502 Id.
503 See Associated Press, College Aid Plan Seeks Too Much, Lawmakers Say, Dallas
Morning News, Oct. 16, 1998, at 33A.
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While affirmative action challenges are not limited to the fol-
lowing states, it is these states that have set the precedent both in
the past and for the present time. States such as Maryland are sim-
ply forbidden to distribute race based financial aid (scholarships)
to students, which has left enrollment down, and in the "de-
cree's" '50 5 wake, a scramble to find alternative methods to boost
enrollment and keep minority students. Other states, like Califor-
nia and Michigan have been entangled in litigation and legislative
action, which has seized the purse strings of even the most selec-
tive admission processor.
"The University of California-which has the distinction of
being the nation's leading producer of minority graduates, could
soon become the first state university system to have re-segregated
voluntarily. ' 50 6 In 1995, the University Board of Regents voted to
ban affirmative action in the admission process. As a result, en-
rollment of Latinos and blacks at the university's most selective
campuses is lagging far behind where it was before the ban. In just
a two-year period following the ban, applications from blacks
dropped 25 percent, and from Latinos, 31 percent.
50 7
California schools also have Proposition 209 and the Regent's
SP-1 action, which mandate "colorblindness" in the admission
process, with which to deal.508 In California, in 1996, more than 54
percent of the voters approved Proposition 209, a constitutional
amendment. 509 This amendment basically sought to eliminate
preferences from state affirmative action programs. The Proposi-
504 See id.
505 See Ortiz, supra note 500, at 109.
506 Cheryl D. Fields & Michele N-K Collision, Shameful Occurrences, Black Issues
Higher Educ., August 19, 1999, at 106.
507 See Ortiz, supra note 500, at 109.
508 See id. For analysis of Proposition 209, see California Legislative Analyst, Analy-
sis of Proposition 209, available at <http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/htm/BP/
209analysis.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 2001). For the text of SP-l, see The Regents of the
University of California, Policies Ensuring Equal Treatment Admissions (SP-I), avail-
able at <http://www.ucop.edu/regents/policies/spl .html> (visited Feb. 5, 2001).
509 See Corinne E. Anderson, A Current Perspective: The Erosion of Affirmative Ac-
tion in University Admissions, 32 Akron L. Rev. 181, 209-10 (1999).
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tion had a dramatic effect on admissions of minorities. For exam-
ple, Boalt Hall, the University of California at Berkeley's law
school, which had admitted an average of 24 black students per
year prior to Proposition 209, admitted only one in 1997.510 Fol-
lowing this, bills were proposed in thirteen states to eliminate af-
firmative action programs, though none were enacted. 511
Proposition 209 has aroused many doubts as to its constitu-
tionality, its potential conflicts with federal law, and its alleged
withdrawal from state and local authorities the authority to enact
programs that "inure to the benefit" of minorities and women.
51 2
This "political participation" argument, advanced by the American
Civil Liberties Union, stems from a 1982 Supreme Court decision
that struck down a Washington state initiative forbidding busing
for racial integration (which had been mandated by the Seattle
school board), while allowing it for nonracial purposes.513 The
November 1998 Washington initiative was approved by Washing-
ton voters and banned any racial preferences by any agency of the
state government including state universities.51 4 While the situa-
tion in Washington included minorities but not women, the fun-
damental problem with the argument drawn from the case lies in
the assumption that preferences in public employment, education,
contracting, and busing, really do "injure to the benefit" of minori-
ties and women. The troubling note here is that the voters in Cali-
fornia and Washington and the judges on the Fifth Circuit say
preferences, hence affirmative action programs, must not. Affirma-
tive action, however, is a term that encompasses both preferential
and non-preferential procedures. 515 The colorblind rule that propo-
sitions such as Proposition 209 introduced debated whether or not
there might be some circumstances in which race should be a fac-
510 See John E. Morris, Boalt Hall's Affirmative Action Dilemma, Am. Law., Nov.
1997, at 4.
511 See Jodi Miller, Note, "Democracy in a Free Fall": The Use of Ballot Initiatives to
Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 1, 9.
512 See Anderson, supra note 509, at 212.
513 See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) ("The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees racial minorities the
right to full participation in the political life of the community.").
514 See Steven A. Holmes, Victorious Preference Foes Look for New Battlefields,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1998, at A25.
515 See Anderson, supra note 509, at 221-24.
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tor in the assignment of public benefits (affirmative action), and in
terms of whether, even if there are such circumstances, we are bet-
ter off with a rule forbidding preferences.516
In October 1997, the University of Michigan was privy to its
first reverse discrimination suit. The white plaintiffs in the case of
Gratz v. Bollinger,517 as in Hopwood, alleged racially discrimina-
tory admission processes in the university's undergraduate and law
school admission procedures. 518 In August 1999, a three-judge
panel overruled two previous decisions and agreed to allow black
and Latino students to become defendants in the case. 51 9 These
students were introduced as defendants by defenders of affirmative
action to show the grave harm the students may be subjected to if
the plaintiffs won the suit, including loss of access to the univer-
sity system in Michigan. According to attorneys on the case, this
would be the first time that these students would have the opportu-
nity to present the truth about racism, bias, and the inequality that
continues to saturate higher education. 520 Concerning the possible
loss of affirmative action in admissions on the campus, former
President Gerald Ford, alumnus of Michigan State, reminded the
public that future college students should not suffer the cultural
and social impoverishment that afflicted his generation.521
The University of Georgia, in October 1999, announced that it
would keep its racial-preference policies despite legal advice that
they were unconstitutional. 522 Georgia's president, Michael F. Ad-
ams, told a campus forum that affirmative action in admissions
was needed to overcome the legacy of segregation in the state and
that until 1987 the school was under a court order to desegre-
gate.523 Georgia has been sued in federal court for bonus points it
516 See id.
517 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
518 See id.; Noteworthy: 6th Circuit Court Says Black and Latino Students Can Join
Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, Black Issues Higher Educ., August 19, 1999, at 108.
See also supra note 483.
519 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999); Noteworthy, supra note
518. See also supra note 483.
520 See Noteworthy, supra note 518.
521 See id.
522 See Peter Schmidt & Patrick Healy, U. of Va. Poised to Limit Race-Based Admis-




adds in an admission formula for borderline minority applicants. 524
Campus officials expect a federal judge to strike their affirmative
action policies.525 Other elite public universities are reviewing
their affirmative action admissions policies to assess the continued
feasibility of such programs in the wake of the Court's seeming in-
tolerance of racial preferences and swing towards colorblind ad-
mission policies.526
Meanwhile, as racial preferences in student admissions have
been successfully banished or drastically reduced to hopefully
avoid a lawsuit such as the University of Georgia's, racial prefer-
ence policies in admissions continue to thrive in the nation's pri-
vate universities. In particular, the use of race as a qualifying fac-
tor in student selections is deeply embedded in the policies of the
nation's most sought-after private universities such as Yale, Har-
vard, MIT, Stanford, and Duke.527 Primarily, this is because suits
challenging racial preferences have been brought under the Four-
teenth Amendment, referring to state operated universities as in-
strumentalities of the state.52 8 The basis for suit of a private uni-
versity's affirmative action policies must be found in a statute,
government regulation, or judicial precedent. 529 While opponents
of affirmative action may imply that private institutions are bound
by the Court's recent rulings, in reality, legal advocates of color-
blind admissions prefer to target the state schools where their legal
case rests on the far more secure terrain of clear constitutional lan-
guage. 530
524 See Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2000); Schmidt & Healy, supra note 522, at A40.
525 See Schmidt & Healy, supra note 522, at A40.
526 See id. (noting the University of Virginia's consideration of race in admissions and
the findings of a committee of the university's Board of Visitors).
527 Theodore Cross, Why the Opponents of Racial Preferences Haven't Taken Amer-
ica's Private Universities to Court, J. Blacks Higher Educ., Summer 1999, at 106.
528 See id. at 107.
529 See id.
530 See id. at 110.
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B. Class-Based Affirmative Action
531
Also in the wake of Hopwood, the concerns of educators and
lawmakers in Texas to maintain diversity have created a debate
over class-based, 532 as opposed to race-based, affirmative action
programs designed to provide aid to those economically disadvan-
taged rather than those disadvantaged on factors such as race, gen-
der, or ethnicity. 533 Such programs shift focus away from race and
focus primarily on social economics as a factor in determining the
allocation of government benefits and burdens. 534 In a 1996 speech
531 The Association of American Law Schools in 1997 held a Workshop on Achieving
a Diverse Student Body in a Time of Retrenchment: Rising Controversy and Renewed
Commitment. It was held against the backdrop of the Hopwood decision, as well as a de-
cision by the University of California regents to prohibit racial preferences in admis-
sions, and California's adoption of Proposition 209, prohibiting race- and gender-based
preferences in public education. The papers in the December 1997 issue of the Journal of
Legal Education were based on presentations made at the workshop. See Introduction to
S2mposium, Affirmative Action, 47 J. Legal Educ. 451 (1997).
512 It has been stated that were it not for racism and heterogeneity in this country we
would be more deeply involved in a class war so eminent in many other nations. See
Ellis Cose, Color-Blind: Seeing Beyond Race in a Race-Obsessed World 194-98 (1997)
(discussing class and race in America as well as in foreign countries, not only from a co-
lorblind perspective, but also from an "apartheid" perspective. For example, Cose dis-
cusses Brazil's "race neutral" class system through such comments as "money whitens"
and hints at the emerging theme that class can trump race).
533 See Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. Legal
Educ. 452, 458 (1997).
534 See Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J.
Legal Educ. 472 (1997). Professor Sander uses the University of California at Los Ange-
les as an example of studies showing disparities in academic success with low socio-
economic status:
In 1991 the UCLA law school conducted surveys of its students to
estimate the income, education, and occupational status of their par-
ents. The data showed that most students were from relatively elite
backgrounds; the median income of students' parents was more than
double the national median. A useful, though extreme way of think-
ing about the data is this: if one considers the national population of
people in their twenties, those from families with incomes over
$200,000 were aboutfifty times more likely to end up as students at
our law school than were those from families below the poverty line.
Data from a variety of other sources, including two surveys of a na-
tional sample of law schools, suggest that UCLA is not at all atypi-
cal. A 1995 survey of nearly 6,000 first-year students at 30 law
schools found that 41 percent of the students' fathers and 25 percent
of the mothers had earned graduate degrees. These numbers are close
to the levels we found at UCLA, but they contrast sharply with com-
parable populations in the United States as a whole: among Ameri-
cans aged 45 to 64, 8 percent of men and 4 percent of women have
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delivered by then Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole, the
candidate added his voice to a growing number of individuals who
associate themselves with class-based preferences. 535 A motivating
factor has been that the effect will favor minorities, thus allowing
a colorblind "substitute" for race-based affirmative action pro-
grams.536 "Whether this is viewed as a dodge around prohibitions
on race-based admissions [in education], or as a vital antidote to
the discriminatory, disparate impact of test scores, the connection
between race and class has undoubtedly been the main source of
growing interest in class based affirmative action. '537 Other "ad-
vocates include conservatives like Newt Gingrich and Jack Kemp,
but the roots of the idea go back to civil right stalwarts like Martin
Luther King, Jr. and Bayard Rustin.
538
Professor Deborah Malamud sees the class-based affirmative
action as a "poor tool" both in responding to economic inequality
and in achieving racial goals in education.539 First, she questions
the effectiveness of class-based affirmative action as a poverty
program because many of the persons in the defined "poverty
class" will not meet the minimum standards set by the institutions
of education. 540 Of those who do meet the minimum standards,
"the least disadvantaged of the poor would tend to displace those
members of the next class above the poor-call it the working
class or the lower end of the lower middle class-who have barely
succeeded in qualifying for admission under standard entry crite-
ria. ' 541 Similarly, she finds problems with class-based affirmative
action aiding the "middle class" since the middle class of citizens
graduate degrees. The socioeconomic disparities between American
legal education and American society are comparable to the racial
disparities that existed in the 1940s.
Id. at 475 (footnotes omitted).
535 See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Need-Based Affirmative Action, The Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, November 4, 1996, at 20.
536 See Sander, supra note 534, at 475-76.
537 Id. at 476.
538 Kahlenberg, supra note 535, at 20.
539 See Malamud, supra note 533, at 459, 464.
540 See id. at 460 ("In short, poverty disqualifies many students for class-based af-
firmative action programs by denying them the minimum educational qualifications and
the minimum financial means necessary to attend college or graduate school.").
541 Id. at461.
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is so difficult to define: 542
Take, for example, a comparison between a higher-
paying blue-collar job and a lower-paying white-
collar job-say, a union machinist and a book-
keeper. We tend to agree that the machinist is lower
in status than the bookkeeper; the collar-color line
has a categorical place in many Americans' concept
of class. But a belief in the sanctity of the white
collar is not always enough to overcome a sense
that a higher income makes a person better-off than
a lower one. One reason Americans tend not to
think in terms of a "working class" is that highly
skilled blue-collar workers-the aristocracy of la-
bor-view themselves as, and are largely accepted
as, members of the middle class.
543
Professor Malamud believes the same principles that render
class-based affirmative action problematic to ensure economic
inequality will be even more problematic to achieve racial goals.
First, while there may be a general correlation between economic
disadvantage and minority status, "not all members of the minority
group suffer equal economic disadvantage."'544 Moreover, a race-
based program tends to favor minorities who may not have suf-
fered economic disadvantage-saying nothing about racial disad-
vantage-so the program may tend to disproportionately harm
economically disadvantaged whites.545
It is tempting to think that class-based affirmative
action could succeed where race-based affirmative
action failed-that it could significantly aid the mi-
nority poor. After all, one often hears, the fact that
minorities are disproportionately poor means that
class-based affirmative action will disproportion-
ately help minorities. This is a dangerous miscon-
ception, for two reasons. First, one must remember
that minorities are minorities: there are more white
542 See id.
543 Id. at 462-63 (emphasis in original).




poor people than black and Latino poor people,
even though white poverty rates are lower than
black and Latino poverty rates. Most of the pov-
erty-based affirmative action slots will go to whites,
by simple force of numbers. Second, the basic prin-
ciples of affirmative action weigh against the use of
poverty-based affirmative action as a tool for aiding
the minority poor.... [I]t will be the best-off peo-
ple in the eligible group (here, the poor) who will
be in the position to benefit from affirmative action.
To the extent that minorities are dually disadvan-
taged by their poverty and by their race/ethnicity,
they are the bottom of the bottom and are thus
likely to be underrepresented as beneficiaries of
poverty-based affirmative action in comparison
with their proportion among the poor. Yes, some
poor minorities will get through-albeit (according
to the principle of the return of the repressed) those
whose life experiences are least typical of their
group. But the beneficiaries of poverty-based af-
firmative action will be disproportionately white. 546
Race also proves problematic for aiding the minority middle
class. Professor Malamud's study has shown that the black middle
class "is systematically worse off than the white middle class with
regard to housing, occupational advancement, income and income
security, wealth, educational opportunity, the intergenerational
transmission of middle-class status, and the enjoyment of the pub-
lic dignity that customarily both defines and accompanies mem-
bership in the middle class. ' 547 Moreover, studies have indicated
that standardized test scores of of black candidates with the high-
est socio-economic status are substantially lower than the mean for
lower middle-class white students. 548 If the blacks in the higher
546 Id. at 465 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
547 Id. at 467. See also Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the
Black Middle Class, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 939, 999-1000 (1997).
548 See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admis-
sions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1997) (indicating that the LSAT scores of Af-
rican-Americans from a higher socio-economic status group were lower than those from
whites in a lower status group). See also Malamud, supra note 533, at 467 (discussing
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socio-economic level are not benefited from class-based affirma-
tive action, and do not attain the appropriate admissions scores,
then they are excluded. At the same time, lower middle class
blacks will compete with lower middle class whites for slots in the
class-based admissions. For the same statistical reasons, the whites
will benefit more from the program than the blacks. While not all
minorities will suffer, the system for selection remains dispropor-
tionate, and the likeliness of substantial exclusion of minorities
from the educational selection process seems more likely.549
More problematic than the reasons indicated by Professor Ma-
lamud is that her argument addresses class-based affirmative ac-
tion primarily in educational admissions. It says very little about
such a system in other contexts, such as awarding government
contracts or employment advancement. For example, assume that
there are ten positions open at a government agency, none of
which have traditionally been filled by members of a racial minor-
ity. The position pays an annual salary of $40,000 per year. In a
race-based system, perhaps two positions will be reserved for mi-
norities. If a class-based system replaces the race-based system,
how does a government agency determine the appropriate level of
socio-economic disadvantage of the applicants to determine who
should fill those numbers? Unlike educational opportunity, which
offers the potential of future earnings, employment opportunity
provides immediate and concrete improvement of the socio-
economic level of the person chosen to fill that position. In other
words, it takes either a poor person or a person in the lower middle
class and puts him or her somewhere higher in the middle class.
The person chosen might be black, white, Latino, or otherwise, but
the system seems to be more of an extended welfare system than
one which allows a member of a minority to be in a position for
which he or she would have been but for the long-term discrimina-
tion against the class of persons to which he or she belongs.
Professor Wightman's study).
549 Professor Sander's study favors class-based affirmative action as a means to in-
crease minority enrollment, but a large part of his findings are based on statistical ab-
stracts. See Sander, supra note 534, at 480, 483, 485, 488-89, 490, 493, 494, 496-97.
Colorblind I/Colorblind II
Advocates of class-based preferences seem to make two as-
sumptions. First, they assume that a member of a minority group
that has achieved a certain socio-economic level is no longer af-
fected by societal discrimination. This argument is best left to so-
cial scientists, but it must be questioned at what socio-economic
level discrimination ends. A middle-class African-American can
be subjected to discrimination (or, to the extent blatant racism still
exists, deemed a "nigger") just as readily as a lower-class black
American, but at what point does a middle-class black person
move beyond such discrimination? Similarly, class-based prefer-
ences seem to assume that a middle-class minority has assimilated
with white society to an extent that preferences are no longer war-
ranted. The middle-class minority may or may not face race as a
societal barrier, but that minority no longer faces the economic
disadvantage associated with a racial barrier. If a minority does
face an economic disadvantage due to a racial barrier, the lower-
class minority is placed in the same position as a white American
who does not face the racial barrier.
C. Strivers: Research Points to Alternative Affirmative Action
Researchers at the Educational Testing Service (ETS) and
elsewhere are developing methods that could help admissions of-
fices identify "strivers," those students who score more than 200
points above the average score of students with a similar back-
ground.550 The service is working on a system that would take into
account 14 variables, such as family income, parents' education,
and the rigor of high school courses pursued by the student,551 and
compares the student's test score with that of the school's aver-
age. 552
550 Ben Gose, More Points for "Strivers": the New Affirmative Action?, Chron.
Higher Educ., September 17, 1999, at A55. Factors included in the system may include
race, sex, socioeconomic status of the student's parents, and reporting if the mother
works. See id. Variables considered for the school's index include the location of school,
whether it is an urban or rural school, what percentage of the last high school class went
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Using these systems, students who earned "striver" status
could be given extra considerations in admissions, and the relative
value of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of many mi-
nority students will go up.553 ETS, which administers the SAT, de-
scribes the system as having the potential to alleviate some of the
problems asociated with standardized test scores.554 After all, as-
similation into the white university of a disadvantaged black is a
way to preserve racially diverse classes at a time when affirmative
action is under attack.555 The approach is directed towards reward-
ing the hard worker, not displaying preferences, as traditional af-
firmative action was thought to do. A colorblind version of the
SAT--one that does not take race or ethnicity into account-has
been created, along with one that does consider race and ethnic-
ity.55
6
The proposed system would only help preserve racial diversity
when race is included as a factor, and this inclusion may cause the
system to fall under judicial scrutiny.557 ETS officials explain that
if you want a student body to reflect the general racial composition
of the population, you have to put race in as a factor. 558 The other
problem with strivers is that students who have low test scores
should not be expected to shine in the classroom, since studies re-
veal that lower grades, not higher grades as one might expect, are
the norm, as the same disadvantages of race or parental income are






558 See id. at A56.
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D. "Stereotype Threat; ,559 Thin Ice or Black Ice?560
Not only does assimilation pose a threat to the compensatory
intent of affirmative action, but the "stereotype threat" also places
affirmative action on the brink of disaster:
Over the past four decades black American college
students have been more in the spotlight than any
other American students. This is because they are
not just college students; they are a cutting edge in
America's effort to integrate itself in the thirty-five
years since the passage of the Civil Rights Act.
These students have borne much of the burden for
our national experiment in racial integration. And
to a significant degree the success of the experi-
ment will be determined by their success.
561
The 1990s however, have shown that the national college dropout
rate for blacks has been 20 to 25 percent higher than that for
whites, and the grade-point average of black students is two thirds
of a grade below that of whites. 562 Attempts to explain the under-
performance of blacks, even though they go on to do just as well
in postgraduate work and professional attainment as other stu-
dents, has moved away from a class-based analysis to a recogni-
tion that "something racial is depressing the academic performance
of these students. ' 563 This racial force has been labeled the
"stereotype threat," that is, "the threat of being viewed through the
lens of a negative stereotype, or the fear of doing something that
would inadvertently confirm that stereotype. ' 564 As W.E.B. Du
559 Claude Steele, Thin Ice: Stereotype Threat and Black College Students, 44, The
Atlantic Monthly, August 1999, at 44.
560 "Black ice" is a colloquial phrase which refers to a hazardous situation found when
sidewalks and walkways ice over, but the sheet of ice is utterly transparent, and conse-
quently the danger to the casual passerby is not readily seen. "Black ice" can lead to se-
rious slip and fall injuries for the unwary traveler. It is with this in mind that the meta-
phor "black ice" seems most appropriate for those black college students on "thin ice" as
a result of stereotype threat. Just as with black ice, to the casual observer everything ap-
pears in order. However, the real dangers are just below the surface, ready at any mo-
ment to break the step of those unaware of its presence.
561 Steele, supra note 559, at 44.
562 See id.
563 Id. at 46.
564 Id.
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Bois put it, "It is a strange sensation, this double-consciousness,
this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of an-
other. ' 565 These students fall prey to the external force of society's
perception and treatment of their group, despite their hard work
and potential success in college. This can lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy, or to a choice of disassociation and denial of one's race
so as to survive through a psychic adjustment of "disidentifica-
tion. '' 566 Disidentification is a high price to pay to fight what oth-
ers perceive about their abilities, or to perhaps disprove the exter-
nal stereotype threat. One solution offered has been to create
educational niches in which negative stereotypes are thought not to
apply, and to use weekly sessions to minimize racial concerns
among black and white students.5 67
E. Pluralism and Assimilationism Revisited
Class-based preferences are still in the experimental stage,
568
so only time may tell whether they will be effective. Unfortu-
nately, few offer plausible answers. Minorities found themselves
repressed as a result of a system allowing white preferences to be
reflected in the law, until the judiciary disavowed those racist
preferences. One commentator has noted that "a dominant culture
can be relatively unconcerned with a subordinated group's defini-
tion of itself. ' 569 For a time, minorities were able to press their
preferences, and sought to achieve proportional representation.
570
565 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, 16-17 (Fawcett Publications, 1961)
1903).
66 Steele, supra note 559, at 46.
567 See id. at 51, 54.
568 See Sander, supra note 534, at 476 (noting the worthiness of class-based prefer-
ences in achieving racial balance "lies largely in the eye of the beholder.").
569 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
1060, 1083 (1991).
570 See Dinesh D'Souza, The End of Racism 539 (1995)
("There are four possible policy remedies for dealing with persistent
discrimination .... The first approach is to maintain the status quo,
perhaps even to expand the logic of proportional representation for
all racial groups. The approach.., is a radical application of cultural
relativism, which becomes the basis for an enforced egalitarianism
between racial groups. This approach, which necessarily entails ra-
cial preferences, was perhaps necessary and inevitable in the late
1960s-it sought to eliminate comprehensive discrimination against
blacks in many areas, to kick in a closed door. Now such comprehen-
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But just as proportional representation failed in the courts, the in-
ability of African-Americans to assimilate in American society has
also caused it to fail.
Assimilation is not today a popular term. Recently I
asked a group of Harvard students taking a class on
race and ethnicity in the United States what their at-
titude was to the term "assimilation." The large ma-
jority had a negative reaction to it. Had I asked
what they thought of the term "Americanization,"
the reaction I am sure would have been even more
hostile. The "melting pot" is no longer a uniformly
praised metaphor for American society, as it once
was. It suggests too much a forced conformity and
reminds people today not of the welcome in Ameri-
can society to so many groups and races but rather
of American society's demands on those it allows
to enter. Indeed, in recent years it has been taken
for granted that assimilation-as an expectation of
how different ethnic and racial groups would re-
spond to their common presence in one society, or
as an ideal of how the society should evolve, or as
the expected result of a sober social scientific
analysis of the ultimate consequence of the meeting
of people and races-is to be rejected. Our ethnic
and racial reality, we are told, does not exhibit the
effects of assimilation; our social science should
not expect it; and as an ideal it has become some-
what disreputable, opposed to the reality of both in-
dividual and group difference and to the claims that
such differences should. be recognized and cele-
brated. 571
sive discrimination, which stretches across entire sectors of the work
force, is nonexistent, yet we have become used to doing business
through the legerdemain of preferences and relaxed standards. Pro-
portional representation also entails administrative benefits: it estab-
lishes an enforceable arithmetical standard for implementing civil
rights laws.").
571 Nathan Glazer, We Are All Multiculturists Now 96 (1997).
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Nathan Glazer claims that "[m]ulticulturalism is the price
America is paying for its inability or unwillingness to incorporate
into its society African-Americans, in the same way and to the
same degree it has incorporated so many groups. ' 572 Multicultural-
ism is little more than cultural pluralism, yet the ideal of the for-
mer is to educate all races of the different cultures that make up
American society. 573 According to Glazer,
The two nations for our America are the black and
the white, and increasingly, as Hispanics and
Asians become less different from whites from the
point of view of residence, income, occupation, and
political attitudes, the two nations become the black
and the others. The change that has shaken our ex-
pectations for the future of American society is not
the rise of women or of gays and lesbians. It is
rather the change in our expectations as to how and
when the full incorporation of African Americans
into American life will take place. Only twenty
years ago we could still believe that African Ameri-
cans would become, in their ways of life, their de-
gree of success, their connection to society, simply
Americans of darker skin. I still believe that will
happen eventually. But our progress in moving to-
ward that goal, while evident in some respects,
shows some serious backsliding, and more than
that, a hard institutionalization of differences, one
example of which is multiculturalism in American
education. It is not easy to see how these institu-
tionalized differences will be overcome soon.574
If cultural pluralism and assimilationism stand on contradic-
tory grounds as colorblindness and race-consciousness stand in
government action, multiculturalism should face the same analyti-
cal difficulties that race-consciousness faces. Yet the fact is neither
cultural pluralism nor assimilation has been implemented from a
572 Id. at 147.
573 See D'Souza, supra note 570, at 546 ("[In the view of multiculturists], what
Americans have in common is their ethnic and cultural diversity and we should learn to
celebrate that.").
574 Glazer, supra note 571, at 149.
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race-blind perspective, and neither offers a viable solution to the
end of racism. Cultural pluralism perhaps fosters racism, since it
teaches that different cultures and races indeed possess traits that
are different, and supremacy can easily permeate the educational
process. At the same time, assimilation forces upon both blacks
and whites inclusion of the minorities in white society, and the
clash of such forced inclusion has resulted in an incompatible
combination of assumptions. But is indifference to race in public
policy the answer to the race problem in society? The conservative
Dinesh D'Souza concludes that
[t]he black problem can be solved only through a
program of cultural reconstruction in which society
plays a supporting role but which is carried out
primarily by African Americans themselves. Both
projects need to be pursued simultaneously; neither
can work by itself. If society is race neutral but
blacks remain uncompetitive, then equality of rights
for individuals will lead to dramatic inequality of
result for groups, liberal embarrassment will set in,
and we are back on the path to racial preferences.
On the other hand, if blacks are going to reform
their community, they have a right to expect that
they will be treated equally before the law. Al-
though America has a long way to go, many mis-
takes have been made, and current antagonisms are
high, still there are hopeful signs that the nation can
move toward a society in which race ceases to mat-
ter, a destination we can term "the end of ra-
cism." 575
Until "the end of racism," however, we are stuck in a "wait-
and-see" predicament. Wait until blacks become competitive, then
wait to see if the change in black competitiveness alters the white
preference of dominance. In the interim, where racism is still pre-
sent, it should seem "colorblindness" is nothing more than an
ideal; perhaps even pragmatically meaningless. 576 Racism is still
575 D'Souza, supra note 570, at 551.
576 In summary, the meaning of many things have changed-at one time, for example,
"minority" meant, from this author's point of view, a euphemism for primarily a black
2000] 449
450 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 7:3
problematic, and the signs of change do not indicate that race will
not be problematic in the foreseeable future. The American legal
dilemma continues.
IV. SUMMARY: THE RULES HAVE CHANGED AGAIN-A SEMANTIC
APOTHEGMATIC PERMUTATION
Like the term "minority," the term "colorblind" 577 has also
come to mean something different than it once did. It is an
interesting and appropriate note that the term "colorblind," outside
of medical and constitutional commentaries, has not been traced to
any one source during the course of this project which reveals a
definition in this context, yet also during the course of this project,
it has revealed many meanings. Those meanings have permeated
this project, just as racism permeated the American frontier and
society. Gunnar Myrdal called this the "American Dilemma" over
fifty years ago.578 Today, it is still an American legal dilemma,
and it is still as great a threat to the nation as it was then. As long
as the legislature and the judiciary, as well as the electorate grap-
ple with colorblindness, then there will be a continuing American
legal dilemma. Furthermore, as long as the dominant white major-
ity continues to change the rules, the game will be played, fair or
not. 579
person. The term "minority" now can refer to a host of others, including Asians, Hispan-
ics, even women, although in sheer numbers this is a misapplication of the term. While
the author was a student at Yale Law School, minority enrollment had a perceived, un-
written limitation of 10 percent. Originally, this percentage applied to blacks, hence the
"minority". Debate ensued on this subject as the term minority grew to encompass other
groups, but the percentage remained the same. It was often noted that the term, while
benefiting many deserving students, actually came to disadvantage those it was originally
defined to compensate, because as the meaning of the term expanded, the benefits af-
forded to the original group became smaller. (This did not mean that black minority stu-
dents were not supportive of other minorities-that is not the case).
577 The term colorblind in medicine is a defect, "an inability to distinguish between
colors [or] some form of deficiency of color vision." Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing
219-220 (W.B. Saunders Company, 1972). In law, however, it appears to connote perfec-
tion afortiori.
578 See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text and note 485 (discussing Gunnar
Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modem Democracy (1944)).
57 One might argue, and blacks often do, that whenever blacks are "catching up" or at
least appearing to do so, then whites change the rules. For example, when the author's
Army officer father was stationed at Fort Eustes, Virginia in the early 1960s, his two sib-
lings attended segregated schools in Newport News, Virginia. They were both good in
Colorblind I/Colorblind II
In summary, Part I attempted to define the foundations for co-
lorblind and the implications in society which prevent this ideal
from occurring. In Part II, an analysis of the evolution of the term
colorblind was presented through judicial action as noted in Co-
lorblind I and Colorblind II. In Colorblind I, the legislature recog-
nized the white majority dominance while the Court attempted to
prohibit a superior, dominant class of citizens on a constitutional
basis. Colorblind II showed an evolution of the "colorblind" term
to eventually denote a lack of color-consciousness and sensitivity.
Ostensibly, this created an even playing field that did not take into
account the effects of past and present racism. This definition es-
sentially caused race-blindness, and put a new cloak on racism in
America. As expressed by one author,
The claim made by proponents of colorblindness
ultimately becomes an argument about the worth of
race relative to other categories of oppression.
Those who believe that colorblind policies will be
effective are contending that these other categories
(class, income, age, status, etc.) are better measures
of disadvantage than race. I would argue that this
contention generally is not true. If we eliminate
poverty, we will not eliminate racism for the pre-
cise reason that racism was not the focus of the at-
tack. Indeed, we will not even eliminate the inter-
sections between race and class in such situations,
because they are likely to be resistant to purely
class-based attacks.580
The chief difference between Colorblind I and Colorblind II
academics and band. As a result, they performed as part of the segregated school band.
The various school bands, both white and black, marched in ostensibly non-segregated
band contests. It appeared that both black and white bands were competing for the same
awards. However, after a long winning streak by the black bands, the white sponsors and
judges changed the rules. Thereafter, the black bands did not win overall. Many blacks
have stories such as this, but some stories are much worse. The fact that so many blacks
over time have similar stories from different parts of the United States should raise ques-
tions. These stories occurred long before the internet, and long after slave drumming was
outlawed.
580 Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Op-
pression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 162, 180
(1994).
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lies in the underlying meaning of the term colorblind: how it was
initiated, applied, impliedly redefined, and finally, what it now
signifies. This new meaning to the word colorblind is, as shown in
Part III, an essential component or factor in the continuing cycle of
America's struggle with racism, or now, its non-recognition of
race. This Part also emphasizes pluralism and assimilationism as
they relate to race and racism, consequences of the re-invigorated
struggle, and threats inherent in the system.
CONCLUSION
The cases discussed in this Article demonstrate that one of the
most problematic implications of the Court's colorblind theories is
their ahistorical demand for racial symmetry in the implementation
of remedial measures to promote equality. 581 "The cases show that
symmetrical preclusion of race-based factors in legal analysis re-
sults in hierarchical allocation of privilege across race. '582 This
imposition of a racial symmetry theory upon a white dominated
racial caste system furthers asymmetrical treatment of both whites
and blacks. 583 One explanation of colorblindness is putting the
burden on the black to change-to be seen by whites as white.
"Colorblindness is, in essence, not the absence of color, but rather
the monochromatism: whites can be colorblind when there is only
one race-when blacks become white. '584
[H]ere is the perversity of color-blindness-to ban-
ish race-words redoubles the hegemony of race by
targeting efforts to combat racism while leaving
race and its effects unchallenged and embedded in
society, seemingly natural rather than the product
of social choices. If all mention of race, whether
White or Black, remedial or discriminatory, is
equally suspect, the reality of racial subordination
is obscured and immunized from intervention. 585
581 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
1060, 1105 (1991).
582 Tanya Kateri Hernandez, "Multiracial Discourse": Racial Classifications in an Era
of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 Md. L. Rev. 97, 153 (1998).
583 See id.
584 Aleinikoff, supra note 581, at 1081.
585 Ian F. Haney Lopez, White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race 177 (1996).
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"Our Constitution is colorblind" initially meant that white ma-
jority preferences could not and should not be reflected in gov-
ernment action. The maxim now means race should not be re-
flected at all in government action. In effect, colorblindness denies
that race matters. But while racism continues to shape our views as
a society-whether that racism is aversive or blatant, and whether
the effects of racism are tangible statistics or competing views of
the state of American society-nothing can prevent some form of
race-consciousness. Jerome Culp, Jr. ponders,
The question many of you must be asking is: do we
know how to use race consciousness to eliminate
the status quo? The answer is that it depends on the
circumstances. The appropriate race-conscious pol-
icy will depend on how deeply entrenched racial
subordination is in a particular context. The inter-
section of race and other issues of oppression, like
gender and class, also means that fashioning an ap-
propriate race-conscious policy is more compli-
cated than some have assumed; it requires ulti-
mately that policymakers and judges apply practical
policy, instead of simple bright-line rules, to elimi-
nate the consequences of racial subordination.
586
The answer to racism lies somewhere between well-reasoned
"blind" hope and historically-proven skepticism. The compelling
government interest is to end racism permanently, so that govern-
ment need not narrowly tailor a program to fight off the effects ra-
cism continues to have throughout society. We can hope that ra-
cism will no longer permeate to the governmental level, but the
hope is not based upon any indication that it has not and will not
permeate to such a level. Race is a constant, and today's color-
blindness seeks to disregard it.
Those who tell white lies soon become colorblind .... 587
586 Culp, supra note 580, at 195.
587 The author would ask if, in truth, are we telling white lies when we ignore racism?
Perhaps to ignore racism and to follow a colorblind path is no different than to follow a
path covered in "black ice." We need to rethink this apothegm of colorblind, and recog-
nize the hidden dangers it presents.
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